Non-Ideal Practices: An Essay on Ethical Theory and Deliberation by Kubala, Robbie
Non-Ideal Practices: An Essay on Ethical Theory and Deliberation 
Robbie Kubala 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the  
requirements for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 





All rights reserved 
ABSTRACT 
Non-Ideal Practices: An Essay on Ethical Theory and Deliberation 
Robbie Kubala 
What role does ethical theory play in everyday deliberation? On the ideal view, agents are 
taken to have an overriding commitment to a theory that dictates the obligatory, 
permissible, and forbidden actions in every conceivable situation. I argue that the ideal 
view imposes undesirable psychological burdens, whereas a non-ideal view—on which 
agents act according to the norms of their local practices and appeal to theory only when 
those norms prove insufficient to resolve particular problems—does not. Inspired by J. S. 
Mill, I develop one non-ideal theory for practices of regret, toleration, punishment, and 
partiality.  
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Introduction 
 This is an essay about the relationship between ethical theory and deliberation. 
Deliberation—deciding on the basis of reasons—has been around ever since we became capable 
of more than instinctual response to environmental pressure. Ethical theory—a system of 
normative principles, some of which explain others—arrived on the scene much later, perhaps 
with Socrates or earlier religious traditions. Although there are plenty of cultural trends that 
emphasize spontaneity, habit, and unreflective action, everyone agrees that deliberation has some 
place in the good life, whereas many would do without ethical theory altogether. Critics of theory 
often observe that deliberating in the terms of an ethical theory—deciding on the basis of reasons 
of utility, autonomy, virtue, etc.—can work against achieving the very aims set by the theory, and 
defenders of theory typically respond by restricting theory’s deliberative role in various ways. 
But their exchanges presuppose the answer to a prior question, namely what role theory is 
supposed to play in everyday thought. Imagine that someone selects from the menu of theoretical 
options, settling for him- or herself the question of which theory is the correct one. What comes 
next? How should a commitment to that theory guide his or her ordinary life? Though I cannot 
pretend to a full answer, my arguments and discussions here are inspired by, and hopefully derive 
much of their interest from, that very large question.  
 My primary claim in this dissertation is that facts about our limited deliberative capacities 
should constrain both the role that ethical theory plays and the form that ethical theory takes. The 
first constraint is familiar from an older literature—ethical theory should offer a criterion of 
rightness without necessarily playing the role of decision procedure—although my account of the 
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details draws on more recent work. The second constraint is less familiar. Essentially, I hold that 
if theory is non-ideal in form, we can more readily integrate it into our everyday deliberative 
lives than if we take it to be ideal in form. I unpack these claims by way of giving an overview of 
the four chapters of the dissertation.  
 In Chapter 1, I develop a two-level model of ethical psychology that locates our ordinary 
motivating thoughts at the first level and ethical theorizing at the second, more reflective level. 
This model, which I take to be the best way to meet the desideratum that ethical theories should 
guide us without defeating the very aims they set, is common to philosophers as otherwise 
different as R. M. Hare and P. F. Strawson. But there is a crucial difference between them 
concerning theory’s role. For Hare, the second level is normatively fundamental: the only reason 
to have a first level is to implement an ideal criterion of rightness. This means that agents are 
required to reconstruct their everyday motivations and attitudes so as to best implement that 
theoretical criterion. Strawson denies this: the second level does not set an ideal standard but 
serves as a resource for explaining and thereby improving our practices. This means that agents 
are mostly permitted to act according to their local practices and to revise them only where 
problems arise. Adopting Hare’s version of the two-level model, I argue, is bad for us qua 
deliberators: it can cause an unhealthy bifurcation in our thinking, lead to alienation from our 
psychological makeup, and embroil us in rational inconsistency. On my diagnosis, these 
undesirable expected outcomes arise from taking theory to be ideal in form. This in turn 
motivates the idea, which I explore in Chapter 2, that theory should instead be non-ideal in form, 
serving not as an end-state standard of rightness from which we derive what to do in any 
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conceivable situation, but—in the spirit of the pragmatists—as a tool to diagnose problems with 
our current practices and frame hypotheses for how to ameliorate them.  
 Do facts about deliberation constrain the content of theory as well as its form? Here I am 
less sanguine. In a general sense of ‘constraint’, yes: if theory is to be capable of guiding us, then 
we must be able to deliberate in its terms at least sometimes. But nobody would deny that 
conditional (although some would deny the antecedent). In a more specific sense of ‘constraint’, 
no: different ethical theorists offer different fundamental value-orientations—eudaimonia for 
Aristotle, rational nature for Kant, happiness for Mill—and it is implausible to claim that the 
selection of a basic value is entirely settled by facts about deliberation. It is not the case, for 
instance, that in order to count as deliberating at all, we must universalize our maxims. Rather, it 
is an open question, for all we might say about deliberation, which basic value-orientation to 
affirm.  
 Thus although in Chapter 1 I try to remain neutral between competing ethical theories, in 
Chapter 2 I adopt a particular conception of theory’s content. Having argued that (i) theory 
should be non-ideal rather than ideal, I motivate the further claims that (ii) theory should be 
teleological rather than deontological, i.e., that considerations of goodness are the only 
fundamental determinants of rightness, and that (iii) theory should be practice-based rather than 
act-based, i.e., that theory’s criterion of rightness should be applied directly to practices and only 
indirectly to actions. I call the resulting theory Non-Ideal Practice Utilitarianism (NPU), show 
how it can derive a criterion of right action indirectly, and discuss how it fares better than 
standard maximizing act-utilitarianism with respect to practices of regret, toleration, and 
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punishment.  Along the way, I offer readings of Mill and William James, though my primary 1
purpose is not exegetical. Rather, I want to depict the psychology of an agent who might commit 
to these various theories and to evaluate the outcomes of his or her doing so. It turns out that, in 
virtue of its teleological component, adopting NPU requires agents to bracket: not to treat some 
otherwise valid considerations as motivating reasons. But bracketing can seem psychologically 
puzzling, if not downright impossible—how is it possible to act on the basis of a reason not to 
act on the basis of a reason?—and so in the final section of Chapter 2 I respond to these further 
challenges.  
 Chapter 3 offers the lengthiest illustration of NPU, testing the theory against our practices 
of partiality. Here I show how NPU can vindicate our current practices to some degree while 
yielding new reasons to improve. Although I show how NPU offers a distinctive way of 
reconciling our partial commitments with a commitment to impartiality, thereby engaging with 
much recent philosophical discussion of partiality, my primary aim is to show how NPU guides 
deliberation. Chapter 4 considers various objections and replies, then brings the project full circle 
by returning to assess the developed NPU in light of the objections canvassed in Chapter 1. 
 Though my deepest influences are Mill and John Dewey, another of my guiding lights 
throughout is Bernard Williams, although I am inspired more by his general outlook than his 
 I recognize that some philosophers find any mention of ‘utilitarianism’ offensive, in virtue of its 1
apparent reduction of the rich diversity of the thick goods we value to the thin notion of utility. But I 
prefer the term ‘utilitarianism’ to ‘consequentialism’, first, because it better connects my view to its 
historical predecessors (‘utilitarianism’ dates to the 18th century, while ‘consequentialism’ was first 
coined by Elizabeth Anscombe in an article of 1958), and second, because contemporary 
consequentialism, but not Millian utilitarianism, is wedded to the evaluation of consequences under strict 
deontic impartiality, i.e., under the idea that it makes no moral difference who is harmed or benefited (by 
an action). As I discuss further in Chapter 2, what matters to my theory is that rightness ultimately be 
derived from goods, which can be much more complex than pain and pleasure, and that there is a moral 
difference between self and other, i.e., that it makes a difference to my reasons whether, say, I am the one 
feeling vulnerable or you are. 
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particular arguments, which can be opaque. In particular, we are hampered by his own definition 
of theory in Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy: “An ethical theory is a theoretical account of 
what ethical thought and practice are, which account either implies a general test for the 
correctness of basic ethical beliefs and principles or else implies that there cannot be such a 
test” (1985: 72). Several difficulties arise, starting with the most grievous, namely the patent 
circularity of defining an ethical theory as a theoretical account. Relatedly, there is the oddity of 
claiming that the account implies either x or not-x, especially since the ‘negative’ ethical theories 
that Williams only briefly discusses, such as emotivism, all appear to be better classified as meta-
ethical rather than first-order views. These concerns suggest that Williams’ definition is either 
too empty or too broad to be informative. Further, the definition itself seems to presuppose meta-
ethical commitments in appealing to the realist notion of ‘correctness’ as opposed to other 
success terms. Likewise for the cognitivist focus on ‘beliefs’ as opposed to other attitudes. My 
own definition of ethical theory is much more minimal: its essential feature is that it offers a 
criterion of rightness—a ‘test’ of rightness, if you like—whether rightness attaches primarily to 
action or to some other evaluand, such as a motive, rule, or practice. Theories, whether ethical or 
scientific, aspire to explain more with less, in this case with a general principle from which more 
specific recommendations can be derived. Even when theory is understood in these minimal 
terms, however, Williams is resolutely anti-theory, whereas I want to secure a positive role for 
theory that does not fall prey to his many objections. Doing so requires going non-ideal.  
 It is a striking fact about recent philosophy that the debate over ideal and non-ideal theory 
has largely limited itself to political theory. There is admittedly a historical reason for this: it was 
John Rawls, in A Theory of Justice, who first made the distinction vivid, arguing that ideal theory
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—done under the twin assumptions of full compliance with the demands of justice and favorable 
natural and historical circumstances—provides “the only basis for the systematic grasp” of the 
actual pressing problems we face under non-ideal conditions (1971: 9). Yet Rawls himself is less 
ideal than some, since he claims that principles of justice should be tailored to realistic 
conditions of moderate scarcity and limited altruism, and more ideal than others. G. A. Cohen, 
who represents the farthest end of the ideal spectrum, holds that principles of justice are entirely 
independent of material conditions and other factual constraints. Williams, who himself 
represents the farthest end of the non-ideal spectrum, holds that ideal principles of justice are 
completely irrelevant to our real-world circumstances, since they cannot guide us in coping with 
oppressive existing power-structures and inequalities. Most philosophers today fall somewhere in 
between these two extremes: given that, contra Cohen, we want principles of justice to guide us, 
we have to ask precisely which facts are relevant to placing constraints on ideals. In moving the 
feasibility question squarely into ethics, it is my contention that facts about our deliberative lives 
are relevant to constraining our ideals.  
 Here my project intersects with recent work on reasons and guidance, particularly in my 
discussion of bracketing. Yet because my focus is the shape of ethical theory rather than the 
nature of reasons, I adopt a fairly minimal notion of deliberation: we deliberate in terms of a 
theory just when we represent the theory’s considerations in our minds and act on the basis of 
that deliberation. In order to be guided by an ethical theory, we must represent its terms to 
ourselves at some time or another, even if, as I hold, we should not do so at most times. But I do 
not take a stand on the relationship between reasons and (good) practical reasoning, and I avoid 
further complexities concerning the explanation of action, liberated by Anscombe’s dictum that 
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any intentional act can be placed under a myriad of descriptions and the pragmatist dictum that 
the success of inquiry is assessed in terms of the goals of that inquiry. Since my goal is to 
evaluate theories in terms of their effects on our deliberative lives, I have judged it better to 
remain neutral in many of these adjacent debates. 
 To some, it may be surprising that the non-ideal value orientation I adopt is utilitarian. 
Isn’t act-utilitarianism already non-ideal, at least in the sense that it realizes the good flexibly? 
That is, if act-utilitarianism requires taking whatever means are necessary to the overall good we 
can foresee now, then it doesn’t matter whether others are doing their fair share or whether we 
live in utopian conditions. That may be the case, but my objections target the fact that act-
utilitarianism nonetheless sets an ideal criterion of rightness: what really, and finally, justifies our 
actions is that they promote the overall good, and all our motivation and deliberation must be 
instrumental to that aim. As I argue, not only does this offer a distorted picture of our deliberative 
psychology, but the very attempt to approximate that ideal can lead us astray: first, we are not 
entitled to assume that aiming at the ideal and failing is better than not shooting for the ideal at 
all, and second, deliberating in terms of ideals can yield false positives and false negatives in 
identifying problems with our current situation. Furthermore, existing discussions of non-ideal 
theory in ethics have had somewhat different understandings of the concept of the ‘non-ideal’ in 
mind. Non-ideal Kantianism, inspired by Rawls, has tended to focus on our ethical obligations 
under conditions of partial as opposed to full compliance: how far does our duty of beneficence 
extend in a world where most people are clearly falling short? And non-ideal virtue ethics has 
tended to focus on whether eudaimonia is attainable in our actual, unjust world, particularly for 
those subject to oppression based on race, gender, and other socially constructed categories. 
!7
Non-ideal utilitarianism, as I see it, takes the primary concept of the ‘non-ideal’ to be articulated 
in terms of transitional rather than end-state rightness: the goal of non-ideal utilitarianism, as for 
pragmatism more generally, is to make progress away from our imperfect state rather than 
progress toward a perfect state. While questions of compliance and realistic conditions are 
clearly pertinent to this investigation, they are secondary to this reconception of the notion of 
progress.  
 I conclude with one final note on the goals of the dissertation. As a work of philosophy, 
the main labor naturally consists in carving up conceptual space. But whereas political 
philosophy requires us to evaluate and reform real-world institutions, in ethics we can more 
easily attempt to implement the conclusions of theorizing in our own lives. I can only briefly 
report, autobiographically, that the transition away from ideal act-utilitarianism and toward 
accepting Non-Ideal Practice Utilitarianism has been a welcome one. NPU can reconcile the 
conservative thought that our current practices contain much of value with the progressive 
thought that there are innumerable ways in which they could be improved, whereas ideal act-
utilitarianism tends to obsessively belabor the latter alone. In his essay on Mill, Isaiah Berlin 
writes: “He was committed to the answer that we can never tell (until we have tried) where 
greater truth or happiness (or any other form of experience) may lie. Finality is therefore in 
principle impossible: all solutions must be tentative and provisional” (1969 [1959]: 182). I think 
that this fact about ethics is equally true of ethical theorizing, and my hope is that the non-ideal 
theory offered in what follows captures something of that Millian spirit. 
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Chapter One: Construction and Reconstruction in Ethical Theory 
      … the function of theory is not to furnish a  
      substitute for personal reflective choice but to be  
      an instrument for rendering deliberation more  
      effective and hence choice more intelligent.  
       — John Dewey and James Tufts, Ethics  
 The primary aim of ethical theorizing, as I understand it, is to identify a fundamental 
principle, or set of principles, that explains and justifies at least some particular ethical 
judgments.  Ethical theorists differ in how revisionary they are with respect to common-sense 2
morality, but most philosophers who go in for theory at all agree on this primary aim.  A related 3
disagreement—my focus in this dissertation—concerns how theory relates to everyday 
deliberation.  Standardly, ethical theorists want to use their theories to derive what to do in any 4
conceivable situation. They think that agents should have an overriding commitment to 
 In adopting this characterization, I follow Brad Hooker (2000: 4), although I do not rule out, as he does, 2
moral pluralism, which has a plurality of principles at the fundamental level. I do rule out particularism, 
understood as the claim that there are no interesting fundamental moral principles. And although I use the 
terms ‘ethical’ and ‘moral’ interchangeably, both should be understood as referring to the broader domain 
of the good life, as opposed to the narrower domain of, say, what we owe to one another. I hasten to add 
that there are other valuable forms of ethical reflection that do not take the shape of a theory: stories, 
parables, poetry, images, and exemplars. Although in Chapter 2 I will express skepticism about reliance 
on exemplars for moral improvement, I believe that these other forms of reflection can also provide vital 
resources to help us live rightly, though they will not be my focus here. My aim in this dissertation is to 
reconceive the notion of a theory so that it can better serve as such a resource. 
 I cannot pretend to lay exclusive claim to the term ‘theory’, whose definition must at some point be a 3
matter of stipulation. But I do claim that a focus on principles, and in particular (as I discuss shortly) 
criteria, of rightness captures a core sense of the term. Consider the introduction to Three Methods of 
Ethics, co-authored by Marcia Baron, Philip Pettit, and Michael Slote—advocates of Kantian, 
consequentialist, and virtue ethical theories, respectively—“Ever since Socrates (if not before), 
[philosophers] have sought a general criterion or criteria for distinguishing between right and 
wrong” (1997: 1). 
 Why should we be interested in theorizing at all? While some philosophers think that “brute curiosity” 4
should be sufficient to push us to systematize our moral judgments (Hooker 2000: 21), I think the ultimate 
upshot must be practical. First, coming to identify a fundamental principle might help us to settle 
unresolved moral questions (Scheffler 1992). But second, the very attempt to systematize can help us to 
be more consistent in our behavior, where consistency is itself ethically desirable. See also fn. 5 below. 
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following their favored theory. And they hold that because of this commitment, our non-
theoretical, everyday modes of deliberation are justified only to the extent that and because they 
are sanctioned by the theory. I call this combination of claims the Reconstructive view, because it 
aims to reconstruct all our thought and action in light of a theory. There’s a distinct view, 
however, on which agents decide what to do based on the norms of their local practices and use 
ethical theories as tools to improve those practices only when problems arise. On this 
Constructive view, the kinds of questions we can reasonably ask from the perspective of ethical 
theory are limited. In this chapter, I argue against Reconstruction. Because we have to live in our 
ethical house throughout the renovation, we should not attempt to rebuild it from the ground up. 
Rather, as I will discuss in later chapters, we should make improvements to the existing 
structure. 
 Before turning to these two views, I want to set the scene. Even casual observers of 
philosophical practice over the past fifty years know that there is a variety of competing ethical 
theories: utilitarianism, deontology, virtue ethics, contractualism, and so forth. Each theory offers 
a distinct fundamental principle (e.g., ‘an act is right just when, and because, …’) that is abstract 
in content: it appeals to a consideration such as utility, well-being, the virtuous person, 
autonomy, rationality, and so forth. These theoretical considerations are situation-independent: 
they are supposed to apply across the whole range of ethical situations, however those situations 
are themselves identified. But it is not the case that we always deliberate before we act, and it is 
not the case that, when we do deliberate, we always appeal to the considerations offered by 
ethical theories. Ordinary ethical deliberation, when it occurs at all, tends to center around 
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concrete features of immediate situations, such as the perceived desires, needs, and claims of 
others and oneself.  
 These familiar facts give rise to a problem facing ethical theory, namely the deliberative 
role problem: given that the fundamental considerations offered by ethical theory are abstract and 
situation-independent, what role are those considerations supposed to play in everyday ethical 
life? In short, when and how are we supposed to think in terms of an ethical theory? There are 
two extremes to be avoided here, or so I assume. On the one hand, the theory should play some 
first-personal deliberative role, rather than simply offering agents terms in which to approve or 
disapprove of various actions, motives, and lives from a third-personal perspective—theories 
should be more than idle spectators.  On the other hand, the deliberative role played by the 5
theory should not be such as to alienate agents from those things that the theory holds to be good. 
Critics have charged that deliberating in terms of maximizing utility, complying with the 
Categorical Imperative, or emulating the virtuous person undermines the motivations necessary 
for close personal relationships, precludes spontaneous beneficence, and produces a narcissistic 
concern with one’s own ethical merits.  According to these self-defeat objections, thinking in the 6
 As Michael Stocker famously argued, ethical theories require that we “try to embody their reasons in our 5
motives—as opposed to simply seeing whether our or others’ lives would be approved of by the 
theories” (1976: 466). Although Stocker’s is probably the majority position on the question of whether (as 
opposed to how) ethical theory should play a role in deliberation, Clayton Littlejohn has recently 
articulated a contrary perspective: “I’ve always been more sympathetic to the view that says that . . . it 
didn’t matter whether the considerations that figured in our theories were accessible to agents or could 
help agents see what they ought to do” (2016: 727). Although I do not have an argument for Stocker’s 
position, I believe that the project of ethical theorizing would lose much of its import if it never purported 
to offer guidance for agents to lead better lives.
 Besides Stocker (1976), other notable discussions, in the case of consequentialism and Kantianism, can 6
be found in Williams (1981a) and Baron (1984). Doris (1998), Hurka (2001), and Keller (2007) make 
similar objections to virtue ethics, but this issue is complicated by the question of whether virtue ethicists 
actually offer a criterion of right action. For defenses of virtue ethics on this point, see Annas (2008), 
Martinez (2011), and Pettigrove (2011). I should note that my brief list here does not exhaust the kind of 
objections that have been raised toward deliberating in terms of an ethical theory.
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explicit terms of an ethical theory can actually work against achieving the aims set by the theory. 
Trying to follow the theory will defeat one’s ability to carry it out.  
 The best way to respond to the deliberative role problem is to adopt a two-level picture of 
ethical thinking and to restrict the role of ethical theorizing to the second level. This allows that 
agents need not always think in terms of an ethical theory—thus avoiding the self-defeat 
objection—and yet insists that they should sometimes think in terms of an ethical theory—thus 
avoiding the idle spectator objection. The first level would comprise the considerations that 
ordinarily motivate us to act (‘it’s wrong to lie’, ‘I made a promise’, ‘she needs help’), and the 
second level would consist of the more abstract and situation-independent considerations, offered 
by ethical theory, that explain why the first level considerations have justifying force, when they 
do (‘lying violates the Categorical Imperative’, ‘promising evinces the virtue of loyalty’, ‘we 
should alleviate suffering when we do not have to sacrifice anything of comparable ethical 
importance’). The most basic distinction can be drawn in terms of the reasons we act on versus 
the reasons that (ultimately) justify us in acting.  7
 In this chapter, I first develop the elements of the two-level picture shared by the 
Constructive and Reconstructive views (section 1). I then discuss the difference between them, 
which concerns the relation between the two levels. On the Reconstructive view, which I 
associate with R. M. Hare, the first level of ethical thinking has to be justified in terms of the 
second level: what we ought to do is determined from the perspective of ethical theory alone. On 
 For more on the distinction I have in mind, see Star (2015), who distinguishes derivative from 7
fundamental reasons. There are other kinds of ‘two-level’ theory in the literature that should be kept 
distinct, such as Korsgaard’s (1986a) distinction between ideal and non-ideal reasons and Schliesser’s 
(2006) distinction, following Adam Smith, between thick local morality and thin universal morality, 
though my distinction has important affinities with the latter. See the first section of Chapter 3 for much 
more on this. 
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the Constructive view, which I associate with P. F. Strawson, the first level has a default 
justification and the second level is used only as a resource to guide improvement: what we 
ought to do is determined both by our local practices and by ethical theory (section 2). 
Developing arguments from Bernard Williams, I argue that the Reconstructive view is bad for 
agents in various respects: it causes an unhealthy bifurcation in our thinking, leads to alienation 
from our psychological makeup, and embroils us in rational inconsistency. The Constructive 
view avoids these undesirable results (section 3). And although I direct my arguments at 
utilitarian theories, I discuss how they extend to others as well, including recent theories from 
Parfit and Scanlon (section 4). Underlying my arguments is a more basic contention, namely that 
in addition to evaluating ethical theories on what we might call ‘epistemic’ grounds—how well 
they do in fulfilling the primary aim of explaining and justifying the ethical judgments that need 
justification—we can evaluate them on ‘practical’ grounds, in terms of the effects that adopting 
them would have on our lives. In later chapters, I will argue that this assessment of the practical 
role that theory plays in deliberation thereby constrains the form that an adequate ethical theory 
should take.  
1. Two Levels of Ethical Thinking 
 Everyone distinguishes motivating reasons from justifying reasons (sometimes called 
normative reasons). The former are the reasons for which we act: the considerations that spur us 
to choose particular actions. The latter are reasons to act: the considerations that genuinely count 
in favor of actions. I might perform the same act-type, such as giving a dollar to a homeless 
person on the street, for any number of motivating reasons. I might have just found the dollar and 
!13
feel generous, I might believe that I ought to give charity when I can, I might feel moved by the 
sight of the person in need, or I might be feeling guilty about some recent transgression and 
seeking to assuage my conscience. And that act-type might be right for any number of justifying 
reasons, according to different ethical theories. Perhaps I have a duty of beneficence, or I ought 
to be moved by empathy, or the virtuous person would give a dollar in the same situation. The 
point is that our motivating and justifying reasons are often distinct. 
 There is an enormous debate about whether or not motivating and justifying reasons must 
coincide in order for an action to be ethically worthy (Kant famously argued that they must, that 
I must act from duty). But even in cases where they do coincide, and one’s motivating reasons 
really are justifying—I help because I believe I have a duty of beneficence—there is a distinction 
between levels of justification. The fact that I made a promise to help you presumably counts as 
a justifying reason on nearly any view of ethics—the fact of making a promise counts in favor of 
carrying it out, even if other considerations are ultimately weightier—but ‘keep your promises’ 
does not necessarily belong to the fundamental set of principles of an ethical theory. This is 
because there is almost certainly a more fundamental explanation—one that offers the reasons 
that are ultimately justifying—for why one ought to keep one’s promises. And that explanation, 
whatever it is—perhaps it appeals to the general utility of promise-keeping, or the notion of the 
rationality of a perfect duty, or the self-interest of having others keep their promises to you—is 
not likely to serve as a motivating reason for anyone to keep a particular promise. Moreover, 
even if that explanation did motivate someone to keep a promise, there are probably other 
motivating reasons that are more effective in meeting the aims of the ethical theory, such as the 
simpler thought, ‘I made a promise’.  
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 Although I do not think that any general argument can be made for the claim that, for any 
ethical theory, there will always be a gap between motivating and justifying reasons, it seems to 
me that there is a variety of psychological reasons why such a gap will be common in everyday 
ethical life. If, for any action, your motivating reasons are the considerations that most 
proximally or immediately prompt you to act, and your justifying reasons are the considerations 
that you would sincerely offer, to yourself and to others, to make your action defensible, then 
there are any number of situations in which these will come apart.  Consider the following non-8
exhaustive list:   
 Unthinking Action: I spontaneously jump into a lake to rescue my partner from  
  drowning, without any thought at all about what makes my act right. 
 Inappropriate Motive: Dropping to my knee to propose marriage to my (now-safely  
  rescued) partner, I think of how our marriage will contribute to aggregate  
  happiness, when I should just be thinking of my partner.  
 Telic Indirection: Although I believe that the aim of golfing with my partner (now  
  spouse) is to spend time together outdoors, I find that I best achieve that  
  aim by playing to win, and hence am motivated by competition.  
 Indeterminate Justifying Reason: My spouse has convinced me that utilitarianism is 
  the correct ethical theory. But utility is too indeterminate a justifying reason to  
  motivate me in particular cases.  9
 I say you would offer these reasons ‘sincerely’ in order to exclude contexts in which we are wrongly 8
trying to persuade others, or ourselves, of our own praiseworthiness or lack of blameworthiness. 
 These examples come from Williams (1981a), Stocker (1976), Railton (1984), and Mill (1991), 9
respectively.
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It might seem that we could map the distinction between motivating and justifying reasons onto 
the two levels of ethical thinking, but, unfortunately, matters are not so simple, because justifying 
reasons can have varying levels of justification. Recall that, as I characterized it, the second level 
of ethical thinking consists of the more abstract and situation-independent considerations, offered 
by ethical theory, that explain why first level considerations have justifying force. So the second 
level of ethical thinking contains the reasons that ultimately justify us in acting (utility, 
autonomy, rationality, virtue, and so forth). Other reasons (keeping promises, telling the truth, 
lending a hand) are less fundamental but nonetheless justifying—they render our actions 
defensible to others—but because these are often the reasons for which we act, they belong to the 
first level of ethical thinking, the level of the considerations that ordinarily motivate us to act. 
 With this clarification in mind, we can see why the specific content of each level of 
ethical thinking will vary from person to person. Some people might have no second level, 
because they never even have occasion to reflect on what makes their actions justifiable. Young 
children, for instance, may have no conception of why they have to perform the actions their 
caretakers recommend. On the other hand, some adults might have very complicated second 
levels, because their reflections on what makes actions right take the form of a theory, or aspire 
to.  Some theorists might also have more developed first levels, because they are motivated by 10
the kinds of considerations that do not enter into others’ thoughts. And what is a justifying reason 
for one person might be a motivating reason for another, or the same person at a different time—
 Clearly the distinction between the two levels of ethical thinking is not entirely precise, because it is not 10
always clear whether someone has a theory, or what degree of structure to one’s justifying thoughts would 
be necessary for those thoughts to count as comprising a theory. Insofar as my aim here is to ask what role 
a fully-fledged ethical theory should play in the psychology of an agent who adopts it, I do not need to 
draw a precise distinction. 
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I might refrain from telling a lie because it occurs to me that lying hurts your feelings, whereas 
you have no need for such a motivating thought because you are never even tempted to lie.  
 Given this understanding of the first level of ethical thinking as comprising one’s 
motivating reasons, and the second level as comprising the ultimately justifying reasons offered 
by ethical theory, it will be helpful to introduce two new terms for distinguishing these levels. 
Here I want to map the two levels onto the better-known distinction between decision procedures 
and criteria of right action.  A decision procedure is, in the most general terms, a method for 11
choosing what to do. Some worry about the notion of a procedure, typically because of the 
mechanical or calculative connotations of the term (e.g., Annas 2004). But the more neutral term 
‘method’ admits of a range of interpretations, from acting on pure instinct—such that we could 
speak of an animal’s decision procedure—to acting on a fully-specifiable algorithmic function. 
On a broad understanding of the term, every agent has a decision procedure, one which takes as 
inputs the considerations that ordinarily motivate him or her.   
 A criterion of right action is the most fundamental principle of an ethical theory.  12
Speaking loosely, a utilitarian criterion holds that an act is right just when it brings about the 
greatest aggregate happiness (or, for consequentialists, the best outcomes more generally); a 
Kantian criterion that an act is right just when it is sanctioned by the Categorical Imperative (or, 
for deontologists, in accord with our moral duties more generally); and a virtue-ethical criterion 
 To my knowledge, Bales (1971) was the first to make this distinction explicit, though it plays a role in 11
utilitarian theorizing going back to Bentham and Mill. Baron (1984) and Keller (2007) employ the 
distinction in characterizing deontology and virtue ethics, respectively, although it is more controversial 
within those ethical traditions. 
 Although I speak in this chapter of criteria of right action, strictly speaking these could be criteria of 12
rightness as applied to any evaluand. Some theorists want to identify criteria of right rules, or character, or 
motives, or institutions, etc. 
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that an act is right just when it would characteristically be performed by the virtuous person 
under the circumstances. These criteria purport to fulfill the primary aim of ethical theorizing: 
they explain why we should be confident in our various ethical judgments, by offering 
considerations in terms of which we can assess the rightness of our actions, and justify those 
judgments from a more impartial point of view. (I discuss impartiality at greater length in 
Chapter 3.) 
 So far, a criterion of right action is merely a piece of formalism. What role does it play in 
the life of an agent? As the self-defeat objection suggests, criteria are not always suitable to serve 
as our motivating reasons: deliberating in terms of maximizing utility, complying with the 
Categorical Imperative, or emulating the virtuous person can undermine the motivations 
necessary for close personal relationships, preclude spontaneous beneficence, and evince a 
narcissistic concern with one’s own ethical merits. Inappropriate Motive, above, reflects this. But 
even if we think at the first level most of the time, the second level can nonetheless play a 
deliberative role in its conditional impact. As agents, we have various commitments, to our 
professions and projects, to other people, to ethical ideals and outlooks. Many of these 
commitments play a role at the first level of ethical thinking: we are motivated directly by our 
projects, relationships, and ideals. But we also have beliefs, whether explicitly or only tacitly 
held, about the conditions under which we would revise those commitments. 
 Consider a romantic relationship. Although common parlance occasionally refers to 
‘unconditional love’, in fact most of our personal relationships are conditional in various ways. If 
your partner underwent a radical personality change, or joined a wildly offensive radical cult, or 
(to take a more homely example) simply stopped loving you, you might well stop loving them, at 
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least over time. These possibilities suggest that your love is conditional on your partner’s 
continuity of personality, political affiliation, and degree of affection for you, and that after 
reaching some (hopefully distant) threshold along each of these dimensions, you would 
eventually cease to love him or her. These conditions are justifiable, but others are not. If you 
were to stop loving your partner if he gained ten pounds or got a new haircut, he might quite 
reasonably find this distressing. These just aren’t the kinds of conditions that, by themselves, 
merit a withdrawal of affection. Even if you and your partner have a perfectly contented 
relationship now, you might well face problems if you were seriously prepared to leave him 
under those conditions.    13
 I propose to understand criteria of right action in the same way, as principled conditions 
under which we would revise our ethical outlooks. It is a familiar fact of ethical life that people 
more often agree about what to do than why to do it.  You and I might both agree that we ought 14
to vote in the midterm elections, though we have different views about what justifies voting. 
Similarly, we more often agree about why to do something—we agree on our justifying reasons
—than about the conditions under which we would continue to act on those justifying reasons. 
We both believe that we should vote because we have a civic duty, but you believe that duty is in 
place only when one candidate is clearly preferable to the others, whereas I believe that the duty 
to vote exists even when every candidate is equally hateful. The same structure can be used to 
describe a disagreement between, say, Kantians and rule-consequentialists about lying. In most 
 There are tricky questions, which need not detain us here, about what the upshot would be if your 13
partner never learned of your conditional criteria. They would almost certainly have some dispositional 
behavioral effects, so the problem would be averted only if those dispositions were never actualized. 
 As Appiah (2006: 71) aptly puts it, “We can live together without agreeing on what the values are that 14
make it good to live together; we can agree about what to do in most cases, without agreeing about why it 
is right.”
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particular cases, the two will agree that lying is wrong, but they will differ about the conditions 
under which lying in general is wrong. Understanding criteria of right action as commitments to 
change one’s behavior when certain conditions obtain is essential to my claim that we can assess 
ethical theories on practical grounds as well as on epistemic grounds.  15
 To summarize: on any view of ethical theorizing, we need to distinguish two levels of 
ethical thinking—in order to avoid the self-defeat and idle spectator objections—and we need to 
understand the second level not merely as a piece of formalism but as a commitment on the part 
of the agent. The theory has to ‘get inside’ the agent, and once it does we can ask about the 
practical effects that such a commitment might have. In the next section, I distinguish 
Reconstructive and Constructive views of the relationship between the two levels before going 
on to argue that since the former has negative effects on an agent who adopts it, it should be 
rejected. 
2. Reconstruction vs. Construction  
 On the Reconstructive view, associated with Hare, we ought to be committed to the 
second level of ethical thinking alone. In fact, the only value the first level has is to provide a 
decision procedure for implementing the deliverances of the second level. Put in terms of 
reasons: what we have reason to do is decided by the second level only. On the Constructive 
view, which I associate with Strawson, we ought to be committed to both levels; neither should 
automatically have deliberative priority. Our first level thinking has value independently of our 
second level thinking, although the second level justifications can aid us in improving the first 
 I would certainly not deny that many debates about the content and formulation of particular criteria of 15
rightness can proceed without reference to agents’ psychologies. 
!20
level. Put in terms of reasons: what we have reason to do is decided by both levels of thinking 
and varies with our aims.  16
 The main impetus behind the Reconstructive view is to take a fully worked-out second 
level (i.e., an ethical theory) and attempt to develop a first level of ordinary ethical thinking that 
will allow agents to implement the criterion of right action. This is why I call the view 
‘reconstructive’: our motivations must be rebuilt, or at least reanalyzed, as implementations of an 
ethical theory. Hare arrives at his criterion by reasoning a priori, but other Reconstructive views 
could arrive at the criterion in other ways (such as reflective equilibrium or divine revelation). 
On any such view, we need a first level for the reason that we typically lack the information 
needed to act on theoretical principles or criteria, as in Indeterminate Justifying Reason above 
(Smith 1989; Feldman 2012). Our confidence is greatest in our criteria of right action—agents 
have greater credence in those principles than in their everyday ethical judgments—and our task 
is to modify our ordinary motivational capacities, to whatever extent possible, to bring them in 
line. The simplest view of the first level would be a pure ‘rules of thumb’ approach, on which our 
everyday thinking takes the form of readily revisable heuristics. As I show momentarily, Hare’s 
own position is more complicated than this, because he recognizes that some motivational 
capacities are not readily revisable. This makes his view more interesting and my argument more 
difficult. 
 This is not, of course, the only difference between Harean and Strawsonian conceptions of ethics, but it 16
is the most salient difference as regards their views of ethical psychology. I suspect that their deeper 
differences stem from the fact that Strawson is an empiricist, who holds that ethical standards are fallible 
and revisable, and Hare is a rationalist, who holds that the ethical standard is knowable a priori through 
reflection on the logical features of ethical language. 
!21
 On the Constructive view I favor, the purpose of ethical theorizing is not to adopt a 
criterion and then design or approve of a psychology that can implement it. It is to take our 
actual practices, and the kinds of thinking they typically involve, as reason-giving, and only then 
to search for a plausible criterion—such as happiness, rationality, or virtue—that can explain and 
justify those practices. Our confidence is greatest in our ordinary practices, which enjoy a kind of 
default justification. The Reconstructive and Constructive theorists could, in principle, agree on 
the same criterion at the second level of ethical thinking.  But there would still be a significant 17
difference in the relationship between the criterion and ordinary deliberation: the Reconstructive 
view would see the criterion as the only source of justification for those practices, whereas the 
Constructive view would see it as a resource for improving them.  In the remainder of this 18
section, I explain the similarities between these two views—the elements that Strawson and Hare 
have in common—as a way of developing them in greater detail. Here I will be remaining 
neutral as to the content of the second level, i.e., neutral between theories.  
 In “Freedom and Resentment” (1962), Strawson famously introduced the notions of the 
reactive attitudes and the objective attitude, which he elaborated in his Woodbridge Lectures 
(1985). I think there is a fruitful analogy between these two kinds of attitudes and the first and 
 They would probably arrive at it in different ways, however. In particular, the Strawsonian, but not the 17
Harean, could arrive at the standard through reflective equilibrium. Hare rules out intuitive judgments as 
having any probative force independently of theory, and therefore forbids the use of reflective equilibrium 
(1981: 75-6).
 It is common for anti-theorists in ethics to wonder what authority an ethical theory could possibly have 18
for us, such that we might give up our ordinary ethical judgments for its sake. But the Constructive view 
avoids this objection, because the epistemic route from the first to the second level is built into the very 
development of an ethical theory. See Star (2015: 27) for more on this objection, as well as Baier (1985), 
Noble (1979), and Louden (1992). 
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second levels of ethical thinking, respectively.  The reactive attitudes—gratitude, forgiveness, 19
anger, resentment, and love, to name a few—are the emotionally-toned reactions that we 
experience in response to the perceived good or ill will of agents. We respond to the perceived 
good or ill will of others, either as that will is directed at ourselves (participant reactive attitudes) 
or at other people (vicarious reactive attitudes), and also to our own good or ill will (self-reactive 
attitudes), where this last category includes attitudes of shame, guilt, compunction, and a sense of 
obligation. These attitudes characterize much, if not necessarily all, ordinary ethical motivation: 
we act out of forgiveness, love, compunction, and so on; such attitudes yield motivating reasons 
for which we act. The objective attitude, by contrast, is a more detached point of view in which 
we suspend our reactive attitudes and see ourselves and others as less than fully responsible and 
instead as the product of external causal forces. We can experience both kinds of attitude in 
response to the same situation, but they are nonetheless “profoundly opposed” to each other 
(1962: 9; 1985: 36). 
 In Moral Thinking (1981), Hare distinguishes ‘intuitive’ and ‘critical’ levels of moral 
thought.  At the intuitive level, agents think in terms of prima facie principles, which are 20
internalized universal prescriptions of the form ‘φ’ or ‘do not φ’ (e.g., ‘do not break promises’). 
 Here I am indebted to recent work by Miller (2014a; 2014b), who first developed Hare’s moral 19
psychology with reference to Strawson. My argument differs from Miller’s in at least three ways, 
however: I claim that Reconstructive views are bad even for non-consequentialist theories; I think that 
Williams’ objections are stronger than Miller acknowledges; and my protagonist is Strawson, not Hare.
 In some places Hare also distinguishes a third level, the metaethical, at which a moral theory’s formal 20
component is established—for Hare the logical properties of universalizability and prescriptivity 
characteristic of moral judgments—but he does not take this to be part of everyday moral thinking 
(1989b: 237). Hare is frequently labeled an act-utilitarian, but this conceals a number of complications. 
For instance, while Hare’s universal prescriptivism is taken to issue in “judgements which are the same as 
a careful act-utilitarian would make” (1981: 43), it is also supposed to combine the merits of both act- and 
rule-utilitarianism, and is elsewhere said to be “practically equivalent to a rule-utilitarianism whose rules 
are allowed to be of any required degree of specificity” (1989a: 222; see also 1988: 226).
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Because these principles are internalized, they are accompanied by strong dispositions to act in 
accordance with them, such that agents tend to feel guilt and compunction when they are violated 
(1981: 38-9). Indeed, Hare uses the terms ‘intuitive dispositions’ and ‘intuitive principles’ 
interchangeably: to have an intuitive principle just is to have a disposition to experience various 
feelings. At the critical level, agents step back to assess the efficacy of their prima facie 
principles, often but not always prompted by a situation in which the principles conflict, and then 
either affirm those principles or select new ones to attempt to internalize (1981: 50). While Hare 
recommends that we reason on the basis of utilitarian considerations, he acknowledges that a 
Kantian, for instance, could select new intuitive dispositions on the basis of deontological 
reasoning. Hare says little about the emotions and dispositions that agents experience at the 
critical level, but there is no reason to believe that critical thinking cannot be emotionally 
inflected in a range of ways.  
 I want to highlight four features common to an ethical psychology that both Hare and 
Strawson could, arguably, endorse: (1) the first level of ethical thinking is contentful, affectively 
laden, and appears to give us reasons for action; (2) the second level of ethical thinking allows us 
to step back to assess the situations we face in order to better understand what we have reason to 
do, sometimes but not necessarily in response to perceived conflicts; (3) we can think at both 
levels at the same time, where sometimes this will reinforce the reasons we take ourselves to 
have from the first level and at other times overturn them; and (4) we think at the first level the 
vast majority of the time, and because our first-level attitudes are so deeply internalized, they are 
generally resilient and only sometimes overridable. I develop these features in turn. 
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 (1) Both the reactive attitudes and our intuitive dispositions are understood as points of 
view in a full-blooded sense: they are not bare affects but contentful attitudes that provide a way 
of seeing the world and generate reasons for actions and attitudes. As Strawson puts it, from the 
standpoint of the reactive attitudes, “human behavior appears as the proper object of all those 
personal and moral reactions, judgments and attitudes to which, as social beings, we are naturally 
prone,” and when we experience the world through that standpoint, “human actions and human 
agents appear as the bearers of objective moral properties” (1985: 35). For instance, if you step 
on my toe with the intention of hurting me, or call me by a derogatory name with the intention of 
insulting me, I will be disposed, or “naturally prone,” to experience the attitude of resentment 
and thereby see you as responsible for wronging me and thus deserving of blame.  Further, these 21
moral properties (wrongness, blameworthiness) will appear to me to generate reasons for action, 
such as a reason to retaliate in kind, or to appeal to a third party, or to punish you in some other 
fashion (1962: 22). 
 (2) Both the objective attitude and critical thinking also provide ways of seeing the world. 
The objective attitude can be characterized both negatively, in terms of the inhibition of the 
reactive attitudes, and positively, in terms of the appearance of human behavior as “yet another 
range of natural phenomena to be studied” (1985: 35). Instead of treating you as a responsible 
agent, I understand your behavior as determined by forces external to your intentions: perhaps 
you stepped on my toe only because you accidentally lost your balance, or because you suffer 
from a persisting mental illness. Understanding you in this way will tend to inhibit my 
 Although Strawson is not terribly explicit about ‘objective moral properties’, his paradigm example is 21
blameworthiness (cf. Miller 2014b: 8). Interestingly, although his Woodbridge Lectures discuss 
praiseworthiness, “Freedom and Resentment” focuses entirely on blame; praise is nowhere to be found. 
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resentment.  Yet the objective attitude is not one of affectless detachment. It “may be 22
emotionally toned in many ways” (1962: 10), for instance by pity (for your illness) or fear (that 
you will strike again).  And the properties revealed by the objective attitude generate their own 23
reasons for action, in this case reasons for treatment and control. But the primary feature of the 
objective attitude, as I understand it, is explanation, regardless of whether that explanation goes 
on to alter my emotions (“finding in that very understanding a relief from the strains of 
involvement”) or the reasons I take myself to have (“determining our policy accordingly” (1962: 
13)). When I take up the objective attitude or critical thinking, I have available to me new 
resources for understanding why you behave as you do and how I ought to treat you. 
 In order to employ the notion of the objective attitude, I want to clarify two points that 
are somewhat murky in Strawson. First, we must contextualize his claim that from the point of 
view of the objective attitude, “moral evaluation has no place” (1985: 40). Clearly, we could not 
employ the objective attitude to think about the moral value of our actions and practices if we 
could not engage in moral evaluation from that attitude. To avoid this conclusion, we have to 
understand that Strawson uses the term ‘moral’ to refer specifically to the kinds of evaluations 
and reactions characteristic of the reactive attitudes. So his claim that moral evaluation has no 
place from the objective attitude is purely terminological. It is evident that normative evaluation 
has a place from the objective attitude, since we can reason about what to do from that attitude. 
 There are two possible interpretations here. Either it is partially constitutive of the objective attitude 22
that it inhibits resentment, or taking up the objective attitude has no constitutive emotional effects but 
rather gives me reason not to feel resentment. Whether or not the objective attitude generates reasons 
against certain emotions, it is clear that taking up the objective attitude generates reasons for action. 
 This point is well-emphasized by Sommers (2007), who defends the desirability of living with an 23
exclusively objective attitude, which can heighten our sense of compassion and diminish our sense of 
indignation. Sommers downplays the instrumentalizing aspects of the objective attitude, however, which 
makes his argumentative task much easier.
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In fact, Strawson occasionally seems to assume, though this is not essential to his argument, that 
the kind of practical reasoning that takes place at the objective attitude is consequentialist: if we 
could, per impossibile, choose to abandon our commitment to the reactive attitudes as a class, 
“then we could choose rationally only in the light of an assessment of the gains and losses to 
human life, its enrichment or impoverishment” (1962: 14).  Second, whatever the exact nature 24
of its reasons, taking up the objective attitude can disable the force of the reasons generated from 
the perspective of the reactive attitudes: “particular reactive attitudes, and reactive attitudes in 
general, may be, and, sometimes, we judge, should be, inhibited” (1962: 11).  When you step on 25
my toe, and I believe you to be a ‘normal’ agent, I take myself to have a reason to seek redress, 
even if I ultimately do nothing in response. But when I understand that you were pushed, or that 
you suffer from a psychological disorder, the force of that reason is disabled, and I take myself to 
have no reason to seek redress, even if I ultimately attempt to punish you. These two 
clarifications go beyond the letter of what Strawson says, but I believe them to be in keeping 
with the spirit of his discussion.  
 (3) We can combine both levels of thinking simultaneously. Not only can we rapidly 
toggle back and forth between them, as I might when struggling to balance my reactive 
frustration with my considered belief that you are not a full agent, but we can, to some extent, 
and for a brief period, experience both kinds of attitude at the same time. Strawson speaks, in the 
 Although Miller wants to develop this line of interpretation, he rightly points out that Strawson does not 24
provide an argument that reasoning from the objective attitude must take this consequentialist form 
(2014b: 13). So we should not rule out a non-consequentialist understanding of the reasons we have from 
the objective attitude, particularly if this framework is intended to be neutral across competing theories of 
practical reason.
 To interpret Strawson charitably, we should not understand “reactive attitudes in general” here to refer 25
to the whole framework of reactive attitudes, but a particular set of reactive attitudes toward a single 
agent, or class of agents (e.g., the mentally ill). 
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case of the moral reactive attitudes, of being able to “more easily secure the speculative or 
political gains of objectivity of view by a kind of setting on one side, rather than a total 
suspension, of those attitudes” (1962: 18-9). In such a case, I would continue to have access to 
both kinds of reasons and would continue to feel their force. Strawson briefly discusses two 
examples of a “straddle” between reactive and objective attitudes: adults’ treatment of young 
children, and psychoanalysts’ treatment of patients. In the former case, adults have to deal with 
creatures who are not yet but someday will be capable of full agency, and who therefore must at 
least occasionally be treated like adults, at least for educational purposes. In the latter case, the 
psychoanalyst takes up the objective attitude toward her patient in order to work toward a state of 
affairs in which the objective attitude is no longer necessary because the patient can again be 
treated as a full agent. Going beyond Strawson, we might imagine that the patient should take up 
the objective attitude toward herself as a means to building or rebuilding that sense of agency. 
These examples illustrate the use of the objective attitude as a tool, a resource that we can draw 
upon to improve our everyday functioning at the level of the reactive attitudes: taking the 
objective attitude toward children helps us, as adults, to enter into more complex agential 
relations with them in the future, just as taking the objective attitude toward ourselves helps us to 
live as more fully responsible agents. 
 (4) We think in terms of the first level far more often than in the second. The reactive 
attitudes are our default setting, comprising the vast majority of our mental lives, such that we 
can step back from them only briefly. As Strawson puts it, “Being human, we cannot, in the 
normal case, [take the objective attitude] for long, or altogether” (1962: 10). This suspension can 
happen relatively automatically—in response to a perceived lack of agency in another person—
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or it can be willed, “for reasons of policy or curiosity or emotional self-defense” (1985: 34; cf. 
1962: 10). This last point is worth stressing: we can choose to take up the objective attitude, even 
without the stimulus of a conflict situation. Using Hare’s terminology, this implies that insofar as 
ethical theorizing takes place at the level of critical thinking, it is a project we can engage in at 
will, but also one that we only occasionally engage in, if at all. In general, the reactive attitudes 
are resilient: we cannot give them up entirely, and even if we take up the objective attitude for a 
time, we will always find ourselves returning to the reactive attitudes.  Indeed, Hare’s 26
recognition that our intuitive dispositions are deep marks one of the most plausible elements of 
his ethical psychology. Whereas other utilitarians conceive of our intuitive dispositions as mere 
‘rules of thumb’, or substitute some other motivationally shallow mental state, Hare insists, and 
is right to insist, that intuitive dispositions “are associated, owing to our upbringing, with very 
firm and deep dispositions and feelings,” whereas the violation of a rule of thumb “excites no 
compunction” (1981: 38). 
 Yet even though Hare and Strawson are in agreement about these four features, there 
remains a crucial difference between them, which will play a key role in my arguments that the 
Reconstructive view is bad for agents. It is true that Hare is at pains to emphasize that intuitive 
and critical thinking are not rival procedures but rather “elements in a common structure, each 
with its part to play” (1981: 44). We cannot always be engaged in critical ethical thinking, yet it 
is sometimes necessary for us to go beyond intuitive thinking. To use Hare’s terms, we are less 
 I borrow the apt term ‘resilience’ from Miller (2014a: 49). This feature of Strawson’s ethical 26
psychology is indebted to Hume, who famously wrote in his Treatise (1.4.7) that although he cannot 
rationally justify his beliefs in causation, induction, and so forth, nature cures him “of this philosophical 
melancholy” and he returns to his ordinary habits of backgammon and dining. For Strawson, however, 
reflection at the level of the objective attitude is not idle, but can be used to ameliorate our first level 
practices.
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than “archangels,” who always think at the critical level, but must be more than “proles,” who 
think only at the intuitive level. But for Hare, our most fundamental commitment ought to be to 
the level of critical thinking, which is “epistemologically prior” to intuitive thinking: we have 
reasons at the intuitive level only because the critical level sanctions them. And that commitment 
ought to be overriding: “the right or best way for us to live or act either in general or on a 
particular occasion is what the archangel would pronounce” (1981: 46). We should be able to use 
our ethical theory to derive, in tandem with the facts, what we ought to do in any conceivable 
situation. Further, we should value intuitive thinking only as a mechanism for implementing the 
criterion of right action given by critical thinking. There are two factors about human agents that 
explain the need for an intuitive level and, from the critical point of view, justify the deployment 
of intuitive dispositions: the psychological reason that we are beings of limited cognitive ability 
and the pragmatic reason that “forming relatively simple reaction-patterns” helps us to cope with 
the world (1981: 36). The fact that intuitive thinking, in general, must be justified on the basis of 
critical thinking marks a significant divergence from the Constructive picture.   27
 In summary, let me try to be maximally clear about my strategy in this section. I began 
with an intriguing analogy or isomorphism between Hare’s moral psychology and Strawson’s 
distinction between the reactive and objective attitudes. Both claim that it is appropriate for us to 
have two different modes of practical thinking: a less reflective mode that governs our day-to-
day interactions and a more reflective mode that prescinds from the attitudes and feelings we 
 There are many additional elements of Hare’s broader picture that one might reject or choose to remain 27
agnostic about. For example, he insists that at the critical level there really are no moral dilemmas, that 
archangels thinking properly would all reach the same moral conclusions, that moral language is 
necessarily prescriptive and universal, and that because of these logical features moral thinking requires 
identifying with everyone’s preferences (see, respectively, 1981: 26; 46; 21; 91). Although these elements 
are far from incidental to Hare’s overall theory, they are orthogonal to my purposes here. 
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typically experience. And I tried to elaborate a picture of the kind of psychology that both could 
endorse, a picture that offers us resources for the broader, non-exegetical project of 
understanding the psychology of following an ethical theory. This requires some divergences 
from Strawson’s own view, as I have tried to explain, particularly since Strawson’s primary goal 
is to intervene in a metaphysical debate, not an ethical one. It also requires divergences from 
Hare’s view, and I will argue for further divergences in the next section.  
 Still, three clarifications are in order now. First, I am not claiming that all practical 
thinking is two-level, simply that ethical theorizing must be. Plenty of ordinary instrumental 
reasoning (‘I’m booking a flight so I can go see my mother’) does not require a second level to 
explain what is right or wrong with it, though it should also be said that nearly any decision 
could be ethically relevant under some circumstances. Second, and relatedly, I am not committed 
to the claim that all reactive attitudes or motivating reasons are ethical in character. For one 
thing, different ethical theories will have differing stances about this (Kantians are likely to 
distinguish ethical motivation from prudential motivation, while virtue ethicists may class 
prudence as a virtue, and consequentialists will likely hold that all motivation is ethically 
assessable), and I am trying to remain neutral on first-order topics here. For another thing, 
arguably both Hare’s rules of thumb and Strawson’s reactive attitudes span varieties of 
interpersonal conduct broader than the narrowly ‘moral’, though that point is spoiled somewhat 
by the fact that Strawson at least holds that “the moral sentiments” is “quite a good name for that 
network of human attitudes” (1962: 26). Third, and to reiterate a point made above, not all 
justifying reasons are second-level reasons: some are ordinary motivating reasons internal to the 
reactive attitudes and outside the perspective of ethical theory. One might worry that Strawson 
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actually denies that justifying reasons could be second-level: “Inside the general structure or web 
of human attitudes and feelings of which I have been speaking, there is endless room for 
modification, redirection, criticism, and justification. But questions of justification are internal to 
the structure or relate to modifications internal to it” (1962: 25). This might suggest that second-
level theory has no role to play in justification at all. But the final clause undercuts this reading: 
justification can be ‘external’ to the reactive attitudes so long as it relates to modifications, and 
not wholesale abandonment or affirmation, of them. Strawson develops this possibility in the 
final paragraph of “Freedom and Resentment”: “It is far from wrong to emphasize the efficacy of 
all those practices which express or manifest our moral attitudes, in regulating behaviour in ways 
considered desirable; or to add that when certain of our beliefs about the efficacy of some of 
these practices turn out to be false, then we may have good reason for dropping or modifying 
those practices” (1962: 27).  This is precisely the basis for the Strawsonian view I will develop in 
Chapters 2 and 3: employing a second-level standard like ‘efficacy’ (and here Strawson clearly 
has some kind of utilitarian theory in mind) can be a good reason to drop or modify our practices 
piecemeal. But Strawson goes on: “What is wrong is to forget that these practices, and their 
reception, the reactions to them, really are expressions of our moral attitudes and not merely 
devices we calculatingly employ for regulative purposes. … Indeed the very understanding of the 
kind of efficacy these expressions of our attitudes have turns on our remembering this” (1962: 
27). What I will suggest in the next section is that Hare, and Reconstructive views more 
generally, are guilty of precisely the amnesia that Strawson diagnoses, and that this turns out to 
be bad for agents in a variety of respects. 
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3. Against Reconstruction 
 Regardless of how well ethical theories do on epistemic grounds—how well they explain, 
or explain away, our particular judgments—we can assess them in terms of the effects that 
adopting them would have on our lives. No one has done more than Williams to emphasize that 
our theorizing must be continuous with and answerable to practice. I now want to develop three 
objections, inspired by his writings, and show that they apply to the Reconstructive, but not the 
Constructive, view of ethical theorizing. 
 According to Williams, an agent cannot experience, at the intuitive level, all the 
dispositions and feelings associated with following or flouting prima facie principles and think, 
at the critical level, that those dispositions and feelings have merely instrumental value for 
spurring her to act in ways approved by the ethical theory she endorses. As he puts it pithily, “the 
thoughts are not stable under reflection” (1988: 190; cf. 1985: 110). I think there are at least three 
possible kinds of ‘instability’ that should concern us, in increasing order of seriousness: an 
unhealthy bifurcation in our thinking, alienation from our psychological makeup, and rational 
inconsistency.  
 Before turning to these objections, two clarifications are in order. First, although 
Williams targets Hare’s utilitarianism in particular, these worries will apply to any 
Reconstructive view that claims that our first level attitudes have only instrumental value for 
implementing second level criteria. Second, while I agree with Williams that our first level 
thinking can be reason-giving independently of our second level justifications, I also hold that 
ethical theory has a role to play in improving that first level thinking. But my responses will rely 
on the idea that while the first level does have instrumental value, it does not have only 
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instrumental value. Translating from Hare’s language into Strawson’s: at the first level we think 
in terms of the contentful reactive attitudes, which offer us various motivating reasons. But at the 
second level, we step back to think in terms of the objective attitude, which assesses which 
reactive attitudes we ought to have. In doing so, we treat our reactive attitudes instrumentally: we 
consider which attitudes to adopt in terms of how well they help us to realize some other aim, 
and we evaluate them in light of their success or failure in meeting that aim. But we do not treat 
our reactive attitudes only instrumentally, since they are the default mode in which we 
experience the world. 
3.1 Bifurcation 
 One objection to the Reconstructive view is that as a matter of psychological fact, an 
agent cannot combine seeing the world through the intuitive dispositions and from the point of 
view of critical thinking: as such, there can only be a problematic bifurcation between them. As 
Williams puts it in Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, “The dispositions help to form the 
character of an agent who has them, and they will do the job the theory has given them only if 
the agent does not see his character purely instrumentally, but sees the world from the point of 
view of that character” (1985: 108). Williams’ idea is that once an agent has taken up a critical 
point of view on her intuitive dispositions, she simply will not be able to experience them in the 
same way again without an unhealthy bifurcation in her thinking. Once the sentiment of blame, 
for instance, is conceived not as a fitting response to wrongdoing as such but as a device that 
prevents future wrongdoing, then we can no longer see blame as appropriate when we have been 
wronged. Instead, we will have to severely compartmentalize our beliefs; if we do not, our 
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overriding commitment to critical thinking will lead to obsessive vigilance about whether 
blaming someone could best promote the good, regardless of whether they are guilty of 
wrongdoing. Even if we try to compartmentalize, striving not to calculate whether each 
particular act is optimific, and instead adopt a policy of blaming people just when that seems 
intuitively appropriate, then knowing that the policy is sometimes overridable will pressure us to 
consider overriding it in any particular case, even when there is no appearance of conflict. Note 
that this problem does not arise for a pure rules of thumb approach to the first level of ethical 
thinking, because rules of thumb can much more easily be overridden without the affective 
residue that accompanies the violation of deep dispositions.  
 Judging from his own responses, Hare interprets Williams’ objection as referring to an 
empirical matter of psychological fact only. First, Hare insists that he himself can readily 
combine intuitive and critical thinking. He supports this experiential assertion with the example 
of a battle commander, whose strategic thinking is intended to serve as an analogy to ethical 
thinking (1981: 52; 1988: 289-90). The commander has, at the critical level, endorsed a prima 
facie principle to the effect that one should engage in offensive action whenever possible. At the 
intuitive level, therefore, he evinces all the dispositions characteristic of having internalized the 
principle: he desires to engage in offensive action, and he feels reluctance and perhaps even guilt 
when he misses a chance to provoke the enemy. But he can experience all those dispositions at 
the intuitive level at the same time as he decides, at the critical level, that in some particular case 
he should pass up the chance to attack. That is, the decision not to attack does not in general sap 
the motivational force of the intuitive dispositions, even though they can sometimes be 
overridden. Second, Hare claims, further, that critical thinking actually reinforces dispositions at 
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the intuitive level. If I know why, at the critical level, it is wrong not to lie, that supports my 
tendency at the intuitive level to feel bad about lying (1988: 259).  
 One might well think that Hare cannot have it both ways: he cannot claim that critical 
thinking can in some cases override our intuitive dispositions and in general reinforce the 
motivation those dispositions provide. But in any case, it is evident that Hare has no principled 
response to this objection beyond mere counter-assertion, because he offers no developed ethical 
psychology to justify his claims. This is where Strawson’s picture proves useful, with its analogy 
between the reactive attitudes and our intuitive dispositions, and between the objective attitude 
and critical thinking. If our intuitive dispositions are resilient, then they are motivationally 
insulated from the force of critical thinking.  In general, we will experience our blame reactions 28
as appropriate or inappropriate in the normal way, but if there is a conflict (say, whether to blame 
someone for something she did a long time ago), then we have a reason, from within the 
perspective of intuitive thinking itself, either to revise our reactions in light of other intuitive 
dispositions or to switch to critical thinking to adjudicate the case. But the insulation of our 
intuitive dispositions means that we should feel no general pressure to override them. If we adopt 
the Constructive picture, then it is not the case that “some kind of willed forgetting is 
needed” (Williams 1985: 109): the forgetting will be involuntary, just as returning from the 
objective attitude to the involvement of the reactive attitudes is involuntary. So as a matter of 
psychological fact, combination of the attitudes is indeed possible without unhealthy bifurcation.  
 Indeed, I take this to be the conclusion of Miller’s work, and the feature that most motivates his 28
Strawsonian picture. 
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 Yet while the previous section admitted that it is open to Hare to agree with Strawson on 
this psychological point, there are other problems for the Reconstructive view, stemming from its 
requirement to justify our ordinary motivations on the basis of theory. 
3.2 Alienation 
 A second objection is that even if we could in fact combine the two levels of thinking, the 
combination would lead to alienation from our psychological makeup. Alienation would come 
about because taking up a critical perspective on one’s intuitive dispositions means recognizing a 
deficiency in those dispositions that one previously did not appreciate. But since those 
dispositions can never be fully replaced, in virtue of their resilience, then having an overriding 
commitment to an ethical theory means that regret will always be appropriate. And whether or 
not regret has negative motivational consequences, it is an undesirable consequence of adopting 
an ethical theory that committing to it makes regretting one’s psychology appropriate. I will 
argue that while the Reconstructive theorist can, through a complicated series of dialectical 
moves, avoid alienation in the motivational sense, only the Constructive theorist can insist that 
regretting one’s intuitive dispositions, as a class, is not warranted.  
 Admittedly, the severity of this particular objection will depend on the nature of the 
ethical theory (i.e., the second level of ethical thinking) in question and the concomitant degree 
of imperfection it assigns to our intuitive dispositions. It may not be especially pressing for virtue 
ethicists, if their criterion of right action allows that the fully virtuous person has the ordinary 
sort of motivations, and it will be pressing for Kantians only to the degree that their criterion of 
right action appeals to a demanding Categorical Imperative procedure distinct from those 
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ordinary motivations.  Because the objection is probably most pressing for consequentialists 29
whose criterion of right action makes reference to an aggregate notion, such as pleasure or well-
being, I concentrate on consequentialism in this section, hoping that the relevant argumentative 
changes can be made, mutatis mutandis.  
 Return to the blame example. If we come to believe that our intuitive blame responses are 
not producing the best consequences, but we find that we cannot give them up and that we 
continue to feel blame sentiments intuitively, then not only would the alienation we experience 
be likely to weaken our commitment to our dispositions, such a response would be, from the 
perspective of second level thinking, appropriate or rationally warranted. As with the first 
reading of Williams’ objection, this will not apply to pure rules of thumb approaches, which 
assume that the agent is ultimately committed to the criterion of right action found at the level of 
critical thinking, but it does apply to anyone who represents our intuitive dispositions as resilient 
and not readily revisable. 
 These ideas are compressed and require unpacking. We can begin by putting this version 
of Williams’ objection in the form of a conditional: 
       Williams’ conditional: if an agent truly took up an instrumental perspective on  
  her intuitive dispositions, then that ought to weaken her commitment to those 
  dispositions.  
The force of that ‘ought’ is not merely predictive, but rational. It is supposed to follow from the 
nature of taking an instrumental perspective on something. The task for the defender of any two-
level ethical psychology is to show how to deny the conditional. One answer would be simple: 
 See Rawls (2000: 167-70) for a detailed description of this procedure. 29
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given that we experience regret only at the second level of ethical thinking, and not at the level 
of our admittedly resilient ordinary motivations, then Williams’ conditional will simply not have 
bad motivational outcomes. While I agree that this response is open to the Reconstructive 
theorist, it does nothing to overcome Williams’ conditional.  
 To do so, the Reconstructive theorist should distinguish one sense in which the 
conditional is true from another in which it is false. In the fitting sense of ‘ought’, the 
Reconstructive theorist must agree that our commitment to our intuitive dispositions ought to be 
weakened, but in the telic sense of ‘ought’, it is not the case that our commitment ought to be 
weakened. Or to put the same point in a different idiom, taking up an instrumental perspective 
gives us reasons of fittingness to regret our psychology, but does not give us telic reasons to 
regret our psychology. (I use ‘ought to’ and ‘have reason to’ interchangeably in this section.) I 
first show that the Reconstructive theorist is indeed committed to the view that we have reasons 
of fittingness to regret our psychology.  I then show how she can argue that we have telic 30
reasons not to regret our psychology. If those telic reasons are weightier than the reasons of 
fittingness, such that we have overall reason not to weaken our commitment to our intuitive 
dispositions, then the Reconstructive theorist can partially, but only partially, answer Williams’ 
objection. 
 The question of whether we have reasons of fittingness to regret our psychology is potentially 30
ambiguous. It should be read as (a) ‘is it fitting to regret our psychology, given the instrumental 
deficiencies of that psychology?’ and not as (b) ‘is it fitting to regret our psychology, given the 
unfittingness of the psychology itself?’ I take no stand in this section on whether our attitudes themselves 
(e.g., blame, compunction) are unfitting. Most consequentialists would hold that there is nothing 
intrinsically bad about having unfitting attitudes and would therefore answer (b) in the negative; an 
exception is Hurka (2001), who holds that some unfitting attitudes—loving the bad, hating the good—are 
intrinsically bad. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for alerting me to this potential ambiguity. 
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 The claim that it would be fitting to regret one’s intuitive dispositions as a class is 
supposed to explain why the consequent of Williams’ conditional is true. That is, (i) taking up an 
instrumental perspective, at the level of critical thinking, on one’s intuitive dispositions (ii) gives 
one reason to regret those dispositions, which (iii) gives one reason to have a weaker 
commitment to them. The connection between (ii) and (iii) is stipulative: if one has reason to 
regret something, such as a past action, character trait, or state of affairs, then one should be 
ceteris paribus less committed to it than if one did not have reason to regret it. The substantive 
philosophical challenge is to explain the connection between (i) and (ii), in particular the notion 
of regret at issue. 
 Begin with the idea of an instrumental perspective. In general, to treat something 
instrumentally is to value it only conditionally on its ability to facilitate or realize some other 
value. If I have a set of Ginzu knives, I value them instrumentally if I value them only for their 
ability to cut vegetables efficiently and effectively. A simple counterfactual test determines 
whether I value them only instrumentally: were the knives no longer able to facilitate the 
chopping of vegetables, would I still value them? If the answer is no, then I value them only 
instrumentally. If the answer is yes, then I must value them in respect of some other properties. 
For instance, perhaps I value them aesthetically, admiring the pleasingness of their form, or 
perhaps they have extrinsic sentimental value, because they were a gift from a friend, or perhaps 
I value them instrumentally for some other end. 
 Suppose now that the Ginzu knives are rusty and dull, but they are the only tools I have 
to prepare vegetables. This gives me reason to regret that they are not better. I would replace the 
knives with sharper ones if I could, but instead I have to live with this set if I am to continue to 
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eat vegetables. The analogy to our intuitive dispositions is straightforward. If the goal is acting 
ethically as recommended by, say, Hare’s two-level utilitarianism, then the best tools for the job 
would be archangelic powers of the sort Hare describes—“superhuman powers of thought, 
superhuman knowledge and no human weaknesses,” not even “partiality to self” (1981: 44)—
and anything less would be to that extent regrettable. The archangels would discard their rusty 
intuitive dispositions (if they had any remaining) and replace them with sharper cognitive skills. 
In the same way, we mortals might regret our intuitive dispositions: a utilitarian committed to 
impartial benevolence might wish that her capacity to imaginatively identify and sympathize 
with others was greater, so that she would be motivated to aid more people in need. In all these 
cases, adopting an ethical theory gives one reasons to regret the tools that one has. 
 By claiming that the utilitarian has reason to regret her intuitive dispositions, I mean that 
some property of those dispositions is regrettable: regret would be fitting or appropriate to feel, 
because it accurately presents its object as having certain evaluative features. The emotions in 
general present the world in a certain evaluative light, and regret in particular presents the world 
in a certain negatively valenced way.  As I gloss the evaluative presentation of regret, it presents 31
its object as inadequate to facilitating at least one of the agent’s aims. Thus, regret presents the 
Ginzu knives as inadequate to chopping, and the agent’s intuitive dispositions as inadequate to 
her second level aims. If the knives were sharp enough, then regret would not be fitting, and the 
agent would have no reason to regret the knives. On this account, regret is not essentially tied to 
agency, since not everything that we regret need be an action of ours. Thus I distinguish regret 
 For more on this picture, see D’Arms & Jacobson (2000).31
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from remorse, which is essentially tied to agency: remorse presents a past action of the agent’s as 
blameworthy.  32
 On this understanding of regret, it has a conditional structure: if one’s aims are a certain 
way, then regret is fitting to the degree that the means to those aims are suboptimal. If my aim is 
to be a champion marathon runner, then I have reason to regret that my physical capacities are 
not greater. Similarly for ethical aims vis-à-vis psychological capacities.  So on the fitting 33
reading, Williams’ conditional comes out true for the Reconstructive theorist. On a different 
reading, however, the conditional comes out false, and it is not the case that one’s commitment to 
one’s intuitive dispositions ought to be weakened. This is the telic reading, in which the 
consequences of what one does must be taken into account. A standard example in which the 
fitting and telic senses of ‘ought’ (or ‘reason’) come apart is that of an offensive joke. Suppose 
that some joke is funny, and offensive, and funny because it is offensive (its humor arises out of 
the stereotypes it employs, perhaps). In the fitting sense, I ought to laugh (I have reason to 
laugh), because laughter is an appropriate response to a humorous joke. But in the telic sense, it 
is not the case that I ought to laugh (I do not have reason to laugh), because things would go 
worse if I laughed, whether because I would be encouraging offensive humor or because I would 
 I recognize that this may be a revisionary usage of regret. Bittner (1992), for instance, follows the 32
standard usage in asking whether it is reasonable to regret bad things that one does; in my terms, he is 
discussing remorse. My usage is not lacking in philosophical precedent, however: Wallace claims that 
regret “can be occasioned by reflection either on impersonal misfortunes or on voluntary past 
performances” (2013: 16), and he finds support in the secondary definition in the Oxford English 
Dictionary, which characterizes regret as a response to “some external circumstance or event.” One’s own 
character or psychological makeup is, in the relevant sense, external or impersonal, because it stands 
beyond the power of one’s agential powers to fully control (although see Smith 2005 for further 
discussion). Thanks to Michele Moody-Adams for urging me to clarify this. 
 Hints of this view can be found in Hume’s account of justice (Treatise of Human Nature, 3.2.2). For 33
Hume, the need for justice is contingent, since it would be unnecessary if we could “increase to a 
sufficient degree the benevolence of men, or the bounty of nature.” In my sense, then, it is to some degree 
regrettable that we need justice—which for Hume largely consists in respecting property rights—at all. 
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be signaling to others that I am the sort of person who approves of offensive humor, or so forth.  34
Telic reasons are, we might say, grounded in their conduciveness toward our ends.  Thus, 35
whether a reason is telic depends on what our ends actually are.   
 Achieving our ethical ends requires making use of the tools that we have at our disposal. 
This claim should make it evident how to deny Williams’ conditional on the telic reading. What 
makes the consequent of the conditional objectionable at all, as I understand Williams, is that a 
weakened commitment to our intuitive dispositions is thought to produce a kind of paralysis, 
shaking our confidence in our intuitive dispositions as a class and thereby decreasing our 
motivation to act. Rather than being able to trust in the tools at our disposal, we would feel 
alienated from our very psychological makeup, perhaps suffering a psychic split with debilitating 
consequences. Yet if these are the expected outcomes of indulging in the emotional profile 
characteristic of regret, then the Reconstructive theorist has ample resources to claim that we 
should not give in to regret, even though we believe that certain features of our psychology are in 
fact regrettable. That is, the outcomes that Williams worries about simply need not arise for a 
mature agent capable of the self-mastery required (the serenity to accept the things she cannot 
change, perhaps). 
 One more premise is needed to deny Williams’ conditional, however, which is to claim 
that we have overall reason not to regret our intuitive dispositions. Issues of weighing reasons 
 One admitted complication of the example is that some might insist that laughter is not even a fitting 34
response to an offensive joke. For defense of this claim, see Gaut (2007: Ch. 10); for the opposing view, 
which would support my example, see Jacobson (1997). 
 I borrow this locution from Muñoz (2018), who is inspired by Raz’s distinction between practical (i.e., 35
telic) and adaptive (i.e., fitting) reasons (2011: 36-58).
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are famously difficult, yet in this instance the Reconstructive theorist would have to insist that 
the balance of reasons speaks against regret, on the basis of the considerations just offered.  
 The Reconstructive theorist can deny Williams’ conditional, but only after an exhausting 
amount of dialectical work. Yet even if an agent could engage in some kind of cognitive therapy 
so as not to sap her motivations to act, surely there is still some normative failure in being made 
to feel alienated from one’s very psychological makeup on account of a commitment to an 
ethical theory. On the Constructive view, however, no such regret is warranted. If ethical 
theorizing is seen as a tool for improving our practices, and not the only source of their 
justification, then we do not have to insist upon the evaluation from which our intuitive 
dispositions, as a class, look imperfect. Of course it is still intelligible to regret individual 
instances of those dispositions, from within our practices—one might hope to become less 
susceptible to bouts of anger or resentment—but there will be no reason for regret simply 
because one adopts an ethical theory. 
3.3 Inconsistency 
 A third objection is that even if agents can as a matter of fact combine thinking at both 
levels, and even if they can overcome the potential alienation occasioned by regret over their 
imperfect intuitive dispositions, their thinking will be rationally inconsistent. As Williams puts it 
in “The Structure of Hare’s Theory”: 
      you cannot think in these [intuitive] terms if at the same time you apply to the 
      [intuitive] process the kind of thorough [critical] reflection that this theory itself 
      advocates. That is not a merely psychological claim. It is a philosophical claim, 
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      about what is involved in effective and adequate reflection on these particular 
      states of mind (1988: 190).  
Williams’ objection here is notoriously elusive.  I have attempted to pin it down by labeling in 36
brackets his allusions to intuitive and critical thinking. We can do even better by distinguishing 
two different claims Williams might intend by “you cannot think in these terms.” On the one 
hand, he might be suggesting that an agent would, from the perspective of critical thinking, have 
to consider the view from intuitive thinking to be illusory, and therefore could not rationally 
think in intuitive terms at all. On the other hand, he might be charging that if an agent were 
actually to apply the method of critical thinking to her intuitive dispositions, she would not find 
them justified, and therefore could not rationally think in these intuitive terms. As with the other 
versions of Williams’ objection, this would not be a problem for pure rules of thumb approaches, 
insofar as such heuristics would be put in place by an agent who is ready to admit that heuristic 
attitudes do not reveal the true ethical world and who relies on them only to the extent that they 
can be justified by critical thinking. But deep dispositions, as we have seen, reveal ‘objective 
moral properties’ that appear to generate reasons for action, and these reasons will at least 
sometimes be different in their content from the reasons we appreciate from the perspective of 
critical thinking.  
3.3.1 The Inaccuracy Objection 
 The first reading of the rational consistency objection holds that even if we were to 
employ a criterion of right action, at the level of critical thinking, that approved all our intuitive 
 For expressions of frustration on this score, see Hare (1988: 290-1) and Zangwill (2013: 164 n. 17).36
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reactions, there would be a problem, because critical thinking insists that the reasons disclosed at 
the intuitive level are ultimately illusory. The objection was also developed by Thomas Nagel 
and has recently been pressed by Simon Keller and by Nick Zangwill; all three discuss the idea 
of illusion. Nagel admits that many of our intuitive dispositions have general utility. But, he 
continues, “It is very implausible to claim that intuitive repugnance at personal betrayal is just an 
artefact of upbringing on principles warranted by utility. Hare’s view requires us to regard the 
sense of immediacy that these claims have as a kind of illusion” (1982: 10). Keller says: “It 
would be both implausible and depressing to suggest that when we act well . . . we systematically 
misperceive our reasons” (2013: 27). And Zangwill claims that two-level consequentialist 
theories like Hare’s are “committed to a massive error theory about ordinary moral 
thought” (2011: 164), because they imply that most agents are wrong in their beliefs about what 
justifies their actions. Call this the ‘inaccuracy objection’.  
 As with the second version of Williams’ objection, the Reconstructive theorist can offer 
the motivational insulation response, which is that we do not, in fact, treat the deliverances of our 
reactive attitudes as illusory. Given that most of the time, we experience our reactive attitudes 
and intuitive dispositions in the ordinary way, acting on the reasons they offer without 
considering the reasons offered by the objective attitude and critical thinking, the worry about 
illusion simply does not apply.  But Nagel, Keller, and Zangwill all suggest that we must, for 37
the two-level theorist, be rationally committed to treating them as illusory. I argue that the 
Constructive view, but not the Reconstructive, has the resources to deny this as well.  
 Indeed, Miller, although he acknowledges the possibility of this reading of Williams’ objection, finds it 37
problematic only to the degree that believing one’s intuitive dispositions to be illusory leads to negative 
motivational consequences downstream. As with the second version of Williams’ objection, I think more 
needs to be said. 
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 Zangwill offers the most developed formulation of this line of thought. He considers 
Cordelia, from Shakespeare’s King Lear, who loves her father “according to [her] bond.” The 
actions Cordelia has in the past performed for Lear—spending time with him, caring for him, 
treating him with respect—are reflectively self-endorsed by her and by what Zangwill calls 
‘common-sense morality’, which we can identify with our ordinary reactive attitudes. And, let us 
suppose, those same actions would also be endorsed by second level ethical reflection. Even so, 
there will be a mismatch concerning the grounds of those actions. Cordelia, we suppose, judges 
that her actions are right in virtue of her bond with Lear. But the consequentialist judges that her 
actions are right in virtue of the fact that when people act on their loving bonds, things tend to go 
well. So there is a gap here. 
 Call the common-sense ground ‘B’ (for bond) and the consequentialist ground ‘C’ (for the 
general fact that things go well for everyone). Engaging in a bit of speculative belief-attribution, 
Zangwill supposes that Cordelia believes the conditional ‘if B, then M’, where M is some 
ethically relevant property, here the property of being under an obligation of some kind to Lear 
(and where the conditional is not believed to hold of necessity, hence it is not believed that B is a 
sufficient condition for M). But the two-level consequentialist—who accepts the different 
conditional ‘if C, then M’—allegedly cannot accept Cordelia’s conditional, for the reason that 
the grounds of Cordelia’s conditional are features intrinsic to her relationship, whereas the 
grounds of the consequentialist conditional are extrinsic to any particular relationship. They are 
more general considerations that obtain independently of any token relationship, considerations 
such as ‘piety toward fathers is good’. But such general facts seem, to intuitive thinking, to have 
nothing to do with Cordelia’s relationship to Lear; they do not typically show up in the contents 
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of reactive attitudes. That is, there appears to be a lack of fit between B (with its intrinsic 
features) and C (with its extrinsic features): “The Cordelia-Lear relationship is just a drop in the 
ocean of all the father-daughter relationships” (2011: 155). Hence, Zangwill concludes, anyone 
who comes to believe two-level consequentialism must give up belief in the common-sense 
conditional, ‘if B, then M’.  38
 On the Reconstructive view, an agent is indeed committed to believing that the content of 
the reasons given by first-level thinking is illusory, even if her ethical theory approves all her 
actions and is in no way revisionary. A Constructive Strawsonian view, by contrast, requires 
agents neither to see their intuitive thoughts as illusory nor to abandon all their ordinary beliefs 
about motivating reasons. The first level of ethical thinking does not derive its value only from 
implementing a second level standard, and it yields reasons for action independently of whether 
those reasons are given by the second level as well. This is the crucial difference between Hare’s 
conception of two-level thinking and Strawson’s: for Hare the intuitive level of ethical thinking 
must be justified from the point of view of critical thinking, whereas for Strawson the two 
perspectives are distinct and no such justification is required. 
3.3.2 The Unjustifiability Objection 
 The second reading of the rational consistency objection holds that if an agent were 
actually to apply Harean critical thinking to her intuitive dispositions, she would not find them 
justified, and therefore could not rationally think in those intuitive terms. Call this the 
 Zangwill also considers a second argument against two-level consequentialism, namely that the ground 38
of Cordelia’s conditional is indexical, whereas the ground of the consequentialist conditional is non-
indexical, but he ultimately decides that this is weaker than the argument from intrinsicality. 
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‘unjustifiability objection’. This goes to the heart of the Reconstructive view, which requires that 
an agent’s everyday modes of deliberation must be justified on the basis of her theory. I first 
explain how the Constructive view differs before pressing the objection more forcefully.   
 The structure of Strawson’s argument is a matter of debate, but one way to read it 
employs an ‘ought implies can’ premise. If the reactive attitudes, as a class, are resilient—if “the 
general framework of attitudes itself is something we are given with the fact of human 
society” (1962: 25)—then they can never be given up entirely, even if we all came to believe that 
metaphysical determinism were true. But if we cannot give them up, then it is not the case that 
we ought to give them up: “As a whole, [the general framework] neither calls for, nor permits, an 
external ‘rational’ justification” (1962: 25; cf. 1985: 41). We cannot say either that the class of 
reactive attitudes, i.e., our practice of holding each other morally responsible, is justified or that 
it is unjustified: “it is useless to ask whether it would not be rational for us to do what it is not in 
our nature to (be able to) do” (1962: 20). It is not the case that we ought to give up our reactive 
attitudes, and it is not the case that we ought to keep them; the question of justification simply 
should not arise. The two points of view are simply different ways of thinking, which “tend at the 
limit to mutual exclusion” (1985: 36).  
 Yet while the framework of reactive attitudes is not subject to rational scrutiny, a major 
aim of Hare’s two-level picture of ethical thinking just is to subject the framework of intuitive 
dispositions, as a class, to rational scrutiny. In fact, Hare makes the stronger claim that it is only 
by subjecting intuitive thinking to scrutiny from the critical level that the intuitive dispositions 
can be justified: “The most fundamental objection to the one-level account of moral thinking 
called intuitionism is that it yields no way of answering” the question of which intuitions are 
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appropriate (1981: 39-40). Hare takes his primary opponent, the intuitionist, to be someone who 
is willing to rest content with various ethical intuitions, even when these conflict; he repeats a 
version of this charge in multiple places (e.g., 1981: 137; 1989a: 226; 1989b: 237-8). 
 Now one might object that I have established only that Hare is appealing to the need to 
justify particular intuitive principles, not the framework of intuitive thinking as a class, and 
Strawson similarly allows that particular reactive attitudes can be justified or unjustified. So 
there would be no disanalogy, according to this objection.  But it is clear that Hare also believes 39
that there are good reasons, from the perspective of critical thinking, to allow for the intuitive 
level. Recall that these are psychological and pragmatic reasons arising from our limited 
cognitive capacities and the need to rely on reaction-patterns in coping with the world. So there 
is a sense in which, according to critical thinking, intuitive thinking can be justified. But there is 
no sense in which someone adopting the objective perspective can see how the reactive attitudes 
as a class can be justified. 
 In fact, there is a further, even more significant disanalogy. Even if critical thinking can 
be said to justify intuitive thinking, in the sense of making intelligible what purpose it serves for 
the aims set by critical thinking, it is not the case that critical thinking fully endorses intuitive 
thinking. This is the place where the unjustifiability objection can be lodged. Hare clearly thinks 
that human beings would be ethically better if they were more like archangels, who do not need 
prima facie principles, because they confront each new moral situation with the ability to rapidly 
identify all its salient features, analyze the expected value of alternative actions, and frame a 
 Strawson says little about how to justify particular reactive attitudes—that is not his argumentative task39
—but presumably it will have to do with working out their appropriateness conditions, which are 
themselves internal to our practices. 
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universal and impersonal principle governing the rightness of their action. The most Hare can 
say for intuitive thinking is that it “certainly exists and is (humanly speaking) an essential part of 
the whole structure” (1981: 40). But it is clear that for Hare, it would be rational for us to 
become more purely archangelic, if that were possible. 
 Strawson makes no analogous claim about the objective attitude, however. In a curious 
footnote, he raises a question about the rationality of the objective attitude, bracketing the truth 
or falsity of determinism. (Recall that Strawson believes that accepting or denying determinism 
should have no effect on our belief in the rationality of the reactive attitudes as a class.) Strawson 
wonders whether, issues of determinism aside, “we should be nearer to being purely rational 
creatures in proportion as our relation to others was in fact dominated by the objective 
attitude” (1962: 28). Miller says of this quotation that Strawson “hastens to add that this does not 
entail that it would be rational for us to choose to dispense with the reactive attitudes entirely, 
because we have no choice in the matter” (2014a: 49). But this is not what Strawson says; that 
would be to repeat the same point. What Strawson does go on to say is that the answer to his 
question is yes: we might be more purely rational if we adopted the objective attitude more 
frequently, “only it would have to be added, once more, that if such a choice were possible, it 
would not necessarily be rational to choose to be more purely rational than we are” (1962: 28; 
emphasis added). It is difficult to be certain what Strawson means here, but I speculate that he 
believes that if we were to become more fully rational, there would be some “losses to human 
life” (1962: 14). The reactive attitudes—and here Strawson seems to take a step beyond his claim 
that there is nothing useful to be said about the justification of the reactive attitudes as a class—
might be said to enrich human life. That is, the reactive attitudes are intrinsically valuable, so 
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trying to give them up would not constitute moral progress.  Whatever the correct interpretation 40
of Strawson’s footnote may be, it is clear that Hare takes a different view: we should become as 
much like archangels as we can, given our current makeup, and beyond that it is regrettable that 
we have the makeup we do.  41
 To sum up, the most significant disanalogy between Hare’s and Strawson’s moral 
psychologies is that Strawson is a pluralist about practical reason, but Hare is not. Even if 
Strawson could be interpreted as holding that the reactive attitudes are irrational from the 
standpoint of the objective attitude, he would not want to say that the reactive attitudes are 
irrational tout court. They would be irrational only relative to the objective attitude. But Hare 
maintains that our intuitive dispositions are irrational tout court. Intuitive thinking, both as a 
class and as a series of individual dispositions, must be justified on the basis of critical thinking, 
and only to the extent that it is required by our psychological makeup. Furthermore, because the 
view from critical thinking shows the intuitive dispositions to be imperfect tools, critical thinking 
cannot fully affirm or endorse intuitive thinking. Intuitive thinking is a kind of necessary evil: we 
can justify relying on it because of contingent facts about who we are, but it would be even better 
if we could replace it.  42
 When Williams objects that critical thinking cannot find our intuitive dispositions fully 
justified, there is therefore a sense in which Hare should agree. Hare explicitly recognizes that 
 Strawson’s later clarification of his footnote seems to bear this out: “When I said that the surrender of 40
the reactive attitudes would bring us nearer to being ‘purely rational creatures’, I did not mean that some 
irrational elements would disappear from our lives; for I am not committed to the view that reactive 
attitudes are irrational. I meant only that some affective elements, elements of feeling or emotion, would 
disappear, leaving us more exclusively ratiocinative creatures than before” (1980: 261). See Miller 
(2014b) for intriguing further discussion. 
 Indeed, this view was precisely the basis for pressing Williams’ objection from alienation. 41
 I am grateful to Dale Miller for helping me to formulate the claims made in this paragraph. 42
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intuitive thinking is not fully justified, from a critical point of view, and that it sometimes leads 
us morally astray. For example, he discusses a case in which, traveling to Czechoslovakia at a 
time when the country was under Communist rule and hostile to academic visitors, he was asked 
by the border officials the purpose of his visit (1981: 31). From the point of view of intuitive 
thinking, he would feel guilty if he told a lie, which, given his account of the intuitive 
dispositions, means that he thinks that he ought not to tell the lie. But he also judges, from the 
point of view of critical thinking, both that he ought to tell the lie, in order not to be deported 
from the country (i.e., that his intuitive dispositions ought to be overridden in this case), and that 
he ought to have been thinking that he ought to tell the lie (i.e., that it would be morally worse if 
he did not feel guilt at the prospect of lying). This means that Hare must think, critically, that in 
responding to those intuitive feelings in this case he would have been acting contrary to reason.  
 Other cases have the inverse structure, in which intuitive thinking is not critically 
justified and yet does not lead us morally astray. Hare considers various trolley-style rescue 
cases, in which, for instance, one has to choose between rescuing one’s family member and some 
larger number of strangers. To Hare, the utilitarian has the resources to claim that she would do 
the intuitively right thing, e.g., rescue her family member, because that is the course of action 
that flows from the best intuitive dispositions, and because these rescue cases are statistically 
rare and therefore not the subject of our customary intuitions. But nonetheless, the critically right 
thing to do would be to save the greatest number (1981: 138-9). In these cases, the right act—for 
Hare as an act-utilitarian, the very best act that could be performed—is one that no one with the 
best intuitive dispositions ever would perform.  43
 For a similar analysis, see Railton (1984: 156-60). What is so fascinating about these cases is that they 43
reveal that for the utilitarian, sometimes doing the right thing is both impossible and inappropriate.
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 There are many objections that could be raised to Hare’s treatment of these cases, but I 
will remain neutral on the issues raised by his first-order reasons claims here. What I want to 
stress is Williams’ point that, given the possibility and potential frequency of these gaps between 
the critically right action and the course of action recommended by our intuitive dispositions, 
Hare has not justified his claim that critical thinking has selected these dispositions. In particular, 
he has not really undergone the process of critical thinking that he describes.  
 This challenge can be read in two ways: it’s a fantasy to imagine that we selected these 
dispositions, and in any case doubtful that we should have selected these dispositions. First, even 
if we could show that our intuitive dispositions had general utility, that would not establish that 
they were selected in any interesting sense, let alone selected by a procedure that aims to 
maximize general utility, or to implement any other second level criterion of right action. 
Second, it’s doubtful that critical thinking would select these dispositions, the ones that we as a 
matter of fact have. As Williams points out, if we start from the claim that critical thinking 
provides the correct account of right action, but that we cannot always think in critical terms, 
then there are “many styles of everyday moral thought that might in practice produce the best 
results” in applying that account of right action (1988: 191). But given that, by the 
consequentialist’s own lights, it ought to be an empirical question which kind of everyday 
thinking is the best stand-in for critical thinking, why should it be deep dispositions and not rules 
of thumb? It seems prima facie plausible that we would produce better consequences overall if 
we could entirely abandon our dispositions to blame and resentment, or even our entire concept 
of moral desert, and instead sanction others simply on the basis of whether punishing them 
would have greater expected utility. This is the source of Williams’ suspicion that Hare isn’t 
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really engaged in the process of reflection he thinks he is.  In fact, Williams goes further and 44
claims that Hare, like many utilitarians since Sidgwick, “makes pretty cavalier use of what are 
supposed to be evident matters of fact” in constructing his justifications for various existing 
practices (1995: 163).  Hare himself admits that he wants to overcome “the objection to 45
utilitarianism that it yields counter-intuitive prescriptions” (1988: 288), which provides some 
evidence that he is, despite appearances to the contrary, taking intuitive thinking as a given and 
constructing a justification for that, as opposed to undergoing the procedure of critical thinking in 
an open-minded way.  
 Given that an agent’s commitment to her theory is supposed to be overriding, then she 
faces a dilemma: either she hasn’t fully justified her ordinary dispositions, and by her own lights 
should not rationally think in those terms, or she has fully justified those dispositions, but by her 
own lights her ordinary thinking is illusory. In requiring agents to have an overriding 
commitment to the theories they adopt, the Reconstructive view has undesirable outcomes. These 
objections give us reason to abandon it. In the following chapters, I will develop one 
 As mentioned above, Miller mentions this objection but never explicitly discusses how his Strawsonian 44
reading of Hare allows him to respond to it. As he nicely puts it, “Williams is alluding to the possibility 
that someone might give a kind of ‘lip service’ to the claims that only utility has intrinsic value and that 
her prima facie principles are only goads to encourage her to act in ways that are better from the 
utilitarian standpoint,” and thus “prove unwilling to approach the question of whether it might be better 
from the utilitarian standpoint for her to try to change [her prima facie principles] with the genuinely open 
mind that authentic critical thinking requires” (2014a: 45). I am about to suggest that taking Strawson 
seriously would require Hare to give up the idea that critical thinking, or any second level criterion of 
right action, should automatically have deliberative priority. 
 Hare’s justification for partiality, for instance, is remarkably flat-footed: “If mothers had the propensity 45
to care equally for all the children in the world, it is unlikely that children would be as well provided for 
even as they are” (1981: 137). The facts that many societies raise children communally, or that equal care 
could be combined with targeted interventions on behalf of certain children, are ignored by Hare. Chapter 
3 discusses partiality in much greater detail. 
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Constructive theory in greater detail. In closing, I want to briefly explain why the Constructive 
view in general does not face the objections discussed here. 
 Return to the Strawsonian example from above. If you step on my toe, then from the 
perspective of intuitive thinking I will take myself to have reason to seek redress, i.e., to treat 
you as an agent and to demand some kind of apology or restitution. (A minor infraction, to be 
sure, but the structure of the case remains constant even as the gravity of complaint rises.) Yet 
these are not the only moral reasons I might have in such a situation. For Strawson, further 
reasons are available when I take up the objective attitude, whether in response to a conflict or 
not. Taking up the objective attitude offers me an explanation that makes no reference to 
intentions, decisions, or other agential concepts. Instead, the behavior is explained in terms of 
extra-agential forces, and that explanation in turn might give me reasons to alter my emotions 
(reasons not to feel resentment) or my actions (reasons to avoid further engagement). This invites 
the question of which reasons I should act on, and hence the prior question of which attitude I 
have most reason to take up. Sometimes, of course, the answer will be settled by appeal to 
knowable facts: learning that someone (perhaps even oneself) suffers from an autism spectrum 
disorder or a post-traumatic stress disorder ought to elicit the objective attitude and its 
concomitant reasons for treatment and control. But sometimes such explanations are not 
available, in which case we face a choice. And when we face a choice, whether we should treat 
someone as an agent or as determined depends on what our aims are. If my aim is to persevere in 
a close personal relationship with you, and I find that you are acting aberrantly, then I should 
choose to take up the objective attitude only when I believe that doing so would further that aim. 
Taking up the objective attitude at all times is not only impossible, given who we are, but would 
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distance us from enjoying close personal relationships with others.  And the aim of getting 46
along with others is one we are given from within the intuitive attitude, with the “general 
framework of human life.” So we should take Strawson at his word when he calls the objective 
attitude a “resource” (1962: 10) for explanation and, potentially, conflict resolution.  If the 47
objective attitude is to give us further reasons, then those have to be informed by our aims at the 
intuitive level. Of course, one of our aims can be to follow an ethical theory, and ethical theories 
can even help us to set our aims. But on the Constructive view, we have reasons not to adopt the 
ideal of reconstructing our motivations in light of theory. To anticipate the next chapters, we do 
not need to see ourselves as making progress toward that distant ideal so much as progress away 
from our current, non-ideal practices. 
  
4. Conclusion 
 Clearly much more needs to be said about how second level justifications are supposed to 
operate. The next chapters will do just that, as I explore how the Constructive view of the 
relationship between theory and deliberation constrains possibilities for the form of justification 
in general. In particular, I adopt a non-ideal, teleological, practice-based theory of the right 
(Chapter 2), and then apply a Constructive view of such a theory to our practices of partiality in 
particular (Chapter 3). This chapter has focused much more on the first level of ethical thinking, 
arguing that our ordinary motivations should be understood not as rules of thumb for 
implementing a second level criterion of right action, but as resilient attitudes that can be 
 Shabo (2012) provides a defense of this claim against Sommers (2007). 46
 Other writers who urge this pragmatist conception of ethical theories as tools include Hämäläinen 47
(2009) and, with reference to Mill’s consequentialism in particular, Kitcher (2010). 
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modified only piecemeal by our second level justifications. Understanding the two levels of 
ethical thinking in this way allows us to avoid not just the self-defeat and idle spectator 
objections, but various kinds of instability. 
 How serious are the objections presented here? It depends in part on how widespread the 
Reconstructive view is. An objector might worry that my challenge is fairly trivial: even if the 
Reconstructive view is no strawman, Hare is something of an outlier in contemporary 
philosophy. After all, almost nobody believes that moral language is necessarily prescriptive and 
universal, and that because of these logical features moral thinking requires identifying with 
everyone’s preferences. But those metaethical views are orthogonal to the Reconstructive view, 
which is neutral across competing theories. My objections apply to any ethical psychology on 
which an agent is supposed to be most committed to a second level criterion of rightness that 
requires a distinct set of motivations to be implementable. For instance, a Kantian two-level 
psychology might hold that the maxims behind one’s actions should all be tested against the 
Categorical Imperative and yet allow that in ordinary decision-making we ought to be motivated 
by our reactive attitudes. Although Kant himself seems to have held that our ethical feelings are, 
to the extent they are deserving of that name, “emanations of reason that are necessarily 
congruent with the Categorical Imperative” (Miller 2014a: 58-9), many contemporary Kantians 
would deny this (e.g., Herman 1981; Baron 1984), and if they do, they will be vulnerable to the 
objections discussed here. The same goes for virtue ethicists who concede that there is a gap 
between how the virtuous person would do something, with her ideal set of ethical sentiments, 
and how the less than fully virtuous person would do it (e.g., Driver 2006). So there are 
Reconstructive views of these non-consequentialist theories.  
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 Others need to be considered on a case-by-case basis. Derek Parfit’s recent Triple Theory 
offers a criterion—“An act is wrong just when such acts are disallowed by some principle that is 
optimific, uniquely universally willable, and not reasonably rejectable” (2011a: 413)—that 
purports to be a “single supreme principle” (2011b: 155) of morality, a principle to which we 
should have an overriding commitment. Parfit recognizes the need for a “motive theory” to tell 
us “which motives we ought to have, and what we ought to be disposed to do” (2011a: 407), 
though he does not himself develop one. This strongly suggests the Reconstructive claim that our 
ordinary modes of deliberation are justified only to the extent they are sanctioned by the theory. 
The status of T. M. Scanlon’s contractualism is less certain, since his formula that an act if wrong 
if it would be disallowed by a set of principles that no one could reasonably reject is intended as 
an analysis of what it is for an act to be wrong; what makes an act wrong “are the properties that 
would make any principle that allow it one that it would be reasonable to reject” (1998: 391 n. 
21). Since the contractualist criterion, unlike the others I considered, does not explain what 
fundamentally makes acts right or wrong, it may or may not count as a theory in the sense 
described here; it depends on whether and how it is supposed to guide our everyday deliberation. 
In either case, though, it seems that the Reconstructive view is sufficiently widespread to be 
worth the arguments I have offered against it.   
 Williams is right to deflate the ambition to reconstruct our entire ethical life in the light of 
theory, pointing us to those features that cannot be seen as fully justifiable from outside. We find 
ourselves dragging around too many unselected dispositions. Yet he would be wrong to believe 
that we cannot employ a utilitarian criterion, or any second level ethical criterion, as a tool—an 
instrument, to use the word of Dewey and Tufts from my epigraph—constrained by our intuitive 
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dispositions to react to others in ordinary ways. On the Constructive view I have sketched in this 
essay, we do not have to indulge in impossible feats of psychological division, or be alienated 
from our own psychology, or succumb to rational instability, in order to make use of theory. We 
only have to recognize that our first level thinking can have value, and be a source of reasons, 
independently of our ethical theorizing.  
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Chapter Two: Justification for Non-Ideal Practices 
      Take the love of drunkenness; take bashfulness, the 
      terror of high places, the tendency to seasickness, 
      to faint at the sight of blood, the susceptibility to 
      musical sounds; take the emotion of the comical,  
      the passion for poetry, for mathematics, or for 
      metaphysics, — no one of these things can be  
      wholly explained by either association or utility. 
      They go with other things that can be so explained, 
      no doubt; and some of them are prophetic of future 
      utilities, since there is nothing in us for which some  
      use may not be found. 
       — William James, “The Moral Philosopher 
       and the Moral Life” 
 The denial of a Reconstructive view of ethical thinking—on which our intuitive 
dispositions have value only as an implementation of an ideal criterion of rightness—is 
compatible with a wide range of positive views about which criterion to adopt in a Constructive 
manner. One could be a Constructive Kantian, a Constructive virtue ethicist, a Constructive 
egoist, and so forth. In the remaining chapters of the dissertation, I will be advocating just one 
such positive view: a Constructive utilitarianism. On this view, we are in general permitted to act 
on the reasons given by our ordinary first-level practices, so long as those practices contribute to 
the good, but at the second level, we employ a utilitarian standard to guide our efforts at reform. 
My primary aim in this chapter is to motivate this view. Constructive utilitarianism is a non-
ideal, teleological, and practice-based theory, and each of those components requires defense. I 
first argue that theory should be non-ideal rather than ideal, not only because of ideal theory’s 
practical and psychological burdens—rehearsed in the previous chapter—but because ideal 
theory falls prey to the fallacy of approximation and epistemic inadequacy (section 1). I then 
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argue that theory should be teleological rather than deontological, since the fundamental purpose 
of ethics is to bring about the good (section 2), and that theory should be practice-based rather 
than action-based (section 3). Though I believe that anticipations of each of these three features 
can be found in Strawson, they are better developed by John Stuart Mill and William James. Like 
Strawson, Mill and James believe that ethical theorizing should operate in a highly indirect way 
on our everyday thinking. But whereas the Strawsonian Constructive view, as I have 
characterized it so far, is indirect only as a matter of practice—it allows that decision procedures 
are separable from criteria of rightness—a Constructive utilitarian view is indirect as a matter of 
theory as well. That is, it applies the utilitarian standard not directly to particular actions but 
indirectly to rule-governed patterns of action and attitude, or practices. 
 Having argued for this kind of a utilitarian theory, I then claim—by reference to our 
practices of regret, toleration, and punishment—that it is preferable to a more familiar 
maximizing act-utilitarian standard (section 4). For each practice, on my view, agents are 
required to bracket certain considerations, that is, to refrain from treating some valid, undefeated 
reasons as motivating reasons to act. This gives rise to a different challenge, which is not that 
deliberation is unstable but that it is psychologically impossible, and I respond to this challenge 
as well, returning to issues of how we ought to deliberate in everyday life (section 5), before 
briefly summarizing my conclusions and setting up the following chapter (section 6). The overall 
theory that emerges in this chapter can be called Non-Ideal Practice Utilitarianism, on which 
agents are equally permitted both to follow some of the actual practices of their societies, even 
where these are to some degree imperfect, and to work toward reform, guided by the utilitarian 
standard. 
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1. Non-Ideal Theory 
 By ‘non-ideal’, I mean a distinctive approach to theorizing, one that aims not at 
establishing ideal end-state principles but at diagnosing problems in our current practices and 
proposing hypotheses about how to ameliorate those problems. My first goal is to motivate the 
pursuit of non-ideal theorizing in ethical theory. In recent philosophy, most of the debate in this 
area has been about political theory, inspired by Rawls’ claims about ideal principles of justice. 
Ideal political theory offers principles of justice for a perfectly just society; ideal ethical theory 
offers principles of rightness for perfectly right actions. 
 In political theory, the basic motivation for going non-ideal is that we want theory to be 
able to guide action. That is, theoretical principles should be sensitive to facts about what we can 
feasibly do now. Ideal theorists do not necessarily accept this motivation. For instance, G. A. 
Cohen, in Rescuing Justice and Equality, puts the point starkly: “the question for political 
philosophy is not what we should do but what we should think, even when what we should think 
makes no practical difference” (2008: 268). Cohen simply rejects the idea that principles of 
justice should be capable of guiding us, that they should be tailored to the motivational and 
cognitive capacities of human beings as they are. Elizabeth Anderson, in The Imperative of 
Integration, offers a forceful disagreement: “I do not advance principles and ideals for a perfectly 
just society, but ones that we need to cope with the injustices in our current world, and to move 
us to something better” (2010: 3). The non-ideal theorist wants principles that are normative for 
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us, capable of giving us reasons to act, and not merely evaluative, telling us what is or would be 
best.     48
 Reframing this motivation in terms of ethical rather than political theory, our criteria of 
rightness must be capable of guiding us; otherwise they will not be able to play a deliberative 
role, since we could not necessarily act on principles for beings with different capacities. An 
ideal ethical theorist such as Hare might seem to have a straightforward response to this, namely 
that the very purpose of distinguishing intuitive from critical thinking is to tailor our critical 
principles to our intuitive capacities. After all, since we cannot be archangels, we have to develop 
prima facie principles—intuitive dispositions—to implement the deliverances of critical 
thinking.  
 The whole point of my previous chapter was to object to just this philosophical move: the 
gambit of identifying an ideal criterion of rightness independently of our motivational and 
cognitive capacities and then insisting that the only value our admittedly imperfect capacities 
have is as approximations of that ideal. For one thing, I argued that we have reason to be 
skeptical of our ability to undergo the justificatory procedure that Hare describes, as opposed to 
simply reanalyzing our motives in a post hoc way. We did not select most of our motivational 
and cognitive dispositions, and, given the possibility and potential frequency of gaps between the 
 Laura Valentini (2012) distinguishes three different notions of non-ideal versus ideal political theory. 48
One is the Rawlsian distinction between conditions of partial and full compliance with the demands of 
justice; this is not at all my focus here, though it is perhaps the most frequent sense of ‘non-ideal’ in the 
contemporary literature (cf. Stemplowska 2017). A second is the distinction between realistic and utopian 
conceptions of justice, which do and do not, respectively, place feasibility constraints on what constitutes 
justice. A third is the distinction between transitional and end-state justice, and whether we should content 
ourselves with making progress from some imperfect state rather than progress to a perfect state. My 
focus is the third, although feasibility constraints are clearly relevant to non-ideal theory in this 
transitional sense, because they constrain the possibilities for reasonable progress from our current state. 
Notice that Hare’s archangels elide Valentini’s three notions: archangels are imagined as fully compliant 
with utopian principles of end-state rightness. 
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critically right action and the course of action recommended by our intuitive dispositions, it is 
doubtful that we would have selected these dispositions if we were really thinking critically. But 
even if we did think we could develop a feasible implementation of an independently-formulated 
ideal criterion of rightness, I argued that there are good reasons not to do so, since Hare’s gambit 
results in: an unstable bifurcation between the two modes of thinking; the potential for alienation 
from one’s intuitive dispositions simply on the basis of adopting an ethical theory; and a 
commitment to believing that one’s ethical thinking is rationally inconsistent, because from the 
point of view of critical thinking, one is rationally required to act on reasons that are illusory 
from that same point of view.  
 My arguments in the last chapter, then, have already done a lot of work to motivate the 
pursuit of non-ideal ethical theory: they suggest that we do not want principles of rightness (or 
justice) for archangels, but for humans. This is not to scrap thinking in terms of ideals altogether. 
Rather, it is to conceive of ideals differently, not as standards of assessment, outside of practice, 
for any society (in the case of political philosophy) or any person (in the case of ethics), but as 
diagnostic tools for identifying current deficiencies and suggesting hypothetical solutions to be 
tested in practice. Still, even if one found the previous chapter’s objections to be unpersuasive, 
however lengthily rehearsed, there are at least two other objections from political theory that 
speak against the ability of ideal principles to guide us successfully. I want to show that these 
objections apply to ethical theory as well.  
 The first objection is that when we employ ideal theory to evaluate our current practices, 
we risk falling into the trap of thinking that the solution is to adopt policies aimed at directly 
closing the gap between the ideal and the current reality. This trap goes by the name of the 
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fallacy of approximation: the unjustified assumption that trying to approximate a desired result 
will produce the best outcomes. As Adam Morton memorably puts it, the fallacy consists in 
“thinking that an attempt to approximate an ideal will lead to approximately ideal results” (2012: 
25). Suppose that your doctor has prescribed a drug cocktail of three pills, but you only have two 
of the pills. It would be a mistake to infer that taking only two of the pills is better than taking 
none, even though the former is a closer approximation of the prescription than the latter. This is 
because the value contribution of each pill might depend on the presence of the others and could 
even have harmful effects if taken alone. In this case, the relevant kind of interaction is causal, 
but the fallacy applies to non-causal interaction as well. Take an example of aesthetic value: if I 
am trying to paint like Monet, I might do worse if I use his color palette and pattern of 
brushstrokes, but not his technique for layering paint, than if I simply captured his layering 
technique alone. Rather than directly approximating Monet’s style, I have to build up my 
technique in a different sequence if I want to paint like him. A third example comes from 
Anderson’s political philosophy: if you think the ideal society is a color-blind meritocracy, it 
doesn’t necessarily follow that the best way to achieve that is to immediately end race-conscious 
policies. Creating a genuine meritocracy might first require initiatives to rectify inequalities of 
opportunity between whites and people of color.  
 I think there are similar cases within ethics as well. The virtue ethical tradition has long 
maintained that the virtuous person should be seen as an exemplar, a model to be followed for 
the imperfectly (i.e., only approximately) virtuous.  And many in the Kantian tradition claim 49
that I should treat my fully rational self as an ideal to imitate (e.g., Korsgaard 1986b). But this 
 The literature on this topic is vast and still-growing. One important recent contribution is Linda 49
Zagzebski’s Exemplarist Moral Theory (2017). 
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exemplar view, whether virtue-ethical or Kantian, commits the fallacy of approximation, at least 
if unqualified. Consider Michael Smith’s example of the angry squash player. Suppose I have 
just suffered a humiliating defeat and now have a consuming desire to smash my opponent in the 
face with a racket. If I were fully rational, or a virtuous person, then I would exercise good 
sportsmanship and walk over to shake my opponent’s hand. But that is not what I—an 
imperfectly virtuous and less-than-fully-rational person—should do, since if I walk over, I might 
well act on my desire! According to Smith, “what I have reason to do in my uncalm and uncool 
state is to smile politely and leave the scene as quickly as possible” (1995: 111). Trying to 
approximate the ideal would have worse results than taking my non-ideal circumstances into 
account. 
 Now the ideal theorist may have a response at this point, which is to reject the exemplar 
model in favor of a template model. David Estlund, for instance, now holds that the role of ideals 
is not “as a goal to be promoted or approximated, but as a template against which to identify 
epistemically offending features” (forthcoming: 20). I will argue momentarily that my second 
objection targets even the template model, but let me first note that retreating from the exemplar 
model is itself a significant concession to the non-ideal theorist, since it eliminates one crucial 
role for the would-be exemplar: namely, as a model for action. That is, exemplars no longer play 
a role for mere mortals qua ideal agents: due to the fallacy of approximation, we are not entitled 
to assume that we should act as they do. One might object that an exemplar could still play a 
guiding role, not as a model, but as a giver of advice. But notice that, for the exact same reason
—the fallacy of approximation—exemplars’ lofty epistemic status as advisors cannot derive from 
their status as ideal agents. Neither we mere mortals nor the exemplars are entitled to assume 
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that there is a straightforward inference from the ideal course of action to identifying the second-
best approximation to that course of action. Rather, both we and the exemplars would need to 
arrive at that knowledge in some other way. I am not suggesting that exemplars might not have 
special abilities that could help them give good advice, just that whatever those abilities are, they 
would be distinct from their ability to choose the ideally right thing to do in any situation. 
 Hare’s own claims are insensitive to the distinction between treating archangels as 
exemplars and listening to their advice. Some of his language appears to suggest that the 
archangels are advice-givers: “the right or best way for us to live or act either in general or on a 
particular occasion is what the archangel would pronounce to be so if he addressed himself to the 
question” (1981: 46). But what the archangel pronounces is not tailored to our imperfections, but 
is simply the right act, full stop. Tellingly, intuitive thinking, for Hare, “has the function of 
yielding a working approximation … for those of us who cannot think like archangels on a 
particular occasion” (1981: 46). For all he has said, therefore, Hare runs afoul of the fallacy of 
approximation by assuming that the archangels are exemplars whose style of thinking we should 
try to approximate.  
 It might be open to a Harean to radically revise Hare’s position and argue that the 
archangels should be treated as templates (ignoring the claims quoted in the previous paragraph). 
The second objection to ideal theory, however, speaks against using ideals even as templates 
against which to identify problematic features. The worry is that ideal theory might prevent us 
from recognizing injustices in our current, non-ideal world. That is, not only are ideals 
potentially unable to guide action, they can be positively distorting insofar as they can blind us to 
actual problems. In Rawls’ perfectly just society, some class inequality will exist, and thus the 
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principles of justice must be justified to members of each class position. But no racial positions 
exist in Rawls’ ideal society, and a fortiori the principles of justice do not need to be justified to 
members of each racial position. Thus Rawls’ theory of justice is, as Anderson puts it, 
“epistemologically disabling: it makes us blind to the existence of race-based injustice” (2010: 
5). Anderson considers the racial segregation of many neighborhoods in the contemporary 
United States, a pattern that often occurs because whites prefer to live in neighborhoods that 
contain few non-whites. This preference would be permissible even in an ideal Rawlsian society, 
given rights of free speech and association. Now admittedly, a Rawlsian could identify other 
problems with segregated neighborhoods, such as susceptibility to welfare harms, class 
inequalities, or the assault on individual dignity produced by hostile treatment from others. But 
he could not identify the expressive injuries done to someone simply in virtue of belonging to a 
racially stigmatized group. Such injuries are, as Anderson says, “invisible from the position of 
the putatively raceless individual” (2010: 6).  I call this the problem of false positives, in which 50
an objectionable state of affairs, such as racially segregated housing, is not diagnosable as such 
by ideal theory.  
 Hare’s archangels are, as characterized, similarly blind to certain problems. First, since 
Hare does not situate them in a determinate context, we do not know what kind of social and 
political situation they face. Is this a society of scarcity or plenty, of unrest or stability? Second, 
they lack many recognizably human dispositions, including “partiality to self” (1981: 44), and 
thus might be ill-considered templates for those of us who do evince such partiality.  Third, their 51
 For a blistering critique of ideal theory on the grounds that it can blind us to the working of oppression 50
in our actual context, see Mills (2004). 
 Indeed, Mill’s sensitivity to the moral asymmetry between self and other is one of many reasons to 51
prefer his flavor of utilitarianism to Hare’s. I expand on this discussion of partiality at length in Chapter 3.
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perfections more generally make them insensitive to what the imperfect should do. The ideally 
virtuous person may well have started from a position of mixed virtue and have retained some 
familiarity with imperfection, but the archangels are envisioned as existing ab aeterno.  Not 52
only angry squash players, but jealous lovers, embittered siblings, envious bankers, ruthless 
careerists, listless depressives, and raging narcissists are all potentially unable to perform the 
single fully right act identified by the archangels. Even if Hare’s archangels could diagnose these 
characters’ problems as such, and not as failures of universalizability or what have you, they 
would again face the fallacy of approximation. In other words, the archangels may be able to tell 
such people that they would be better off losing those traits, but what are they to do now? How to 
get from here to there?  
 Not only can ideal theory produce false positives in blithely overlooking actual problems, 
however; it can produce false negatives as well. This is underappreciated even by non-ideal 
theorists. The flip-side of failing to diagnose problems in our current context that would not 
obtain in an ideal context is an overzealous criticism of features of our current context that are 
not in fact problematic now, even though they may or may not be present in an ideal context. For 
instance, affirmative action policies are arguably valuable within our current context, but from 
the perspective of the ideal of color-blind meritocracy, they might seem unjust. False negatives 
will be crucial to my argument against maximizing act-utilitarianism in section 4 below, which 
holds that currently unproblematic practices of regret, toleration, and punishment can be 
 St. Paul is, arguably, alive to this point when he writes that “we do not have a high priest [i.e., Jesus] 52
who is unable to sympathize with our weaknesses, but we have one who was tempted in every way that 
we are, yet was without sin” (Hebrews 4:15). Insofar as he knows how the imperfect can overcome 
temptation, Jesus is therefore a better ethical ideal than a Harean archangel. 
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approved by the Constructive utilitarian but would be condemned by the Reconstructive ideal 
utilitarian.  
 What about within ethics? How could ideal ethical theories be epistemologically 
disabling? There is a variety of possibilities here, but I’ll offer just one example of a false 
negative, again from the virtue-ethical tradition. On eudaimonist theories, there is a close 
connection between living virtuously and living well: one should live so as to flourish, where 
flourishing is partially constituted by beneficial living conditions and partially constituted by an 
exercise of the virtues. But under non-ideal conditions of oppression, flourishing may be 
unattainable on both fronts, whether because of pervasive harmful external conditions or because 
of the kind of damage to the virtues produced by widespread relationships of domination and 
subordination. And if flourishing requires reasoning well about practical matters, or having one’s 
desires formed properly, and one’s reasoning and desires are distorted by racist, sexist, classist, 
or homophobic ideology, then one may be unable to flourish. So eudaimonism might wrongly 
criticize agents for being unable to flourish under conditions of oppression (cf. Tessman 2009).  
 To sum up, the first objection to ideal theory claims that it can’t help us get from here to 
there; the second claims that ideal theory often misdiagnoses where we actually ought to be 
going. At this point in the debate, an ideal theorist might object that non-ideal theory is too tied 
to the status quo and that it has fallen into a ‘sour grapes’ scenario in which we insist that we 
don’t want what we can’t have. Isn’t there a need for some theory in identifying objectionable 
practices and reasonable alternatives to them? To this the non-ideal theorist responds of course! 
Non-ideal theory still endorses ideals. We just have to reconceive their function, not as standards 
of assessment for any society or individual, but as diagnostic tools for identifying current 
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deficiencies and suggesting hypothetical solutions to be tested in practice. Non-ideal theory 
insists that we do not need knowledge of the best in order to have knowledge of the better.  We 53
do not need an ideal of perfect health—what would that even consist in?—in order to diagnose 
and treat obesity, allergies, viral infections, and other conditions. I do not want to pretend that 
these objections to ideal theorizing are conclusive, but simply to claim that they provide further 
motivation for exploring the possibilities of non-ideal theorizing, particularly in ethics.   54
  
2. Teleological Theory  
 In this section, I want to motivate the idea that (non-ideal) theory should be teleological 
rather than deontological. Philosophers in recent years have made increasing refinements to our 
understanding of these two terms, but I propose to start with a simple contrast. Teleological 
theorists hold, and deontological theorists deny, that considerations of goodness are the only 
fundamental determinants of rightness. According to teleologists, what ultimately matters in 
ethics is good outcomes or consequences: there is no intrinsic value to following moral rules, 
behaving as the virtuous person does, or acting rationally. These aspects of ethics are valuable 
only insofar as, and because, they promote or instantiate good outcomes.  
 The most powerful argument for adopting a teleological approach to ethics is a simple 
one: it is better placed to justify the content of our morality than deontology can. Here’s a short 
version of the argument: teleologists about ethics can answer a question that deontologists 
 See Dewey (1910), Sen (2009), and Anderson (2010). For forceful disagreement on this point, see 53
Simmons (2010); for further discussion, see Valentini (2012).
 Indeed, the most recent work on this topic in political philosophy suggests that most players in the 54
debate now think of the distinction as lying along a continuum, with different degrees of ideality suited to 
different purposes (see Weber & Vallier 2017). This is a welcome development, since it emphasizes the 
various uses to which theory can be put. 
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cannot, or can only answer obscurely, namely why we should follow the moral rules. The answer 
that they are intrinsically valuable is unsatisfying, and the answer that they are grounded in the 
value of rational agency is obscure. But teleologists can explain that wrong acts harm, and that 
right acts benefit, those who do them or those to whom they are done. And it’s their badness and 
goodness that, in some way, make acts wrong or right. A deontologist who held, plausibly, that 
we should not harm others would either have to deny that being harmed is bad, or deny that the 
wrongness of harming is explained by its tendency to make things worse. This gives teleology an 
explanatory advantage: it can help to justify the deontological restrictions we do have, without 
pretending that they have any value as such.  
 While the most familiar incarnation of teleological ethics—maximizing act-utilitarianism
—can seem to give the wrong verdict about particular moral cases, recommending that we 
punish an innocent, torture a child, or turn a trolley, even here, as Christian Coons puts it, “we 
must concede that the utilitarian has one heck of a point” (2012: 208). For if such acts would 
really make things best—best for everyone or best overall—then why shouldn’t we do them? Or 
as Simon Keller argues, if morality really advised us to do something other than what’s best for 
everyone, then “would we not be better off with something other than morality” (2009: 91)? I 
return to this point in section 3, where I suggest that the best way to resist these particular 
verdicts is by changing the evaluand to which rightness applies. In the remainder of this section, 
I want to discuss two historical proponents of the teleological view more generally as a way of 
elaborating its theoretical core.  
 Perhaps the most famous proponent of a teleological criterion of rightness was Mill. For 
all I have said so far, one could be a teleologist and an egoist about ethics, and hold that the good 
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is one’s personal good. Mill denies this: he holds that the good is the good of all. In particular, he 
is an axiological impartialist: everyone’s good, if equal in quantity and quality, is equally 
valuable. This claim is the cornerstone of utilitarianism, which amounts to a teleological criterion 
of rightness plus axiological impartiality.  
 Mill’s key idea is that happiness “is the justification, and ought to be the controller, of all 
ends, but is not itself the sole end” (VIII: 952). The claim that there are multiple ends could be 
interpreted as a hedonist claim, namely that we should choose all other ends only in light of 
happiness, or as a pluralist claim, namely that other ends can to some degree conflict with 
happiness. Furthermore, there are various complications in understanding the notion of happiness 
itself, whether in terms of the presence of occurrent pleasure and the avoidance of occurrent 
pain, the satisfaction of desire across a longer timespan, a broader notion of well-being, or 
something else entirely. I will try to remain fairly neutral on these issues in the theory of the 
good in favor of focusing on the theory of the right, although Chapter 3 argues that the goods of 
partiality have a much richer structure than is typically picked out by the thin notion of ‘utility’. 
 Some may wonder why I do not use the term ‘consequentialism’ rather than 
‘utilitarianism’ for my theory, given that I am happy to speak of various rich goods. One reason 
is simply terminological: to emphasize continuity with the Millian tradition by using Mill’s own 
preferred term (perhaps akin to the way that Mill used Bentham’s term while adopting a much 
richer conception of utility). Another reason is substantive, however: following Daniel Jacobson 
(2008), I take consequentialism to be committed to deontic impartiality, the claim that 
everyone’s happiness counts in the same way when evaluating actions as morally right or wrong. 
Utilitarianism without consequentialism amounts to the affirmation of a teleological criterion of 
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rightness and axiological impartiality, and the denial of deontic impartiality, most notably the 
claim that it makes no moral difference who is harmed or benefited. For Mill, as I read him, the 
asymmetry between self and other is morally significant: though my pleasure is just as valuable 
as your pleasure, I do not have the same reason to promote your pleasure as I do my own.  Mill 55
would reject the trope of the impartial spectator, who is indifferent to the distribution of 
happiness: a false positive in which the ideal exemplar or advice-giver is blind to actual 
problems.   
 William James picks up on the Millian notion of happiness in the essay from which my 
epigraph is taken.  For James, the aim of those who seek “an ethical philosophy”—what I would 56
call an ethical theory—is to weave “the moral relations that obtain among things” into “the unity 
of a stable system” (1956 [1897]: 184-5). James is explicit that this is a philosopher’s ideal, and 
one that may well go unrealized insofar as “the world resists reduction to the form of 
unity” (1956 [1897]: 185). It may turn out, that is, that our moral concepts are irreducibly plural. 
James distinguishes three questions in ethics, of which the most directly relevant to ethical 
theorizing in my sense is the casuistic question, which “asks what is the measure of the various 
goods and ills which men recognize, so that the philosopher may settle the true order of human 
 I recognize that this may be a controversial interpretation of Mill, and in future work I hope to turn my 55
attention to exegetical issues concerning Mill’s utilitarianism. Here I can only briefly mention Jacobson’s 
sentimentalist reading, on which plausible norms for the fittingness of, say, guilt and resentment are 
constrained by the nature of our sentiments, which do make a self/other distinction. Not only is this 
reading more consistent with my Strawsonian Constructivism, it also explains Mill’s rather extreme 
antipaternalism: “Mill clearly implies that when a person ‘does mischief’ to himself, his action is not yet 
amenable to moral disapproval [in the narrow sense of what we owe to each other], though both agent 
and act can be criticized in other terms—as selfish, intemperate, or foolish” (2008: 179). This is 
consistent with Mill’s commitment to axiological impartiality. 
 In fact, James dedicated his 1907 Pragmatism “To the Memory of John Stuart Mill from whom I first 56
learned the pragmatic openness of mind and whom my fancy likes to picture as our leader were he alive 
to-day.”
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obligations” (1956 [1897]: 185).  To ask this question is to wonder whether “the heap of things 57
demanded”—the many interests, preferences, and needs of individual people—could prove less 
chaotic than they initially seem, whether “they furnished their own relative test and 
measure” (1956 [1897]: 200). The casuistic question asks, in short, for a criterion of rightness.   58
 James surveys a number of potential responses, including recognizably virtue-ethical, 
Kantian, divine voluntarist, social Darwinist, and intuitionist criteria, and declares, “The best, on 
the whole, of these marks and measures of goodness seems to be the capacity to bring happiness” 
(1956 [1897]: 201). The non-ideal tenor of this sentence is clear: of the many possible criteria of 
rightness, happiness stands out as better than the rest. There is no implication that this is the ideal 
criterion independently of all particular times and places; James’ animadversions against a 
priority in ethics make that clear. Happiness is an ideal in the non-ideal sense: a hypothesis or 
solution to be aimed at in practice. But this idea has a Millian caveat: although happiness is the 
best criterion we have now, it cannot be “so used as to yield to the philosopher anything like a 
scientifically accurate and genuinely useful casuistic scale” (1956 [1897]: 201). James may have 
a variety of claims in mind here, but one is surely the denial of any kind of algorithmic decision 
procedure in ethical life. Another is the denial that happiness is the “one universal underlying 
kind of motive” (1956 [1897]: 201); as for Mill, happiness is not the ‘sole end’ in our 
deliberations. Still, for both Mill and James, it is currently the best ‘justification’ of our other 
ends.  
 The other two questions, the “psychological”—which inquires into the genealogical origins of our 57
moral ideas—and what James idiosyncratically calls the “metaphysical”—the semantic question of what 
our moral words mean—are less directly relevant to first-order ethical theorizing. 
 Though James speaks of a test of ‘goodness’, I think the reference to settling the order of human 58
obligations—a deontic notion—speaks in favor of interpreting him as offering a criterion of rightness. 
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 However the theory of the good shakes out, what matters for non-ideal teleological theory 
is that happiness is an aim that can be affirmed at both levels of ethical thinking. Not only should 
it be endorsed at the second level of ethical theorizing, it is pervasive in our ordinary first-level 
practices. Rather than interpolate a criterion of rightness from outside our practices entirely, we 
isolate one element of our practices, make it explicit, and use it to revise our practices going 
forward. As T. M. Scanlon, a committed contractualist, puts it,  
      it seems to me that a large part of the appeal of utilitarianism lies in the fact that it 
      identifies, in the idea of ‘the greatest happiness’, a substantive value which seems 
      at the same time to be clearly connected to the content of morality and, when  
      looked at from outside morality, to be something which is of obvious importance 
      and value, capable of explaining the great importance that morality claims for  
      itself (1998: 151). 
Following Mill and James, therefore, I take axiological impartiality as an assumption going 
forward. Mill’s own proof has seemed flawed to many, and a better argument may be simply to 
insist that, as John Skorupski puts it, we are, or at least should be if brought up well, “naturally 
disposed to hold that everyone’s good is of legitimate concern to all of us” (2006: 22).  59
Similarly, with James, we might hold that the demands of others are, in themselves, worthy of 
our ethical consideration; egoism and skepticism are not live philosophical possibilities. Thus far, 
then, my non-ideal utilitarianism offers a claim about the good—axiological impartiality—and a 
claim about the right—that happiness is criterial of it. The next step in filling out the theory is to 
answer two questions: rightness of what, and what suffices for rightness? 
 This natural disposition might be understood as a sentiment rather than an affectless cognition, which 59
would be more in keeping with Jacobson’s and Skorupski’s sentimentalist interpretations of Mill.
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3. Practice-Based Theory 
 The most familiar variety of utilitarianism applies the criterion of rightness directly to 
actions and claims that each action should, in order to count as right, promote the good. But a 
better variety of utilitarianism stresses the importance of evaluating rightness more 
systematically, in terms of rules rather than one-off actions. Richard Miller (2009) offers four 
reasons to prefer an indirect, rule-based criterion. First, determining right and wrong in terms of 
rules makes individual rationalization less likely. If agents are given greater flexibility in 
applying the criterion of rightness to each of their actions, they may be more susceptible to the 
temptation to tilt the scales of deliberation in their own favor. Second, determining right and 
wrong in terms of rules rather than one-off actions better promotes social coordination. If agents 
can reasonably expect that others are following the publicly promulgated rules rather than acting 
according to their individual judgment, then they can better secure the goods that can be 
achieved only through cooperation. Third, and relatedly, the mere fact of adhering to a public set 
of rules, whatever the content of those rules, facilitates the good of belonging to a moral 
community, of living on good terms with others. Fourth, adhering to a public set of rules secures 
freedom from blame, since rules are generally less vague in their application than the act-
utilitarian criterion. The demand to maximize the good on each occasion is often only hazily 
fulfilled, leaving individuals uncertain whether they are doing enough good.  Miller notes 60
finally, and crucially, that all these reasons speak in favor of applying the criterion of rightness to 
 Larissa MacFarquhar richly describes the pathologies of one philosophy graduate student who became 60
obsessed with living as maximizing act-utilitarianism demands before allowing herself to deny the 
doctrine: “It took her a long time to get to this point—several years of guilt and self-laceration—but at the 
end of it, she no longer believed that she was obliged to dedicate every waking moment to saving the 
world, or to pry ever more waking moments from her hours of sleep” (2015: 293). 
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actual rules rather than ideal rules, since these four advantages are all better secured by 
adherence to actual rules. If we are going to argue for a rule-based  criterion over an action-based 
criterion on the basis of these instrumental advantages, then for the sake of consistency we had 
better prefer actual rules over ideal rules.  
 Rather than focus exclusively on actual rules, however, I prefer to apply the criterion of 
rightness to actual practices. Practices are of course governed by rules, but practices also 
encompass more than rules: they embody habits of thought, feeling, and action beyond what can 
be encoded in rules alone. As such, they comprise more of ethical life. I develop the notion of a 
practice further in Chapter 3; for now, I hope simply to have motivated the shift away from an 
action-based criterion to a broader one.  
 The question of whether or not Mill subscribed to an act-utilitarian or a rule-utilitarian 
view is endlessly vexed, and I will not pursue that exegetical project here.  James is more 61
readily recruited to the anti-act-based view of rightness. Immediately after claiming that the best 
criterion we have is the capacity to bring happiness, he qualifies this in two important ways: “But 
in order not to break down fatally, this test must be taken to cover innumerable acts and impulses 
that never aim at happiness” (1956 [1897]: 201). First, then, James refers not only to acts, but to 
‘impulses’, a wider notion that gestures at the idea of habits of thought and feeling as well as 
action. Second, neither acts nor impulses always aim at, or are motivated by, happiness. In order 
for happiness to continue to offer a useful standard of assessment, therefore, we must ‘zoom out’, 
as I would put it, from a narrower evaluand to a wider one. The constitutive ethical aim of our 
 The currently dominant view holds that Mill was an act-utilitarian: see Crisp (1997). Rule-utilitarian 61
interpretations began with Urmson (1953) and continue today with Miller (2010) and others. Eggleston 
(2017) provides a useful overview of the debate. 
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practices can be happiness without its being the case that each particular action falling under the 
practice aims at happiness. James makes a related point in the epigraph: even if there are certain 
evaluands—including various emotions and psychological tendencies—that cannot be explained, 
or justified, by utility, they go with broader categories of evaluand that can be so justified.  
 The second question to ask is what suffices for rightness. Again, the most familiar variety 
of utilitarianism is maximizing, which means that rightness of an evaluand (whether an act, a 
rule, a motive, or something else) is tied to its producing the greatest amount of good possible. 
But maximizing criteria face notorious objections, especially when evaluated from the 
perspective of our actual, non-ideal practices. First, maximizing criteria eliminate the possibility 
of supererogation: going above and beyond what is required. If what is required is to maximize, 
then as a matter of definition there can be nothing above and beyond that level. Second, and 
relatedly, maximizing criteria imply that even small divergences from the standard are wrong. 
But this fails to fit our actual practices, on which wrongness is tied to blameworthiness. As Mill 
famously puts it in Utilitarianism, “We do not call anything wrong, unless we mean to imply that 
a person ought to be punished in some way or other for doing it” (X: 246). Suppose that giving 
away 50% of your income to charity is the right thing to do, from a maximizing point of view. 
That means that giving only 49%—which is still wildly revisionary of our practices—is wrong, 
and thus blameworthy. But we just do not seem capable of blaming someone who gives away 
that much of their income.  Although we can inquire about whether a better standard for 62
blameworthiness would be an improvement on our current practices, it is clear that by the lights 
of our current practices, giving 49% of one’s income away is not only not wrong, but would be 
 I modify this example from one given in a talk I heard by Christopher Macleod (2016), called “Mill, 62
Morality, and Malleability.” 
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highly praiseworthy. Third, it is not always clear how to maximize. As mentioned above, there is 
greater uncertainty in applying the act-utilitarian standard than in following the moral rules of 
one’s own society. And to repeat a point from section 1, we often know how to make something 
better without knowing how to make it the best. Rather than having to generate an ideal, we only 
need to work out whether a particular proposed revision will be better than the alternatives when 
promulgated in our immediate context. Thus, something less than the very best should suffice for 
rightness.  
 The theory that is emerging can still be used to generate a criterion of right action, but it 
will be derived from compliance with practices and hence only indirectly utilitarian: 
      Criterion of right action: An act is morally right if it is permitted by a justified  
      actual practice in one’s society, where a justified practice is one that better 
      promotes the happiness of those affected by it than the viable alternatives do. 
This criterion embodies all three theoretical desiderata: it is non-ideal, in claiming that a justified 
practice need not be perfect or end-state but only better than the viable alternatives; it is 
teleological, in appealing to happiness to rule out some practices and rule in others; and it is 
practice-based, in evaluating actions not directly in terms of happiness-promotion but indirectly 
in terms of compliance with happiness-promoting practices. Notice that non-ideal theory is still 
theory: it offers an explanatory principle that helps us to tell when actions are right.  
 My aim in this section has not been to provide a full argument for the theory, but to paint 
some of its basic attractions. The next section will move away from abstract theorizing into 
discussion of three concrete practices for which, I claim, Non-Ideal Practice Utilitarianism is 
superior to maximizing act-utilitarianism. On the latter approach, these practices—or, more 
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precisely, actions that fall under them—are unjustified, but on the former we can see how they 
can be justified.  
4. Three Case Studies 
 For each of these cases, I have two aims. The first is to describe and respond to the 
skeptical challenge from maximizing act-utilitarianism, namely that the phenomenon in question 
is in itself unjustified by a forward-looking utilitarian standard. Zooming out to a broader 
practice, of which the phenomenon is a constitutive part—attitudes of regret as partially 
constitutive of our practices of valuing, the flourishing of harmful opinions as partially 
constitutive of our practices of toleration, and the punishment of the guilty as partially 
constitutive of our practices of deterrence and rehabilitation—allows us to see how that 
phenomenon can be justified indirectly. But becoming aware of this strategy requires individual 
agents to bracket, that is, not to treat certain otherwise valid considerations as motivating 
reasons. Bracketing itself raises a puzzle: what justifies me in putting aside, in my deliberation, 
perfectly valid reasons for action? My second aim is to begin to address this puzzle by 
answering, for each case, three questions: Which considerations should be bracketed? How 
difficult is it, psychologically, to bracket? What justifies this bracketing? In section 5, I will 
address the broader challenge that bracketing is psychologically impossible. 
4.1 Wallace on Regret 
 One essential feature of utilitarian standards, no matter which evaluand they are applied 
to, is that they are forward-looking: they claim that outcomes or consequences provide better 
!82
terms of ethical assessment than backward-looking terms such as moral desert or reparability. As 
mentioned, the standards could be maximizing, or they could be something weaker: for whatever 
is being evaluated—actions, rules, motives, characters, attitudes, and so forth—we might ask 
only whether it ultimately contributes to more expected good effects than expected bad ones, and 
not whether it contributes to the most expected good effects. Act-utilitarians, no matter what their 
stance on maximization, hold that this is a compelling criterion for right action, given that action 
can affect only present and future states of affairs. But some attitudes, such as regret, are 
backward-looking, directed at past states of affairs that can no longer be changed. This raises a 
skeptical challenge. Can regret be justified by the forward-looking criterion? One response 
claims that since regret is not itself an action, it falls outside our theoretical purview. But this is 
too quick: since regret can be the primary motive for, or even embodied in, actions—such as 
expressions of grief and mourning—it is clearly relevant to a forward-looking evaluation. 
 Let me make the challenge more precise. Regret, as I characterized it in Chapter 1, is a 
negatively valenced emotion directed at a state of affairs that can no longer be changed.  Some 63
of those states of affairs are brought about through our own agency, in which case we feel 
remorse, a species of regret, but the more general emotion can also be occasioned by 
circumstances external to our agency. Regret has two features that give rise to the skeptical 
challenge: it is unpleasant to experience, and it appears to have no constructive point, given that, 
as Jay Wallace puts it, “it is no longer possible to do anything about the events that gave rise to” 
 On this definition, therefore, we can regret future states of affairs, at least if the probability of their 63
realization has attained some sufficiently high threshold. I can appropriately regret the coming 
catastrophes caused by climate change, for instance. 
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regret (2013: 30).  Thus it cannot be justified directly by the forward-looking criterion; it must 64
be justified indirectly, if at all.  
 A response naturally suggests itself: regret ultimately brings about more good effects than 
bad ones. Others judge me negatively if I do not seem subject to retrospective sadness over 
negative states of affairs: if I appear not to experience any grief at the funeral of a loved one, for 
instance, then others will find this disturbing and shun me. So it would be better to experience 
regret. But this response will not work. First, it cannot account for regret experienced in private. 
Second, it yields only a reason to appear to experience regret, not actually to be regretful. If 
experiencing regret were the only way to display regret, then the response might be more 
successful, but the possibility of faking regret and other negative backward-looking emotions 
means that the response fails. Perhaps the response can be reformulated: in some cases, actually 
experiencing regret brings about an overall balance of good effects not simply to others but to 
oneself, because it motivates me to do better in the future than I would in the absence of regret. 
But this cannot account for regret over impersonal states of affairs, such as the destruction of 
valuable objects by natural forces that are beyond anyone’s control. Besides, there are other 
emotions that can motivate me to do better that do not entail regret. Indeed, I can admit that I did 
wrong, and resolve to improve in the future, without feeling remorse. So the skeptical challenge
—to justify regret in terms of the forward-looking criterion—stands.  
 The challenge can in fact be strengthened by two further assumptions. First, it is plausible 
to suppose that, empirically, regret and its ilk can never fully be given up. Though we can go 
 Wallace does not explicitly adopt a forward-looking criterion, but it seems to me that these two features 64
would not appear problematic from the point of view of a backward-looking criterion on which regret is 
simply the appropriate emotion to feel, regardless of its effects. 
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some way toward weaning ourselves from regret—by improving ethically so that we do fewer 
regrettable things, or by insulating ourselves from distressing news about the state of the world—
it is, like the reactive attitudes, resilient. Second, although it is easy to see how regret is fitting—
as a very rough gloss, regret fits its object if that object is in fact negatively valenced and works 
counter to our aims—that does not mean that regret is apt, or all-things-considered appropriate, 
where the ‘things’ considered include the prudence, reasonableness, and moral value of a token 
emotion. Although some emotions are perhaps intrinsically incapable of being fitting, such as 
superbia, the feeling of inordinate pride at one’s character and accomplishments, other emotions 
are capable of being fitting without ever being apt, such as schadenfreude, the feeling of pleasure 
at the misfortune of another. In other words, we need a reason for thinking that regret can be apt 
as well as fitting. These two additional claims raise the stakes for responding to the skeptical 
challenge.  
 The best response is to zoom out to a broader evaluand. Rather than trying to justify 
token instances of regret directly, we can justify regret in general indirectly, as a constitutive part 
of something which can be justified directly. Wallace proposes that regret is constitutively 
connected to our capacities for valuing, a complex set of attitudes and dispositions that entails 
emotional vulnerability to the things we value.  Thus, as he puts it, the “retrospective emotions 65
will have a point so long as valuing itself does” (2013: 25). And not only can we not give up 
valuing (as a matter of brute probability, this is even less likely than giving up regret, since regret 
is a constitutive part of valuing), it is clear that our capacity for valuing is directly justifiable. 
 Wallace relies on the account of valuing given by Scheffler (2010a). I have argued for a modification to 65
this account in Kubala (2017). Since, on my view, we can value something without judging it valuable, 
our valuing practices are even more insulated from ethical assessment than many have claimed. 
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Even setting aside the nature of the particular objects that we value, the stance of valuing is itself 
valuable, in giving rise to forms of experience that make our lives worth living. If we were not 
valuing creatures, who cared about the fortunes of at least some of the people, projects, 
relationships, and ideals around us, our lives would be almost immeasurably impoverished. 
Valuing is therefore justified by the forward-looking criterion directly, and regret and its ilk are 
justified indirectly as constitutive parts of something which is justified directly.   66
 I find Wallace’s argument convincing, in its broad outlines, but the zooming-out strategy 
raises two general questions. First, when are we justified in switching the evaluand? In this case, 
we began with a desire to find our attitudes justified, and it turned out that seeing regret as 
constitutively connected to valuing helps us to satisfy that desire. So the justification for 
zooming out often depends on what our interests are in asking the question. But it is important to 
emphasize that in doing so, we do not actually change the lower-order negative evaluation. We 
can still find individual instances of regret problematic in various ways, although not because 
they fail the forward-looking test directly.  
 This leads to the second question: what if we would be better off without regret? 
Shouldn’t we at least consider the possibility of changing? As a matter of practice, the answer is 
probably no. As C. S. Peirce puts it, “Let us not pretend to doubt in philosophy what we do not 
doubt in our hearts” (1935: 157). But in theory, we can examine this question by means of what 
Nick Bostrom and Toby Ord have called the Reversal Test:   
 Although Wallace wants to claim that “the value of [valuing] … does not lie solely in its production of 66
beneficial effects” (2013: 31), it seems to me that the forward-looking criterion, and utilitarianism more 
generally, can acknowledge the value that valuing has in the present; our attitudes of attachment may not 
always produce beneficial effects, but they themselves instantiate or constitute good effects. To put the 
point another way, although Wallace thinks that valuing has intrinsic value, the justificatory strategy is 
successful even if its value is (constitutively) instrumental. 
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      When a proposal to change a certain parameter is thought to have bad overall 
      consequences, consider a change to the same parameter in the opposite direction. 
      If this is also thought to have bad overall consequences, then the onus is on those 
      who reach these conclusions to explain why our position cannot be improved  
      through changes to this parameter. If they are unable to do so, then we have reason 
      to suspect that they suffer from status quo bias (2006: 664-5).  
Bostrom and Ord’s example concerns cognitive enhancement. Since most people would agree 
that a method of safely lowering intelligence would not have good overall consequences, they 
should be prepared to give a reason why they would resist a method for increasing intelligence. 
Otherwise, they would be committed to claiming that the net value for society of our current 
level of intelligence is at a local optimum. Now, there are many reasons we might justifiably 
resist particular modes of cognitive enhancement, such as transition costs, uncertainty about 
expected outcomes, deliberation costs, or anticipation that the benefits of enhancement will be 
unequally distributed. But the burden of proof is on those who resist improvement to offer at 
least one such valid reason. 
 Does valuing pass the Reversal Test? In one sense, it is difficult to assess this question, 
because it is difficult to know what it would mean to enhance our capacities to value. Would it 
involve heightening our affective capabilities, or the number of items we could fully value? 
Perhaps we are at a local optimum for valuing. After all, we clearly would not want to diminish 
our capacities to value. But in different circumstances we might find it reasonable to value fewer 
things, or to value them to a less intense degree. Consider the apocalyptic scenarios discussed by 
Samuel Scheffler (2013). In one scenario, we know that an asteroid will destroy the world in 
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several weeks. In another, inspired by the P. D. James novel The Children of Men (1992), mass 
infertility will lead to the extinction of the human species in some rapidly approaching near 
future. In these scenarios, perhaps generalized anhedonia would be an apt response, and valuing 
would lose its rationale in virtue of the loss of a future for humanity. Pondering such scenarios 
enables us to acknowledge that in some circumstances, which do not currently obtain, we might 
indeed be better off without our valuing capacities. 
 Furthermore, thinking in terms of Non-Ideal Practice Utilitarianism can provide pointers 
for how we might improve our practices of valuing in the here and now. Although the theory 
does not in itself spit out recommendations automatically—it is “an instrument for rendering 
deliberation more effective,” in Dewey’s words—deliberating in its terms can suggest action-
guiding directions for reform. In particular, although we have seen that there may be little reason 
to change our practices now, we can identify potential signs of trouble, such as an overly 
sentimental attitude of nostalgia for a purely imagined past, an indulgent amount of grief as a 
mode of insulation from confronting a future without the absent beloved, or a paralyzing inertia 
in the face of coming environmental dangers. These and other examples could trigger an attempt 
to diminish our regret-reactions on forward-looking grounds, while continuing to respect the 
beneficial role that some amount of regret plays in our practices.  
 To sum up, return to the three questions with which I began this section. Which 
considerations should we bracket? Here we should not treat the facts giving rise to the skeptical 
challenge as reasons; we should not act on, say, reasons to avoid the emotional vulnerability that 
makes us susceptible to regret. How difficult is it, psychologically, to bracket? In this case, it is 
rather easy, since the facts that give rise to the skeptical challenge are, although genuinely 
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reason-giving, not typically salient in deliberative contexts. What justifies bracketing? Here, it is 
our desire to make sense of our habits of valuing in a way that provides regret with a constructive 
point, a desire that we meet by appealing to the value of our actual practices of valuing. 
4.2 Lewis on Toleration 
 David Lewis (1989) considers our practices of toleration. In addition to legal institutions 
for the protection of free speech, we have private customs of publishing and publicizing the 
opinions of those we disagree with, as well as the habit of associating with people of different, 
sometimes extremely different, persuasions on vexed religious, moral, scientific, social, and 
political questions. And even if we choose not to spend time with such people, we often do 
nothing to prevent the dissemination of their opinions. Some of those opinions are, by our lights, 
not simply false but harmful: they would have deleterious effects if they gained even greater 
traction than they already have. Given the possibility of such potentially awful expected 
outcomes, how can we justify our acts of toleration by any forward-looking criterion, even a 
non-maximizing criterion? 
 The main burden of Lewis’ argument is to show that a forward-looking defense of 
toleration—one that would show its expected benefits to outweigh its expected costs—cannot 
succeed so long as it is constrained by a rule of neutralism. Neutralism would require a defense 
of toleration to proceed without appealing to any premises that are in dispute, only to 
considerations that are accepted by all parties to a disagreement. An atheist cannot defend 
toleration of her beliefs, to a group composed partly of religious adherents, by insisting that since 
there is no God, it cannot be harmful to stand on the street corner crying out words to that effect; 
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the orthodox would reject the premise that such an action is not harmful. A truly neutralist 
defense would instead require both sides to agree to a common list of benefits and costs of 
toleration versus suppression. There are several neutralist points that speak against suppression, 
such as the risk of error, the possibility that truth will be mixed in with falsity, the loss of rational 
grounds and meaning that accompany the hardening of a belief into dogma (this point is stressed 
by Mill), the chance to build character in debate, the importance of individuality, the insult of 
paternalism, and the obvious harms, to the heretics, of a secret police or prison, which can be 
recognized by all sides (1989: 155-7). But neutralism, according to Lewis, cannot persuade an 
Inquisitor, even a utilitarian Inquisitor who discounts appropriately for his own uncertainty, who 
insists that the neutral list is outweighed by the consequences of heresy. What chance does such a 
list have against the harms of eternal damnation?   
 We don’t even have to imagine such an extreme character, in fact, since many of us have 
beliefs about our own ‘heretics’ that would tip the balance over the neutralist list and decide in 
favor of suppression. The potential harms of climate change denial, or nuclear hawkishness, 
which stretch to the decimation or even annihilation of the human species, surely approach, or 
even outpace, the catastrophic consequences of hellfire for a smaller chunk of the population 
(and if there are unsaved souls in the coming apocalypses, so much the worse). And even more 
localized harmful beliefs, such as racism in the police force, can have devastating effects not 
only on oppressed individuals but in their communities at large. Why are we not justified in 
taking greater action to expunge these beliefs, beyond our toleration-sanctioned attempts at 
reasoned persuasion and sensitivity training? 
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 If we wish to find a justification for acts of toleration, therefore, we must look elsewhere 
than to the neutralist defense. Lewis proposes a treaty of toleration. Suppose, for simplicity’s 
sake, that there are only two parties to a disagreement, the orthodox and the heretics. For each 
side, it is reasonable to suppose that at least sometimes, by their own lights, the fear of defeat in a 
war of suppression will outweigh the hope of victory. If that is so, then each side would prefer 
toleration to defeat more than it prefers victory to toleration. This generates a preference for 
conditional toleration—toleration so long as the other side is tolerant—and in any case, each side 
might still hope to do reasonably well persuading the other under the irenic practices of 
toleration that result. The equilibrium that results can be characterized as a treaty. This would be 
a “contract for utilitarians” (1989: 166), justified on forward-looking grounds, in terms of each 
side’s preferences, without appealing, at the most fundamental level of justification, to 
backward-looking inviolable rights that must be upheld at any cost.   
 The origin of the treaty in a given society does not matter to its justification: the treaty 
could be formally codified (as with some peace agreements) or tacitly reached by the drift of 
history. It could be attained by non-utilitarian reasons, or it could be present all along by ancient 
custom. Still, the contract itself offers only grudging grounds for toleration, whereas many of us 
tolerate cheerfully today. And not only do we celebrate our practices of toleration when they are 
mutually endorsed, we also tolerate the weak, the intolerant, and the extremely dangerous, who 
cannot be characterized in terms of the original treaty. How did we get from that game-theoretic 
treaty to our full-throated practices today? Lewis’ answer is that we have developed “a climate of 
thought” over and above “a constraint of conduct” (1989: 170), one that extends beyond a two-
!91
sided case to a many-sided and shifting alliance. That climate of thought arises out of a 
commitment to the basic, almost exceptionless, and well-established treaty. As he puts it,  
      If, in the end, you will always decide that the balance of cost and benefit comes 
      out in favor of complying with the treaty, why should you ever stop to think  
      about the harm done by tolerating a dangerous error? Eventually you will be 
      tolerant by habit, proudly, cheerfully, and without thought of the costs. You will 
      proceed as if the neutralist tally were the whole story about the costs and benefits 
      of suppression. You will bracket whatever you may think about the harm done by 
      others’ opinions. You might still think, in some compartment of your mind, that 
      certain opinions are false and harmful. If the treaty of toleration has become  
      second nature, you will be hard put to explain why these opinions are not  
      dangerous enough to be worth suppressing. But you will never think of the 
      danger as a reason to suppress (1989: 170). 
We can unpack this passage in light of the three questions that began this section. What do we 
bracket? That very fact, that others’ opinions can be dangerous. That fact is a reason: it genuinely 
counts in favor of suppression. But we must not treat it as a reason for action, not even as a 
reason that is outweighed. It should not be part of our personal motivational tally. We can still 
hold, by our own lights, that it would be good if harmful opinions could be suppressed (as Lewis 
puts it, “the first choice” would be “to suppress and yet be tolerated” (1989: 165)). But that 
axiological fact is not directly reason-providing for us, living under the treaty, so long as we 
accept the further axiological fact that conditions are better with the treaty than without. 
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 How difficult is it for us to bracket? In Lewis’ treaty, as with the objective attitude, the 
bracketing is more often than not done for us, as it were: it has become ‘second nature’ and so we 
typically do not stop to ponder the harms of toleration, although “in some compartment” we may 
continue to recognize that “certain opinions are false and harmful.” In other words, the challenge 
is not that we must avoid thinking about the reasons given by such facts, but rather that we must 
avoid acting on such reasons.  
 Why then should we bracket? As Lewis puts it, “bracketing might be not just a 
consequence of the treaty but part of its very content” (1989: 170). That is to say, the treaty itself 
may prescribe bracketing, because the practices of toleration are themselves strengthened when 
we bracket. Lewis is not committed to any particular historical claim, however. He is telling a 
story that describes how it might have been possible that toleration arose in the past. And, 
importantly, this story is a device that enables us to see how to construct a second-level 
justification for a practice that remains otherwise unintelligible on a forward-looking criterion. 
The ‘neutralist tally’ is not ‘the whole story’, because we can zoom out to a larger practice—one 
of our actual practices—that does satisfy the forward-looking criterion.  
4.3 Rawls on Punishment 
 Perhaps the most suggestive discussion of bracketing emerges from the seminal work of 
John Rawls (1955), who distinguishes the justification of a practice from the justification of an 
action falling under that practice. Although Rawls puts this distinction to work primarily in order 
to defend utilitarianism from the objection that it cannot explain why we ought to punish the 
guilty or keep our promises, his recognition that the same person should at different times appeal 
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to distinct types of moral consideration gives us the clearest understanding both of the 
deficiencies of an act-based utilitarian standard and of the need to bracket in certain contexts.  
 Rawls begins with an attempt to reconcile two competing justifications of punishment. 
The retributivist holds a backward-looking view, on which punishment is justified only in virtue 
of the fact that past wrongdoing merits punishment, typically in proportion to the amount of 
wrongdoing. The utilitarian holds a forward-looking view, on which punishment is justified only 
in virtue of the fact that it promotes good future outcomes, typically in proportion to the degree 
that it does so. Both views are plausible, but they are incompatible if applied to the same 
evaluand. Rawls’ claim is that they can be reconciled by distinguishing two evaluands: we should 
understand particular actions of punishment as justified by backward-looking considerations and 
the institution of punishment in general as justified by forward-looking considerations. The best 
way to promote good future outcomes for everyone, it turns out, is to hold individuals 
accountable for their past wrongdoing. If we ask why a particular person ought to be punished, 
we should make reference to their guilt, or the crime they committed. But if we ask why we 
punish people in general, we should make reference to considerations like deterrence or 
rehabilitation, which look to future outcomes.  
 Once we appreciate the distinction between these two levels of justification, Rawls 
claims, we can see why our institution of punishment has the features that it has. For one thing, it 
is vitally important that it be an institution that is stable, publicly acknowledged, and designates 
offices and roles for its implementation. A society without any stable set of practices for 
punishment—where individuals and crowds can choose how to mete out ‘justice’ at will—is not 
going to go as well as a society with well-defined practices. Further, the standard utilitarian 
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considerations are not, by themselves, sufficient to ground a successful institution. Rawls 
imagines a practice of ‘telishment’, in which officials have the discretion to condemn an innocent 
person whenever they believe that doing so is in the best interests of their society. But telishment 
would be highly problematic, insofar as it is unclear how the officials could be checked in the 
exercise of their power, especially given that the populace will be uncertain as to whether the 
‘criminal’ in any case is being punished or ‘telished’. Perhaps most crucially, the motive not to 
commit crimes will plausibly be weakened, insofar as one could obey the law and still be subject 
to punishment. Rawls concludes that “as one drops off the defining features of punishment one 
ends up with an institution whose utilitarian justification is highly doubtful” (1955: 12).  
 On this view, which Rawls extends to promises and which, as I will argue in the next 
chapter, can be extended to partiality, instead of evaluating some action of punishment directly in 
terms of a forward-looking criterion, we consider that action as constituted by a practice that is 
itself justified by forward-looking considerations. It is this distinction, and not the justification of 
punishment per se, that primarily interests Rawls. But notice now how respecting this distinction 
generates a reason to bracket in some contexts. Even though I believe that punishment in general 
is justified by forward-looking considerations alone (we would not punish the guilty if it had no 
good consequences), I must not treat this as a reason for action in judging whether particular 
people merit punishment. Acting as a judge, or simply as a concerned private citizen evaluating a 
court case in the news, I must deliberate about and act on only the facts relevant to determining a 
person’s guilt, not the facts about whether punishment in this particular case is likely to deter 
other crime or rehabilitate the criminal.  
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 Admittedly, there will be some instances in which forward-looking considerations can be 
directly appealed to in adjudicating particular cases. A judge might determine someone’s guilt 
but give her a lesser sentence because she wants to set an example for others to cooperate with 
police investigations. Or a promisor might deliberate on forward-looking grounds and decide not 
to keep a minor promise he made. But it is crucial to see that these exceptions are, typically, part 
of the practice itself. That is, forward-looking considerations can sometimes serve as motivating 
reasons to act, because they are sanctioned by the practice. In many cases, though, the practice 
itself forbids acting on the basis of forward-looking considerations. As Rawls puts it, “a practice 
necessarily involves the abdication of full liberty to act on utilitarian and prudential 
grounds” (1955: 24). 
 Although appealing to the rightness of following our actual practices can seem to push 
toward conservatism, this concern can be mitigated by appealing to the notion of a reformer. It is 
not the case that we always have to act in the ways constituted by our social practices, because 
we can and should employ a second-level criterion directly in order to improve the first-level 
practices. Rawls claims: “If one seeks to question these rules, then one’s office undergoes a 
fundamental change: one then assumes the office of one empowered to change and criticize the 
rules, or the office of a reformer, and so on” (1955: 28). As mentioned, it is not obvious how best 
to apply the utilitarian criterion, because among the considerations one has to weigh are the costs 
of implementation, the possibility of widespread acceptance, and the negative consequences to 
oneself of pushing for reform, but the criterion can nonetheless provide guidance in deliberating 
about when and how to reform. One should consider whether a society would be better off with a 
given practice rather than, say, whether a practice would be what a society deserves. 
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 To summarize, on Rawls’ view we are retributivists about punishment because a practice 
of punishment is optimific: it promotes the most utility overall. The two levels could, of course, 
have been flipped: at the first level, we might have had a utilitarian practice of telishment, which 
is justified at the second level because that is what people deserve. But this is highly implausible, 
because it cuts against our understanding of desert. People do not deserve to be punished because 
punishing them will promote overall utility. But the reason for this is that the notion of desert is 
itself, according to Rawls, constructed by our practices. It is possible that other cultures could 
organize their practices in this flipped way, but we would find this difficult to understand given 
our own concept of desert.  
 Return to my three questions. What do we bracket, for Rawls? As a judge, I must bracket 
the aims of the larger practice in considering my reasons for action. That is, I must not treat 
forward-looking reasons as reasons in deciding whether to punish a defendant. Bracketing is 
especially salient when it seems as though I, as a judge (or rather, as a quasi-judge, since for 
Rawls it is constitutive of the role of a judge that I not punish the innocent), could get away with 
punishing someone whom I know to be innocent. That is, in those rare cases where it seems there 
would be overall positive consequences to punishing an innocent person—nobody would know 
she is innocent, she herself will not be harmed, etc.—I still have reason to bracket, therefore 
doing not what I have weightiest reason to do, according to the standard of utility, but what I 
have undefeated reason to do, since bracketing defeats the weightier reason to punish the 
innocent. In cases like this, to treat my second question, bracketing becomes much more 
psychologically difficult, especially since, as discussed above, some forward-looking 
considerations enter in at the first-order level anyway, and the best way not to act on a reason is 
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often not to think about that reason. So what justifies bracketing? As with Lewis’ answer in the 
case of toleration, our practices themselves prescribe bracketing: judges must bracket, though 
legislators need not. Zooming out to the larger practice—our actual, albeit non-ideal, practice—
again allows us to see how the lower-order phenomenon, in this case punishing only the guilty, 
can be to some extent justified indirectly as part of a practice that meets the forward-looking 
standard. And we certainly do not have to claim the practice is ideal: the criminal justice system 
in the contemporary U.S. is deficient in innumerable ways, and reformers should concentrate 
their attempts on remedying welfare harms to inmates, their families, and the communities that 
are overwhelmingly, and disproportionately, swept up into that system.  
5. Bracketing 
 In showing how to overcome the skeptical challenge to justify regret, toleration, and 
punishment in terms of a forward-looking act-based standard, I appealed in each case to 
bracketing. But one might find something puzzling about the demand to bracket. Even if one 
believes that we can have reasons not to act on otherwise valid reasons, one might still wonder 
how it is possible that we deliberate using bracketed reasons. The best way to argue for the 
psychological possibility of bracketing is, I believe, to demonstrate its actuality. I first offer a 
handful of examples of ordinary bracketing, then distinguish three options for how best to 
understand the reasons given by bracketing: as undercutting, overriding, or exclusionary reasons. 
I suggest that the best way to understand bracketing is in terms of exclusionary reasons, then 
respond to a recent skeptical challenge to the existence of such reasons and the possibility of 
deliberating in terms of them. 
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 I start by motivating the notion of bracketing in ordinary contexts, hiving off the 
particular challenges of thinking in terms of ethical theories. When we bracket, we have a mental 
state, such as a belief, a desire or a commitment, and we set it aside in thinking about what to do. 
That is, we refrain from treating it as a motivating reason: a consideration for which we act. 
Importantly, the belief or desire does not disappear from our motivational set entirely, since we 
can ‘un-bracket’ it in a different context. The desire or commitment still represents something we 
want; the belief still represents something we hold to be true. Since the project of ethical 
theorizing concerns our beliefs, my examples will also discuss beliefs rather than desires or 
commitments. Consider an example in which we have to bracket our true beliefs in order to act 
successfully:  
      Scientifically Literate Addict: An addict knows that addiction is disease-like, in that 
      there are biological determinants of his condition. But he also knows that studies  
      have shown that people who believe their addiction is a disease have less ability to  
      resist it.   67
Suppose the addict is deliberating about whether to sober up, or, having decided he should, about 
continuing to do so. This process takes place over a longer timespan, with complex motivational 
peaks and valleys. At some moments the addict is likely to think about the fact that his condition 
is indeed disease-like. But he also has a reason, given by his aim of sobriety, not to treat that fact 
as a reason to despair or even to abandon his goal, even though the fact bears on the likelihood 
 An interesting discussion of this phenomenon can be found in an interview with the writer J. D. Vance 67
(2016), who says: “It’s this awful catch-22, where recognizing the true nature of the problem actually 
hinders the ability to overcome.” 
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that he will be successful. It might even be worthwhile to try to forget entirely that addiction is a 
disease, or at least to refrain from reading or hearing about that fact.  
 Further examples are not hard to come by. Lawyers regularly ask jury members to set 
aside certain facts in their deliberations, and deliberators in a democratic body are frequently 
asked to bracket their own commitments to reason in a more neutral framework about the public 
good. These considerations still bear on the case at hand—the DNA evidence, although 
contaminated, still bears on the question of who committed the crime; the religious commitment 
still bears on the question of the permissibility of the state’s policy—but they must not be acted 
upon, for procedural or other reasons. Simply having to set aside a true belief would not give rise 
to philosophical puzzlement, however, since the vast majority of my true beliefs do not bear on 
any particular deliberative situation. What is puzzling is that it seems we have a reason, given by 
some other end or aim, not to treat the bracketed true belief as a motivating reason, even though 
what is bracketed is still a valid reason that speaks in favor of some option we are considering.   68
 The first challenge is to analyze that puzzlement and to understand more clearly what 
bracketing is supposed to be. We can begin by distinguishing three ways in which reasons can be 
affected negatively by other considerations. First, reasons can be undercut by other 
considerations. If I promise to meet you for drinks, then I have a reason (on some views, even an 
obligation) to show up at the agreed-upon time. But if you begin to express reservations about 
 Compare here scientific cases, in which investigators are deliberating about which conclusions their 68
evidence supports. No one thinks that, if the aim is truth, any inquirer ever has a reason to set aside 
perfectly valid evidence; Galileo had no epistemic reason to bracket his observations of sunspots (though 
he surely had some prudential reason to publicly proclaim that they were simply undiscovered planets 
crossing in front of the sun). There may be cases in which one wants to find a more direct inferential route 
to one’s conclusion and thus brackets some evidence; in many of these cases, however, the goal is to 
persuade someone of a truth one already believes oneself (though not all cases, e.g., mathematicians 
trying to find a simpler proof). The puzzle, then, is why bracketing can be legitimate in normative cases 
as opposed to scientific cases. 
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your ability to make it, or your desire to drink, then, plausibly, your scruples undercut—reduce 
the weight of—my original reason. At the limit, you might release me from the promise entirely, 
in which case my original reason is disabled.  Second, reasons can be outweighed by other 69
reasons. If I pass a drowning child on the way to the cocktail bar, then I have weightier reason to 
stop and rescue him. I still have a reason to meet you; its force hasn’t been diminished or 
canceled. But I have even more reason to help the child. Third, reasons can be excluded by other 
reasons. The notion of an exclusionary reason was first formulated by Joseph Raz (1999). To 
borrow one of his examples, suppose I am deliberating about where to send my daughter to 
school. There’s a school which is conveniently located near my home and whose principal is a 
friend of mine. But there’s another school which has slightly better educational outcomes and is 
correspondingly more expensive. I have promised my partner that I will make the decision only 
on the basis of what is best for our daughter’s education, and not on the basis of my own 
interest.  Such a promise, according to Raz, gives me a negative second-order, or exclusionary, 70
reason: a reason to do something not on the basis of some valid reasons. In particular, I have a 
reason not to make my decision on the basis of self-interested considerations.  71
 Clearly, we cannot identify bracketing with disabling reasons, because disabling reasons 
affect the weight of other first-order reasons, whereas bracketing requires us to put aside valid 
reasons whose weight is not affected. So bracketing must be identified with either outweighing 
 Dancy (2004) has a thorough analysis of the ways in which the weight of reasons can be affected by 69
facts that do not themselves count for or against the actions in question.
 Supposing, for the sake of argument, that my daughter’s interests and my own diverge. 70
 Each of these ways of affecting reasons has a positive counterpart: reasons can be intensified by other 71
reasons (making them more weighty), reasons can outweigh other reasons (without changing the weight 
of the original reasons), and we can have positive second-order reasons (reasons to act on the basis of 
other valid reasons). I focus on the negative sort because my interest is in bracketing. 
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or exclusionary reasons, since neither changes the force of our first-order reasons. The key 
difference between the two is that when deliberating in terms of outweighing reasons, I simply 
weigh the balance of all the reasons I have, whereas exclusionary reasons do not compete with 
first-order reasons; they tell us not to act on the basis of first-order reasons, and (if valid) they 
always win out. In particular, exclusionary reasons can sometimes tell us that we should not act 
on the balance of reasons: they can change the verdict about what we ought to do.  Suppose that 72
I have weightier reason to choose the first school for my daughter: it is not that much worse, 
pedagogically, than the second, and we can give the money we’ve saved to charity or spend it on 
a vacation, and it will be more convenient and advantageous for me. If my promise to my partner 
generates an exclusionary reason, however, then what I ought to do is to choose the second, more 
expensive school, on the basis of my daughter’s educational interests, on the basis of the promise 
I made to my partner. Exclusionary reasons, as Raz admits, require us to give up the general 
principle that we ought to do what we have most reason to do, at least if ‘most reason’ is 
understood in terms of the weight of first-order reasons alone. Instead, we have to replace it with 
a related, but distinct, principle of practical reasoning: “It is always the case that one ought, all 
things considered, to act for an undefeated reason” (1999: 40), where a reason can be defeated 
either by being outweighed at the first order or excluded at the second order. 
 It is crucial to emphasize that exclusionary reasons are not reasons to perform some 
distinct mental act, such as not thinking about other first-order reasons. They are reasons to act 
on the basis of other reasons. Perhaps in some cases I do have additional reasons to try not to 
 Edmundson (1993: 333) emphasizes that there must be at least some cases in which the excluded 72
reasons would tip the balance of first-order reasons, were they not excluded, if there is to be any practical 
difference between exclusionary and outweighing reasons. 
!102
think of the excluded reasons, because thinking about them makes it more difficult for me not to 
act on them. But in general, merely thinking about the excluded reasons is not ruled out: in the 
promise case, it is not that I promise not to think about the reasons given by my own interests (a 
difficult thing to guarantee, after all). I can think about them all I like, so long as I do not actually 
act on the considerations they represent. As Raz puts it, “So long as one knows that one’s 
reflections will not affect one’s action, the ill effects of such thoughts are avoided” (1999: 184). 
Perhaps Raz puts the point too strongly; the opacity of our motivational states suggests that it is 
difficult to know whether we have acted on one or another reason. But even if the distinction is 
messy in practice, it is clear, in theory, that what is required by exclusionary reasons is that we 
not choose to act on the basis of the excluded reasons. The following list compares the three 
kinds of reasons: 
 Disabling        Outweighing   Exclusionary 
Change first-order reasons       Do not change first-order     Do not change first-order 
Weighed in the balance       Weighed in the balance  Not weighed  
While I speak of reasons as entities, talk of reasons should be understood as shorthand for talk of 
processes of reasoning. And if this is so, then we can use the key difference between outweighing 
and exclusionary reasons as the basis of a test for whether or not some case of deliberation is best 
captured as one or the other. The test is whether we are, in deliberation, weighing up all the 
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considerations in deciding what to do.  If we are not, then we are acting on second-order 73
reasons; if we are, then we cannot be acting on second-order reasons. Consider Raz’s example of 
Jeremy, a soldier who is ordered by his commanding officer to appropriate a civilian’s van. This 
order, backed by the officer’s authority, generates an exclusionary reason for Jeremy not to act on 
the basis of his own deliberations. He must bracket his own assessment of the case. Suppose now 
that Jeremy actually believed, prior to the order, that he has weightier reason not to appropriate 
the van. Raz admits it is possible that someone could regard the order as an outweighing first-
order reason but stipulates that this is not how Jeremy reasons. For Jeremy, it is not the case that 
“yet another factor is added to the balance of reasons”; the order is not “a conclusive reason for 
appropriating the van” (1999: 42). Rather, Jeremy reasons that it is not for him to act on his own 
assessment of the case. 
 One complication that Raz does not discuss is that we can weigh whether or not to 
respond to an exclusionary reason. Jeremy could deliberate about whether or not to obey the 
order; he might suspect that his commanding officer is mentally unbalanced. But it is important 
to distinguish this deliberation about the authority of the officer from deliberation about the 
content of the order. The former deliberation might be a matter of weighing reasons only, but the 
latter, if Jeremy obeys the order, is a matter of not acting on his own assessment of the first-order 
reasons for and against appropriating the van. So long as we can distinguish these two kinds of 
 Chang (2016: 220-7) is especially emphatic on this point, although she would deny the usefulness of 73
my test because she finds the notion of an exclusionary reason mistaken. Chang wants to frame purported 
cases of exclusionary reasons in terms of deliberation about which choice situation to be in, deliberation 
that is a matter of weighing considerations alone. This just moves the lump under the rug, however, since 
exclusionary reasons could surely be just as relevant to the question of which choice situation to be in!
!104
deliberation, then we can apply the test to the latter and determine that it is better captured in 
terms of exclusionary reasons. 
 An additional complication in applying the test is that we may not ultimately be certain 
which reasons we acted on. Our motivations are notoriously labile and opaque, and we cannot 
always know what really motivated us. This is why the best way to bracket—to act not on the 
basis of certain reasons—is often to avoid thinking about those excluded reasons. If we have 
made it the case that we have not thought about those reasons, then we will be more confident 
that we have not acted on them. But the fact of our uncertainty is not sufficient to establish that 
ultimately we only have first-order reasons to try not to act on the basis of excluded reasons. 
Perhaps an order such as that of Jeremy’s commanding officer generates such reasons, but it also 
generates second-order reasons for him actually not to choose based on those reasons. 
Understanding bracketing in terms of exclusionary reasons gives us a vivid sense of the different 
orders of justification at play. 
 So which type of reasons, outweighing or exclusionary, should we employ to characterize 
my examples? Scientifically Literate Addict is plausibly described in terms of exclusionary 
reasons: the addict’s desire to overcome his addiction gives him an exclusionary reason not to 
avoid seeking recovery on the basis of his belief that his addiction is a disease outside of his 
control. But an objector might claim that it can also be analyzed in terms of competing reasons, 
if the belief that addiction is a disease is outweighed, in deciding whether to seek treatment, by 
the desire to get clean. So consider the three practices discussed above. In the case of regret, it 
seems most plausible that, in our deliberations about the things we value, we are not weighing up 
all the considerations relevant to our affective state. Regret passes the test for exclusionary 
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reasons, since it is not as though the sadness of regret is outweighed by the potential joys of 
valuing. Rather, we typically just experience the various dispositions and attitudes associated 
with valuing, and insofar as we deliberate at all, our deliberation concerns the objects we value, 
not our attitudes toward them. In the case of toleration, our practices clearly generate a reason 
not to act on the potential harm of others’ opinions; we simply must not weigh that harm in our 
deliberations about how to act. And punishment is perhaps the clearest case, given the separation 
of the roles of judge and legislator: the judge must not weigh considerations of overall utility, but 
must bracket them and deliberate about guilt alone, except insofar as the practice permits 
otherwise.  
 The vividness of the notion of an exclusionary reason—we have a reason not to act on the 
basis of certain considerations, even though those considerations retain independent weight—
makes it attractive in thinking about bracketing. But the mere fact that we can make use of a 
concept to characterize some instances of reasoning is insufficient to establish the concept’s 
coherence. Daniel Whiting (2017) has recently issued a serious challenge to the existence of 
second-order reasons in general and exclusionary reasons in particular. Although his challenge 
explicitly concerns the existence of such reasons, as entities, it seems to me that the interesting 
question concerns whether or not we can deliberate and act in the ways described. In fact, his 
first two objections concern this more interesting question, charging that deliberation in terms of 
exclusionary reasons is impossible.  74
 Whiting’s third objection is that second-order reasons are the ‘wrong kind of reason’. Reasons of the 74
wrong kind are those that bear not on whether some object has some evaluative property (e.g., is 
desirable, credible, etc.) but on whether some attitude toward that object has that evaluative property. But 
although there may be theoretical reasons to deny that such entities exist, a wrong kind of reason may 
nonetheless be a good reason for action (Jacobson 2013). If a demon threatens to torture you if you do not 
desire to eat mud, that may not count in favor of eating mud ‘in the right way’, but it does provide an 
“exogeneous incentive” to eat the mud. As such, this challenge is orthogonal to my present purposes.
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 1. Whiting’s first objection is that second-order reasons cannot guide us. One plausible 
constraint on reasons—one which I endorse—is that if you have a reason to φ, it must be 
possible for you to φ on the basis of that reason.  So if you have an exclusionary reason not to φ 75
on the basis of some first-order reason, it must be possible to φ on the basis of that first-order 
reason on the basis of that second-order reason. But Whiting claims this is not possible: you 
cannot do something on a certain basis on a certain basis (2017: 404).  
 This claim is difficult to assess, because Whiting’s own examples do not adequately 
support his case. Notice at the outset that it is prima facie plausible to offer descriptions of 
motivation that fit the supposedly impossible form: I choose to go to rehab on the basis of my 
desire to get clean on the basis of bracketing my belief that addiction is a disease. It seems 
eminently possible to do something for a reason for a reason or, as in this example, for a reason 
not for a reason. But Whiting offers two examples to claim that this description of motivation is 
not coherent.  
 First, he considers the following description: Kelly goes to the pub for the reason that she 
promised to do so for the reason that she received a decent upbringing (2017: 404). This seems to 
fit the form that defenders of exclusionary reasons employ, but Whiting points out that ‘that she 
received a decent upbringing’ is not the kind of reason that could guide one; I cannot act for the 
motivating reason that I received a decent upbringing.  ‘That she received a decent upbringing’ 76
 Whiting (2017: 403) offers a non-exhaustive list of philosophers who endorse this principle: Gibbons 75
(2013), Kolodny (2005), Lord (2015), Parfit (2011), Shah (2006), and Williams (1981b). Notably, Raz 
himself endorses it: “reasons are there to guide action” (1999: 183). So Whiting is accusing Raz of 
incoherence. 
 Plausibly, I could act on the basis of the thought that I received a decent upbringing, if, for instance, I 76
imaginatively project a certain ideal of myself—as a well-raised, upstanding individual—and am 
motivated by that. But I cannot be motivated to act on the basis of receiving a decent upbringing alone. 
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is neither a motivating reason (a reason for which I could act) nor a justifying reason (a reason 
that counts in favor of going to the pub). But this objection misses the mark, because no one 
should think that the reason in question is exclusionary. That I received a decent upbringing is 
not a reason to be motivated or not motivated on the basis of any particular set of reasons at all; it 
is simply underspecified as a reason that could count in favor of anything.  
 Second, Whiting attempts to extend this line of objection to the school case. It seems as 
though I can choose the more expensive school for my daughter on the basis of educational 
reasons on the basis of my promise to my partner. Whiting claims instead that my promise is 
better seen as an explanatory reason: a reason why I made my decision on educational grounds, 
not a reason for which I did so (2017: 405). But this is not so. For one thing, it seems to be a 
general fact about explanatory and motivating reasons that whenever I offer a motivating reason 
in terms of an aim my action furthers, I am thereby citing an explanatory reason.  Whiting’s 77
strategy could be extended to show that the fact that I made the decision on educational grounds 
is itself a reason why I chose the school I did. Indeed, I think this is true; that fact helps to 
explain why I made the decision I did. But it does nothing to exclude the possibility that the 
explanatory reason is also a motivating reason. So Whiting’s strategy proves too much. For 
another thing, when I imagine myself deliberating about this case, the promise seems to me to 
count in favor of making my decision on educational grounds; it doesn’t seem like an 
explanatory reason. I can think about the self-interested grounds all I like, so long as I do not 
choose the school on their basis. So the promise seems to give me a reason for choosing (what 
turns out to be) the more expensive school on the basis of educational considerations alone.  
 Skow (2016: 142) defends the claim that teleological answers to why-questions (i.e., answers in terms 77
of the aims of action) report reasons why (i.e., explanatory reasons). 
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 2. Whiting recognizes that his first objection rests on “an appeal to (so-called) 
intuition” (2017: 404), and I have tried to argue that his intuitions can be explained away by 
thinking more carefully about the cases in question. The next objection, however, he takes to be 
an argument proper, namely that we cannot receive credit for acting on second-order reasons. 
More specifically, he claims that “it cannot both be true that a person deserves credit if she does 
the right thing for the right reason and that it is possible to respond to second-order 
reasons” (2017: 407). Remaining with the school example, Whiting tries to argue that one cannot 
receive credit for acting on a second-order reason alone. He considers a version of the case in 
which the reasons in favor of the pedagogically superior school are weightier, and in which I 
would have chosen the other school if not for my promise to my partner. In fact, I am concerned 
about my daughter’s education only insofar as I am concerned with keeping my promise. In such 
a case, according to Whiting, I cannot receive credit for responding to second-order reasons, 
because I am not really acting for the sake of my daughter’s education. 
 There are several problems with Whiting’s version of this case. For one thing, here the 
exclusionary reasons lead me to choose the option that had greater first-order weight anyway. As 
Raz himself recognizes (1999: 41), this makes it difficult to assess whether exclusionary reasons 
are the best way to describe the case. For another thing, it may be that my lack of concern for my 
daughter is what is, distractingly, preventing me from receiving credit. In general, keeping a 
(valid) promise makes one creditworthy, and Whiting obscures this fact in describing the case as 
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one where I lack concern for my daughter.  It seems to me that I deserve some credit here at 78
least for keeping the promise.  
 Even if this is acknowledged, perhaps I will be pressed to concede that one always 
receives less credit for acting on second-order reasons than on first-order reasons. But this is not 
so. Suppose, to construct a better version of the example, that the first-order reasons in favor of 
one or the other school are tied; that is, there are equally weighty reasons to choose each school. 
Or, to paraphrase the ‘reasons as entities’ talk, I am torn between the two schools; each seems to 
me equally choiceworthy. But my partner really wants me to choose one school, although I do 
not know on what basis he wants this. Suppose that I have already factored this into my first-
order deliberations: I think that my partner’s desire to choose the one school counts in favor of 
that school, and it is this fact that makes the two schools equally choiceworthy. That is, if my 
partner did not want this school so badly, I would have more overall reason to choose the other 
school. But suppose that now my partner extracts from me a promise that I will make the 
decision based only on educational grounds, and therefore I exclude other reasons and wind up 
choosing the school he prefers. It seems to me that in this case I deserve credit for keeping my 
promise, thereby satisfying my partner’s desires, and certainly not less credit than if I had simply 
flipped a coin or decided in some other way which of the (to me) equally choiceworthy schools 
to choose. Crucially, my partner’s desire for one school is not, for me, a first-order reason: it does 
not itself count in favor of choosing that school. But on the basis of my promise, I have an 
 Whiting does insist that we might be able to fill out the case such that I am blameless for my lack of 78
concern for my daughter, and that I would still not be creditworthy for making my decision on the basis of 
my promise. But (a) I have a very difficult time imagining circumstances in which one is blameless for a 
lack of concern for one’s (young) child and (b) in any case, the defender of second-order reasons could 
continue to insist that this case would be better analyzed in terms of outweighing reasons and would 
therefore fall outside the scope of Whiting’s challenge. 
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exclusionary reason not to consider other kinds of grounds. So we can, contra Whiting’s 
challenge, receive credit for acting on second-order reasons.  
 At this point, I hope to have provided further defense of employing the notion of an 
exclusionary reason to characterize bracketing, and to have responded to a challenge that 
deliberation in terms of exclusionary reasons is impossible. To close, I attempt to draw together 
the strands of these first two chapters.  
6. Conclusion 
 What unifies the phenomena discussed in section 4? In each case, we employ a plausible 
evaluative standard but find that the standard cannot justify some evaluand directly. In order to 
find the evaluand justified, we instead analyze it as a constitutive part of a distinct evaluand 
which can be justified directly. Regret, which appears unjustified from a forward-looking 
perspective, is analyzed as a constitutive component of valuing, which does appear justified. 
Toleration, which seems nonsensical when viewed in terms of the standard of preserving our 
own conceptions of truth and value, turns out to make sense when seen in the light of a treaty of 
toleration. Retributive notions of guilt and sentencing, which look confused when we consider 
that we cannot change the past, begin to seem justified when we see that a practice of punishing 
only the guilty makes things go better overall.  
 There is a second commonality to these phenomena, however, which is that the initial 
confusion arises from attempting to justify an act or attitude in isolation, considered apart from 
the psychological and social practices that render it intelligible. Rather than looking at the 
narrower evaluand alone, we can become more confident in its justification when we see it as 
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part of a broader one. As I suggested in section 3, our actions are often best evaluated not in 
themselves, but as instances of habits or larger patterns. 
 A third commonality is the need for bracketing. As per the ethical psychology developed 
in Chapter 1, most of the time, in ethical life, things go according to habit, and while our habits 
are to a great extent repositories of practical intelligence, they are often suboptimal, due to path-
dependence and other contingencies. As we saw with Hare, it is a fantasy to imagine that we 
chose our intuitive dispositions and reactive attitudes, and it is highly doubtful that we would 
have chosen this set if we were designing optimal agents. Take the love of drunkenness, or 
bashfulness, as James urges us in the epigraph: these phenomena cannot be “wholly explained,” 
or justified, in terms of utility alone. But they go with other things that can be so explained. The 
love of drunkenness often goes with a laudable conviviality; bashfulness often accompanies a 
virtuous modesty. So we can sanction these phenomena, at least up to a point. And when we need 
to change them, we can appeal to that other standard: to utility, or to some other second-level 
criterion.  
 Still, we cannot always act on that second-level standard, for a variety of reasons. And 
when that is so, we need to bracket. We sometimes have reason not to act on the reasons given by 
the second-level standard, even when those reasons have greater weight. From the point of view 
of the utility of actions, we sometimes have weightiest reason to punish the innocent, or to 
suppress our opponents’ points of view, or not to regret the past. But those reasons can be 
defeated by the practices that govern them and the exclusionary reasons that such practices 
generate.  
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 Return to Strawson’s ethical psychology. The objective attitude is a welcome resource. 
But our reactive attitudes, when understood in Strawsonian and not Harean terms, generate an 
exclusionary reason not to adopt the objective attitude on every occasion. If, in my dealings with 
some especially frustrating person, I find that viewing them from the perspective of the objective 
attitude is actively impeding our long-term prospects of continuing in a meaningful relationship
—my first-level aim—then I have reason not to treat the objective attitude as reason-giving, even 
if doing so would make things easier for us both in various ways. Ethical theories, I claim, are 
similar. If ethical thinking comprises both levels, and not the second level alone—that is, if both 
levels are genuinely reason-giving—then we can sometimes have ethical reason not to treat the 
second-level standard as reason-giving. 
 Having motivated my favored theory, Non-Ideal Practice Utilitarianism, I will fill it out 
in greater detail in Chapter 3 by extending it to one of the most vexed issues in moral 
philosophy: our practices of partiality.  
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Chapter Three: Partiality as a Non-Ideal Practice 
      The art proposes to itself an end to be attained, 
      defines the end, and hands it over to the science.  
      The science receives it, considers it as a pheno- 
      menon or effect to be studied, and having invest- 
      igated its causes and conditions, sends it back to 
      art with a theorem of the combination of circum- 
      stances by which it could be produced. Art then 
      examines these combinations of circumstances, 
      and according as any of them are or are not in  
      human power, pronounces the end attainable or 
      not. The only one of the premises, therefore,  
      which Art supplies, is the original major premise, 
      which asserts that the attainment of the given end 
      is desirable. 
       — John Stuart Mill, System of Logic 
 In this chapter, I extend the Non-Ideal Practice Utilitarianism (henceforth NPU) 
developed in the previous chapters to our practices of partiality. Partiality refers to the 
preferential treatment, in action and attitude, that we give to those with whom we share what are 
called special relationships, as opposed to the generic relationship we bear to fellow members of 
the moral community. 
 The standard view of partiality treats partiality as a puzzle, given liberal Enlightenment 
morality’s commitment to impartiality, the idea that all the individuals who matter morally 
matter in the same way (Cottingham 1986; Kolodny 2010a; Scheffler 1982; Wolf 1982). 
Different ethical theories vary in which properties of individuals they take to be morally 
fundamental, but most agree with the core claim that no one matters morally more than anyone 
else. But if this is so, then what explains our giving certain people—those with whom we stand 
in special relationships—preferential treatment? As Simon Keller puts it in his book on partiality, 
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“If morality is all about promoting overall enjoyment and minimizing overall suffering, or 
treating all autonomous creatures as ends, or respecting everybody’s rights, then special 
relationships would not appear to hold any moral significance. … Why should the fact that 
someone happens to share some relationship with you make a difference to how you ought to 
treat her?” (2013: 5). The standard view takes impartiality as an ideal end-state standard for 
assessing our practices, and treats partiality as a puzzle accordingly. How do my objections to 
ideal theory from Chapter 2 apply to the standard view?  
 The primary motivation for going non-ideal was that we want theorizing to guide our 
action. One very basic objection is that it would be impossible to give up our partial motivations, 
and thus impossible to be guided by an ideal of impartial treatment (Goodin 1985). 
Sociologically, it seems that norms of limited altruism were crucial historically and are crucial 
today to the success of societies. Psychologically, it seems that we naturally empathize most with 
those closest to us, and that parental partiality is necessary for healthy child development: a child 
needs to perceive itself as especially valuable to somebody. And phenomenologically, it seems 
that our attachments to particular people are often the source of greatest meaning in life. I do not 
want to argue that ideal ethical theories cannot justify some partiality on impartialist grounds, but 
I do want to recall, from Chapter 1, that perhaps the most common objection to them stems from 
their alleged inability to guide action. This is the objection that acting on impartial motivations is 
self-defeating: if you visit your friend in the hospital just because you think that will promote the 
most aggregate good, then you are not really behaving as a good friend would (Stocker 1976).  
 Even if we thought that impartial treatment of others was the ideal, however, the fallacy 
of approximation implies that we might be unjustified in trying to directly close the gap between 
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our current and ideal motivations. And worries about false negatives recur here, too: why do we 
have to see partiality per se as a problem? Non-ideal theory proposes instead to consider what is 
good about partiality now, and what function it serves. And it is evident that extreme 
impartialism, on which no form of partiality is morally permissible, is neither endorsed by the 
vast majority of actual ethical practices nor reasonable or feasible to implement. So rather than 
begin with an impartialist criterion and attempt to justify partiality in those terms, I want to 
assume that our practices of partiality are to some degree reason-giving and then to apply my 
theoretical criterion to explain what is good about partiality, justify our current practices to some 
degree, and offer guidance for improvement. This will follow the model developed in Chapter 2 
for regret, toleration, and punishment.  
 This chapter has two parts. In section 1, I return to an abstract account of two-level 
ethical theory, arguing against what I call the partialist constraint and against a constitutivist view 
of normative explanation. The partialist constraint, common in recent philosophy, states that in 
investigating what makes right acts right we must grant a great deal of authority to our 
experience of the reasons we act on. I argue instead that given the gaps between motivating and 
justifying reasons, the only match we need is extensional adequacy, which does not require that 
motivating and justifying reasons be identical in content. A constitutivist view of normative 
explanation states that the second level of ethical thinking offers an explanation of what it is for 
something to be a reason at the first level, without appealing to further reasons. I argue instead 
that normative explanation itself ought to be reason-giving.  
 In section 2, I develop my own account of partiality in terms of the facilitation of partial 
goods. Inspired by Mill’s procedure, quoted above from the System of Logic, I first interpret our 
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current practices to determine which goods are most valued in partial relationships, then try to 
identify what kind of value those goods have. Only then do I apply the second-level theoretical 
criterion, in order to investigate how such goods can be better distributed. The non-ideal criterion 
gives us new reasons to work toward improving our practices.  
1. Two-Level Ethical Theory Reprised 
 In Chapter 1, I offered four examples of ordinary situations that seem to involve a split 
between motivating and justifying reasons. Characterizing these situations accurately, I 
suggested, requires an account of moral psychology in which agents can think in two different 
ways about ethics. At the first level are our ordinary moral thoughts: the properties of actions and 
attitudes that make them seem choiceworthy or appropriate, the reasons that we take ourselves to 
act on, and the kinds of considerations we might typically offer as justifications. At the second 
level are the more fundamental ethical considerations from ethical theory, fundamental in the 
sense that they explain why the first level is reason-giving. In Chapter 1, I argued that adopting a 
two-level picture of ethical thinking is the best way to respond to the deliberative role problem. 
But developing an adequate moral psychology is not the only motivation for a two-level picture 
of ethical thinking. There are at least three other reasons to go two-level.  
 First, one might be moved by curiosity about what makes right acts right. Why do we 
have a duty to keep our promises? Why should I try to be more generous? One way to hear these 
questions is as requests for explanation, such that even someone who is committed to promise-
keeping and generosity might want to know more about why. This curiosity could be ethically 
motivated; for instance, I might believe that becoming more consistent will lead me to behave 
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more fairly toward others, and that I will be more consistent in my actions if I can develop a 
more systematic account of what makes them right. But curiosity can also be solely theoretical. 
Although it might be regrettable for someone to study ethics without becoming, or even desiring 
to become, a morally better person, such an outcome is surely possible. After all, one could 
develop a two-level theory to describe the ethical practices of some alien culture—giving an 
account of what its agents ought to believe about the right-makers of their acts—without 
endorsing its practices oneself. This quest for explanation does not commit one to moral realism, 
however, since the investigative procedure would be the same whether the second level was 
thought to be discovered or constructed. In either case, the only materials to hand would be our 
moral intuitions, our reflective judgments, various salient empirical facts, and our capacity to 
reason about all these things. I tried to remain neutral on such metaethical topics in previous 
chapters, and I intend to maintain that neutrality here.  
 Second, one might be drawn to a two-level picture of ethical thinking in order to 
legitimate both everyday morality and ethical theory. As Daniel Star (2015) has persuasively 
argued, a two-level picture can make sense of two plausible but apparently inconsistent claims: 
(i) people can be ethically virtuous without the aid of philosophy, and (ii) normative ethical 
theorizing, understood as the search for very general ethical principles, is not a waste of time. 
Behaving ethically might require knowledge only of the first level, but investigating the second 
level would nonetheless improve our understanding of the subject matter of ethics.  
 Third, a two-level theory seems better able to do justice to what we might think of as 
morality’s Janus face, which looks toward both individuals and social practices. The first level of 
ethics concerns how individual agents ought to think in order to act morally, holding fixed the 
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wider social milieu in which they live. But the second level provides the resources to evaluate 
the broader social practices that make sense of our individual actions. As Simon Keller puts it in 
discussing partiality, “To understand what you should do for someone with whom you share a 
special relationship, you need to appreciate his value in isolation, but you also need to see him as 
a participant in a relationship that has a certain social significance and function” (2013: ix). 
These two views, as Keller’s quotation suggests, should both be treated as reason-giving, i.e., as 
contributing to understanding what one has overall reason to do.  
 These three motivations for adopting a two-level theory can be brought together in the 
following way: investigating our social practices can help to explain what makes right acts right, 
which can in turn legitimate both ordinary ethical thinking (to some degree) and ethical 
theorizing (in a certain fashion). In section 2, I investigate our social practices of partiality in 
particular. In this current section, I focus on the explanatory function of two-level theory in 
general.  
 Given our ordinary ethical thinking, including our understanding of the considerations 
that count in favor of our actions and attitudes, we want to know why our thinking has the force 
it does, and why those considerations do genuinely count in favor. On the first, ordinary level, 
the fact that some action has been promised, or will help our friend, or will prevent causing pain 
to a sentient creature, can all seem to be reasons in favor of performing that action; they can even 
be the reasons on which we act, if we are sufficiently reflective before performing them. The 
second level promises to tell us why these are reasons: for instance, because promise-keeping is 
required by the Formula of Universal Law, or because beneficence is a virtue, or because pain is 
intrinsically bad and always gives us a reason to avoid it (and so forth). Thinking at this second 
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level has the potential to loop back and put pressure on our first-level practices, at least to the 
extent that it implies that our other practices cannot consistently be willed as universal laws, or 
fail to demonstrate the virtues, or produce a net balance of pain over pleasure. This picture is 
illustrated in this simple diagram:  
   1:  Ordinary moral thinking  
     explain 
   2:     Fundamental right-makers  79
 This understanding of two-level theory in terms of its explanatory role should be 
distinguished from others. First, I do not understand two-level theory in terms of the distinction 
between conditions of imperfect compliance and full (ideal) compliance. Christine Korsgaard 
(1986a), for instance, has argued for a Kantian two-level theory with ideal reasons at the second 
level, which set a standard beyond which we can never permissibly act, and non-ideal reasons at 
the first level, which tell us what we may do when we accept the responsibility of violating ideal 
standards. But I think of the second level as presenting not an ideal end-state standard, but rather 
an explanatory standard that can in turn be used to ameliorate our actual, non-ideal conditions. 
Second, as I argued at length in Chapter 1, I do not understand two-level theory in terms of 
providing guidance for how to implement a worked-out ethical theory. Hare, for instance, 
 As Star (2015: 17 fn. 16) points out, ‘right-maker’ is a term of art that can be used to refer either to one 79
side of an explanatory relation or to one side of a metaphysical relation, such as the grounding or 
constitution relation. Here I understand right-makers in the former way, as parts of explanations that cite 
the properties and relations in virtue of which our actions and attitudes are justified.
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understands the first level in terms of intuitive principles, derived from the second level, that 
approximate second-level principles under real-world conditions. For Hare, the existence of the 
first level is justified only in terms of its ability to help us to realize the demands of the second 
level (Feldman 2012; Forschler 2013). But I deny that the first level has value only derivatively 
of the second level. As Alex Worsnip (2016) points out, morality may be an instance of a general 
phenomenon in which ordinary people are largely attuned to fine-grained features of situations 
but very bad at articulating the general principles that govern their discriminations. If so, two-
level theory would be a good way to model this.  80
 So much for a reprise of the two-level picture. In the remainder of this section, I first 
argue that there is no reason to treat our ordinary moral thinking as a constraint that, in itself, can 
rule out certain normative explanations. I then argue in favor of a particular kind of normative 
explanation, one that grounds our ordinary reasons in further reasons that we have. 
1.1 Against the Partialist Constraint 
 Much of the recent literature on partiality contains an appeal to a methodological 
constraint of the following form: in investigating what makes right acts right, we should grant a 
great deal of authority to our experience of the reasons we act on.  If it seems to Cordelia that 81
what justifies her love for her father is the relationship that they share, and if Cordelia is not an 
 See also Kleiman-Weiner et al. (2017), who note that we learn abstract knowledge from observational 80
data but often do not understand and cannot articulate how. Other examples might be the principles of 
grammar and the rules that govern perceptual recognition.
 Often very little is said about the nature of this experience, but see Horgan and Timmons (2005: 60-1) 81
for the claim that the phenomenal experience of moral judgment consists in (a) a felt demand evoked by 
(b) an experientially-present sense of the basis of that demand, namely its fittingness to certain features of 
the environment. The idea is that all direct moral judgments consist in part in a sense of some and only 
some features (the basis of the demand) calling out for some and only some responses (the demand).
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isolated case, then parent-child relationships should be thought, prima facie, to be the 
fundamental right-makers of actions that fall within the compass of filial relationships. This 
constraint can come in a stronger or weaker form, depending on whether it is held that our 
experience of the reasons we act on must be the guide to fundamental right-makers, or simply 
one guide that we cannot discount. But in either form, this constraint is frequently wielded both 
(a) as an objection to any posited right-maker that does not show up in moral experience, notably 
the forward-looking claim that ‘making things go best’ is the fundamental right-maker that 
explains our reasons, and (b) as part of an argument for some favored account of what the right-
makers are. Thus, Jay Wallace claims that the best argument for non-reductionism about the 
reasons provided by relationships—the idea that relationships themselves have fundamental 
moral significance—is that reductionism “amounts to a denial of the normative 
appearances” (2012: 185) and that the normative appearances reveal that relationships are in 
themselves reason-providing. Simon Keller similarly claims that it would be “both implausible 
and depressing to suggest that when we act well within special relationships we systematically 
misperceive our reasons” (2013: 27), and that the best argument for his own account, on which 
reasons of partiality are provided by individuals (and not relationships), is that it preserves the 
“phenomenology of partiality.” And Nick Zangwill claims that any ethical theory that posits a 
different right-maker from what we experience as the reasons we act on must be “committed to a 
massive error theory about ordinary moral thought” (2011: 164), and that we should therefore 
adopt what he calls a “common-sense morality” about reasons of partiality.   
 In Chapter 1, I argued that a Constructive view of ethical theorizing can meet the 
objection, raised by these writers, that two-level theories are committed to treating the first level 
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of ethical thinking as illusory. Here, I want to argue that the objections themselves are misguided 
insofar as they only get off the ground by endorsing the partialist constraint. Rather than 
assuming a two-level theory and showing how it can overcome the objection (as I did in Chapter 
1), here I want to argue against the partialist constraint on independent grounds, based on more 
general considerations about motivating and justifying reasons.  
 One plausible response to Bernard Williams’ path-breaking article on “Persons, 
Character, and Morality” is to note that Williams fails to avail himself of this distinction between 
motivating and justifying reasons. Williams borrows from Charles Fried the thought experiment 
of a man forced to choose between rescuing a stranger and rescuing his wife. Imagining that the 
man opts for the latter route, Williams notes that for standard ethical theories, the consideration 
that ‘it was his wife’, although surely “an explanation which should silence comment,” would be 
thought insufficient for justification, in the sense of appealing to a moral principle that can 
“legitimate his preference” (1981a: 18). One such legitimating principle would be that ‘in 
situations of this kind it is morally permissible to save one’s wife’. But if that principle were to 
serve as the man’s ‘motivating thought’, then it would provide him with ‘one thought too many’. 
According to Williams, it ought to be motivationally sufficient for the man to have thought 
simply, ‘that’s my wife’.  
 As I said, a plausible response is to judge that Williams has not appreciated the force of 
the distinction he seems to assume. Motivating reasons are the reasons on which we act, and 
justifying reasons are those that, in Williams’ word, legitimate action. But once we have drawn 
this distinction, we need not imagine that the two should always coincide. In fact, we should 
expect that the two should become increasingly separate. Williams seems to think of motivating 
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reasons as the thoughts that immediately precede and causally initiate action. The motive for 
one’s action, which on this picture is always a conscious motive, is the consideration that springs 
to mind immediately before acting and that plays a causal role in bringing that action about. But 
notice now that even the thought that ‘that’s my wife’ might be one thought too many! Why 
should the man, faced with the choice of rescue, have to place this woman under the ‘wife’ 
concept in order to be motivated to save her? It might have been hoped (for instance, by his wife) 
that he simply has to recognize her in order to be motivated to save her, all thoughts of their 
relationship be damned. Or perhaps, given a different psychology of motivation, there is nothing 
thought-like at all that need pass through the man’s head before he acts: his love for his wife is so 
ingrained that he moves to rescue her with the force of a brute instinct.   
 But just as motivating thoughts can become increasingly spare, so can justifying thoughts 
become increasingly baroque. After all, the legitimating principle to which Williams appeals
—“in situations of this kind it is at least all right (morally permissible) to save one’s 
wife” (1981a: 18)—might itself stand in need of further defense. Why is saving one’s wife 
morally permissible? What if there were two people, or five, or a hundred, who could be saved 
instead of her? Now we are back in the realm of ethical theorizing, and justifying thoughts, “fully 
spelled out,” might be wildly complex indeed. Thinking about the gap that can open between 
motivation and justification, I claim, puts pressure on the defender of the methodological 
constraint to explain why we should grant so much authority to our experience of the reasons we 
act on. 
 At this point, the defender of the partialist constraint might note an ambiguity in the 
phrase ‘the reasons we act on’. My argument, it is conceded, has force, but only if the reasons we 
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act on are understood exclusively as the motivating reasons we act on. But the phrase might also 
mean the justifying reasons we act on, such that our experience of those reasons would, even if it 
never showed up in our motivating reasons—because we acted entirely by habit, say, or because 
we were so fully virtuous that we never needed to deliberate even when confronting novel 
situations—need to be given some authority in investigating what makes right acts right. After 
all, as Marcia Baron puts it, “one’s action can be governed by a belief that one is acting fairly 
without its being the case that one thinks about fairness at the time of action” (1984: 212). In 
other words, I might have beliefs about justifying reasons of fairness without ever being 
motivated—in Williams’ sense of immediate, conscious, causally-effective motivation—by 
thoughts of fairness. And our investigation of what makes right acts right should, according to 
the objection, grant a great deal of authority to our experience of justifying reasons in this 
broader sense.  
 My response begins by conceding that there is a thin sense in which I accept the partialist 
constraint for our experience of our justifying reasons. This is the sense in which the posited 
right-makers must accord with what Brad Hooker calls “attractive general beliefs about 
morality” (2000: 4). The fundamental right-makers that we posit have to make sense to us; they 
have to have the right kind of connection with our self-understanding of what we are doing when 
we act. And so explanations such as ‘this action is right because it was chosen by a roll of the die 
from a predetermined option space’ or ‘because it is the will of our alien overlords’ will be ruled 
out by the thin sense of the constraint that I endorse. Those right-makers just aren’t plausible as 
explanations: we would not be willing to acknowledge them as right-makers. It is difficult to 
give a precise account of what is ruled out by this thin sense of the constraint, but the candidates 
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offered by standard ethical theories are certainly ruled in. This is why I find it odd that Zangwill 
(2011: 150) claims that the right-makers posited by consequentialism are not ‘intuitive’. It is 
precisely the fact that ‘because it makes things go best for everyone’ sounds so intuitive that 
makes consequentialism compelling for so many.  82
 That being said, there remains another sense in which I do deny the partialist constraint. 
This is the understanding of the constraint in terms of the justifying reasons that we take 
ourselves to have when we act. These are the reasons that we would, if asked, cite as justifying 
our actions and attitudes. But I claim that even these reasons need not be expected to coincide 
with the fundamental right-makers. I can best illustrate this by reference to an analogous 
position, articulated by Susan Wolf in a recent exchange with Nomy Arpaly, about a certain class 
of non-moral reasons. Wolf proposes that, in addition to reasons of morality and reasons of self-
interest, we also have reasons of meaning, which reflect our motivation to find and attach 
ourselves to fulfilling projects, relationships, and ideals. Such reasons, according to Wolf, cannot 
be captured by the domains of morality and self-interest alone. Arpaly worries, however, about 
one possible development of this line of thought: “Those who act, say, for the love of art, do not 
act for the sake of a meaningful life but rather for the sake of art. … imagine a person who 
thinks, ‘I am going to help my wife because she is my wife and love for my wife is among the 
things that make my life meaningful.’ That, too, is one thought too many” (2010: 90). Arpaly’s 
objection seems to be that ‘meaning’ cannot pick out a third category of reasons, because people 
do not act for the sake of meaning, whereas they do act for the sake of morality and the sake of 
self-interest.  
 I am grateful to Michele Moody-Adams for discussion of this point. Philippa Foot (1985) refers in this 82
context to the “spellbinding force” of consequentialism. 
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 Yet Arpaly, like Williams, fails to appreciate the distinction between motivating and 
justifying reasons. First, we need not deny that someone who had the motivating thought Arpaly 
imagines would indeed be “inappropriately agent-centered,” as she puts it. What is odd about the 
thought is that we do not typically conceive of the choiceworthiness of our projects, 
relationships, and ideals in terms of their being things that make our lives meaningful. Second, 
however, as with Williams’ legitimating principle, even this thought might not be taken as 
sufficient justification by a suitably hectoring interlocutor, and in any case it would certainly not 
be required in ordinary conversational contexts, where the consideration that it is one’s wife 
would be “an explanation which should silence comment.” Yet surely the thought Arpaly 
imagines could be part of a good explanation for why one ought to engage in such projects.  
 Wolf makes similar points in her response to Arpaly. She first discusses reasons of self-
interest. When we do ordinary things such as preparing a meal or going for a walk, we are often 
motivated (at the first level of practical thinking, as I would put it) simply by the thought that 
these things will be fun or relaxing: “One may never class these acts under the more general and 
abstract heading of ‘self-interest’. But generally, one would be willing to acknowledge one’s 
reasons of pleasure as a species of reasons of self-interest” (2010: 117). I read this as passage as 
expressing a constraint similar to the thin constraint of sense-making I articulated above. Even if 
some agents never think in abstract terms about moral right-makers or the meaning of their lives, 
they would be willing to acknowledge such descriptions as intelligible and applicable to them. 
Wolf then extends this thought to reasons of meaning: 
      Insofar as there are such things as “reasons of meaning”—that is, insofar as facts  
      to the effect that something will contribute to the meaning of a person’s life give 
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      reasons to foster or promote that thing, those facts will rarely be directly available 
      to the people whose lives are in question and are not likely to matter much, even 
      when they are (2010: 118). 
What kind of reasons could have genuine justificatory force and yet be unavailable to most 
people and not likely to matter much even where available? The answer is fundamental reasons, 
i.e., the kinds of theoretical considerations that figure at the second level of ethical thinking. 
These considerations are, often, not likely to matter much to the practices of those who reflect on 
them, when they are thought of at all. People are overwhelmingly more likely to act on reasons 
drawn from the first level, reasons that incorporate considerations about the things—the projects, 
relationships, and ideals—that they recognize as valuable. This is all perfectly in keeping with 
my Strawsonian ethical psychology. But at the same time, someone who wondered what it was in 
virtue of which all those things might be justified could reasonably think that part of the answer 
was their meaningfulness, even if a fuller answer would also make reference to the domains of 
morality and self-interest.  
 Yet these second-level reasons should not always be motivationally idle. They have the 
potential to loop back and change our first-order practices, as Wolf herself admits. Recognizing 
that meaningfulness is a dimension of a good life, distinct from happiness, “will make one want 
to ensure that all children are exposed to such things, and that our social, political, and economic 
institutions provide opportunities for all people to form relations and pursue interests that bring 
meaning to their lives as well as pleasure and comfort” (2010: 119). To some degree, “we already 
want these things,” Wolf notes—these motivations already belong to our practices—but the force 
of theorizing is to draw out and make explicit these previously unrecognized commitments in our 
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everyday practices, which can exert pressure to extend opportunities to others to participate in 
those practices. 
 In section 2, I will sketch a similar normative explanation for partiality, with a parallel 
structure to Wolf’s account of reasons of meaning. To summarize this subsection: the lesson I 
draw from my argument against the partialist constraint is that the explanation for why our 
reasons have the force they do need not coincide with the reasons we take ourselves to act on. 
Once we have made that separation, the normative explanation can be as egoistic or as 
impartialist as we like, so long as it is intelligible, applicable to us, and, of course, has good 
arguments on its behalf. We can apply this lesson to the debate about partial relationships. The 
fact that you are my spouse, or the fact that we stand in a certain relationship, or the fact that you 
are X, might all represent the content of my motivating reason or the justifying reason that I 
would cite if asked to account for my actions. Those are the considerations on which I act, and 
they might well silence comment in everyday conversation. But when, as ethical theorists, we 
ask the question of why those considerations provide reasons, we are offering an explanation that 
might appeal to distinct considerations: partial relationships promote my personal well-being, 
promote the well-being of our relatives, promote impartial well-being, constitute one way of 
legislating the Kingdom of Ends, serve our normative interests, exemplify the life of virtue, and 
so on and so forth. There is no reason to expect that the content of these reasons should coincide, 
given the vagaries of ordinary motivation. In fact, the only match we need between our ordinary 
reasons and the normative explanation of those reasons is extensional adequacy: the normative 
explanation should explain all the good reasons we take ourselves to have, although not 
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necessarily only the good reasons we take ourselves to have, since the normative explanation 
could itself, as I will argue next, reveal further reasons.  
1.2 Against Constitutivism about Normative Explanation 
 The second level of ethical thinking is the level of normative explanation, which I have 
characterized in terms of right-makers. But there are two distinct views one could hold here, only 
one of which is compatible with my view that ethical theorizing can provide us with further 
reasons. First, one could offer a non-normative, constitutive explanation of what it is for 
something to be a reason at the first level, an explanation that does not appeal to further reasons 
that one has. Second, one could offer a normative explanation in terms of more fundamental 
reasons we have.  In this subsection, I will argue that we should look for an explanation of the 83
second kind, and in section 2, I will provide such an explanation for partiality. 
 The first way to think of the second level of ethical theory would be as providing an 
explanation of why reasons at the first level are reasons, an explanation that does not itself 
appeal to further reasons. This would amount to a kind of metaphysical explanation, one that tells 
us what it is for something to be a reason, or in virtue of what a particular consideration counts in 
favor. For instance, one might offer a constitutive consequentialist account on which reasons just 
are considerations which, when acted on, most promote the overall good. At the first level, the 
fact that some action aids another person does provide a reason to perform that act. But at the 
second level, the explanation of why that fact is a reason—because it contributes to the amount 
 I am grateful to Kieran Setiya for helping me to distinguish these two views of normative explanation. 83
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of good in the world—is not itself reason-providing. The fact that some option promotes overall 
good is, on this view, no reason in favor of it.  
 There are three objections one could offer to such an account. One minor objection is that 
it incurs weightier ontological commitments than a non-constitutivist account, which can remain 
neutral on ontological questions. A more significant objection is that it renders our second-level 
explanation motivationally inert. Rather than pointing to further reasons on which one could act, 
thus offering the potential to change our practices, the constitutivist account is purely 
explanatory. I follow Star (2015: 30), however, in thinking that the account is problematic on its 
own terms. Star considers a constitutivist interpretation of rule-consequentialism, on which a rule 
directing us to keep our promises is explained in terms of the fact that it belongs to a set of rules 
that together satisfy the rule-consequentialist conditions. He imagines that we are speaking to a 
reliable guardian angel, who (i) tells us that rule-consequentialism is the best ethical theory, (ii) 
tells us that only one of the acts about which we are currently deliberating is permitted by a rule 
endorsed by rule-consequentialism, but (iii) does not tell us what that rule is. The key to Star’s 
objection is (ii). On the constitutivist account, we have no reason to perform the act endorsed by 
the rule; the information given to us in (ii) is, by the constitutivist’s lights, simply an account of 
what it is to be a reason, and not itself a reason. That is, for the rule-consequentialist 
constitutivist, to belong to the set of rules that jointly satisfy rule-consequentialism just is what it 
is to be a reason, and is not itself a reason (a consideration that counts in favor of something). 
But this is the wrong result. If we could possess such reliable moral information from a guardian 
angel, we would have a reason that counted in favor of performing the act, even if we did not 
know the content of the rule that permitted the action we had reason to perform. I take this 
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implication to be the most powerful argument against the constitutivist view of normative 
explanation.  
 The view of normative explanation that I endorse—call it the normativist view—claims 
that the fundamental considerations offered by ethical theory are reason-giving, however 
indirectly. If an action is what the virtuous person would do in the circumstances, or if it passes 
the Categorical Imperative procedure, or if it would make things go better overall, then that is a 
reason in favor of it. The constitutivist view of normative explanation denies this. And the 
constitutivist view does not sit well with the claim that criteria of right action express our 
fundamental commitments, since our commitments must, in order to count as commitments, be 
reason-giving for us. Of course, the fact that a consideration is reason-giving does not mean that 
we always have reason to act on it. As Chapter 2 discussed, sometimes the reason is overridden 
by another one, or sometimes we have an exclusionary reason not to act on a reason. 
 There are many accounts of our fundamental reasons that are consistent with the denial of 
constitutivism about normative explanation: egoist, eudaimonist, welfarist, perfectionist. My 
own preferred account, as per Chapter 2, is Non-Ideal Practice Utilitarianism. Having explained 
more fully the kind of two-level theory I want to offer, I now want to develop such a theory for 
partiality. 
2. Justifying Partiality 
 In Chapter 2, I relied on Wallace, Lewis, and Rawls for their accounts of the justification 
of regret, toleration, and punishment, respectively. Here I offer my own account of partiality, 
which will proceed in three steps. First, I start with what we already value in partiality. What do 
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people want from their partial relationships (§2.1)? Then, I try to identify the distinctive aim, or 
aims, of partiality. What does this practice facilitate that other practices do not (§2.2)? Finally, I 
deploy impartiality as a non-ideal ideal—not a final, end-state standard that we must comply 
with, on pain of moral wrongdoing, but a hypothesis to guide proposed reforms (§2.3). In the 
end, we should be able to explain in more detail how relationship goods give us reasons to 
pursue them, and how a second-level standard gives us reasons to improve our practices.  
 The procedure I recommend can be described even more telegraphically: identify the 
goods (the Utilitarianism component) produced in our practices (the Practice component) as they 
currently are (the Non-Ideal component). Since the bulk of this section will consist in an 
elaboration of the three steps of the justificatory procedure for partiality, I first want to motivate 
this procedure by describing each of these components in more detail. 
Goods:  Deontologists hold that the right-making features of an act “include such things as 
whether the act involves keeping a promise, telling the truth, returning a favor, helping a friend, 
protecting the innocent,” and so forth (Hooker 2000: 106). These are the sorts of features that we 
cite, at the first level of ethical thinking, as counting in favor of our actions, and they are often 
the kinds of considerations that motivate us. Further, many deontologists hold that these right-
making features are fundamental: there is no principle that explains and justifies these and only 
these features. But as Chapter 2 discussed, these features are not fundamental: their value derives 
from their tendency to make things better. 
 This component inspires the goods-based focus of my account, namely that the 
fundamental justification of partiality as a practice must appeal to the goods that relationships 
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facilitate, to their participants and to others. This is importantly distinct from the standard 
approach to partiality in the recent philosophical literature, which is to ask which relationship 
types are justified. Niko Kolodny (2010a), for instance, assumes that the question of when we 
have reasons of partiality is equivalent to the question of which relationship types justify 
partiality. On my view, however, the question of which relationship goods are worth producing is 
more fundamental than the question of which relationships justify partiality. 
 All parties to the debate agree that there is a challenge to determine when we have 
reasons of partiality. My claim is that the challenge cannot be met at the level of relationship 
types. This is because, in normative explanation, partial goods are more fundamental than 
relationship types. In other words, the value of a relationship type is best explained by the value 
of the goods it facilitates or instantiates, and not the other way around. Four considerations speak 
in favor of my view. First, there is an open-question argument in the vicinity. It is evident that to 
call a relationship a friendship or a sibling relationship is to say nothing about whether it is good, 
absent an account of its good-making features. Second, relationship goods are more fine-grained 
than relationship types, because any relationship is likely to be the site of multiple goods, such 
that an overall normative judgment can be rendered positive by the presence of multiple goods or 
rendered ambiguous by the presence of some negative features. Third, and because of the 
previous two points, explaining the value of a relationship type will not necessarily explain the 
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value of a relationship token.  Fourth, the nature of a relationship type changes over time. Five 84
centuries ago, a paradigmatic marriage was not as likely to be the site of mutual respect and 
equality that we take marriage to be today. This point can be supported by the stronger claim that 
relationship types do not exist independently of the social practices that individuate and regulate 
them, social practices that are not timeless or essential.  All four considerations illustrate that the 85
explanatory buck can and should be passed from relationship types to relationship goods.  
 I should emphasize from the outset that I am understanding relationship ‘goods’ in an 
expansive sense, to pick out all good-making features and not just discrete quantities such as 
money and other transferable resources. The list of relationship goods is potentially quite lengthy 
and includes goods of enjoyment, respect, attachment, vulnerability, trust, virtue, and so forth. In 
§§2.1-2.2, I will offer an interpretation of our practices that provides some structure to the list of 
goods. 
 To identify a good is not yet to license an inference to how we ought to act. In general, of 
course, one has reason to promote goods.  But the denial of standard maximizing act-86
 Kolodny occasionally seems to recognize this point, but it does not affect the way he frames the 84
challenge: “it is far from obvious that there is the same reason for partiality within every relationship that 
is, in some recognizable use of the terms, a relationship between ‘parent’ and ‘child’, sibling’ and 
‘sibling’, and so on. The challenge ‘Why do we have reason for partiality in some relationships, but not in 
others?’ seems to recur within kinds of relationship that, loosely understood, call for partiality” (2010b: 
55). Seidman rightly points out—and I would agree—that a better answer to the question of when we 
have reasons of partiality would tell us not which relationships are reasons of partiality, but which 
considerations are reasons of partiality (2013: 124). 
 As Raz puts it, “for friendship to be possible it must be predefined. It is predefined by social practices 85
which establish and mark out patterns of interaction between people. The ability of people to have a 
particular relationship depends on its being established by social practices known to them, and which they 
share, at least to some degree. People nowadays cannot establish the relations between master and 
apprentice which existed in mediaeval society” (1989: 19-20). 
 Maguire (2017: 687) calls this claim VALUE SUFFICIENCY: “If some state of affairs S is valuable, then 86
the fact that some option φ would promote S is a reason for you to φ.” This is consistent with there being 
overwhelmingly weightier reasons against φ. 
!135
utilitarianism implies that there is no entailment from the claim that a state of affairs is valuable 
to the claim that one has most reason to bring that state of affairs about. Furthermore, just as, in 
identifying various goods that relationships provide, we do not yet say anything about how to act 
or feel in any particular situation, neither, in identifying various reasons that we have, do we yet 
say anything about the weight of those reasons, which would be required to render a final deontic 
verdict on how to act or feel. But the inquiry into the goods we value in relationships is still 
relevant to real-world ethical deliberation, because it identifies the kinds of considerations that 
we ought to be weighing; we are identifying the raw materials for deliberation, as it were. 
Practices: I take a practice to be a shared form of activity constituted by norms that define 
roles, moves, penalties, and standards of right and wrong behavior. A practice of baseball defines 
the role of the batter, the pitcher, and the umpire, and standards of correctness for how they play. 
An economic practice defines the roles of buyer and seller, and sets standards that govern what 
counts as a transaction versus a robbery. A practice of voting defines the roles of voter and 
observer, and distinguishes between a valid and an invalid vote, or a free choice and a coerced 
choice. Practices are something more than recurring patterns of individual action: they are 
constituted by the norms that govern such actions and the roles that relate the people who occupy 
them. So why take partiality to be a practice? First, partiality clearly has structured roles: 
becoming a friend or a mother or a citizen all carry with them evaluative standards for how to 
behave in that role and how to relate to those who play complementary roles. Furthermore, these 
roles are both variable and to some degree optional. They are variable because, as mentioned 
above, different social groups organize these roles in distinct ways: relationship types do not 
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exist independently of the contingent social circumstances that regulate them. Role play all you 
like, you and your friend simply cannot become a medieval master and apprentice; that social 
form is no longer available to us today. And these roles are optional because people deliberate 
about whether or not to take them on. Consider marriage or parenthood. It’s noteworthy that 
many people deliberate whether they wish to inherit the baggage of these practices. Do they 
really want to be married in a culture where marriage is so politically fraught. Do they really 
want to raise children in a social group where parenting takes on outsize importance? When 
people do opt in, however, and they do so consciously, it is typically because they expect to be 
able to facilitate certain goods for themselves and others. So while it may be true that partiality 
has less structure and fewer institutions than other canonical practices, such as punishment, this 
is no mark against understanding partiality as a practice in my sense.  87
As They Are: Understanding partiality as a non-ideal practice means starting with our current 
habits of behaving partially to one another. Once we have a sense of which goods are actually 
valued (§2.1), we can try to identify what kind of distinctive value those goods have (§2.2). 
These steps have to go in order; it is not as though we have a list of our antecedent values, 
specifiable in advance, and then work out practices that best realize those values. As Elijah 
 My definition is inspired by Rawls, for whom a practice is “any form of activity specified by a system 87
of rules which defines offices, roles, moves, penalties, defenses, and so on, and which gives the activity 
its structure” (1955: 3 n. 1). A distinct definition of a practice, which would also make room for partiality, 
comes from MacIntyre: “a coherent and complex form of socially established cooperative human activity 
through which goods internal to that form of activity are realized in the course of trying to achieve those 
standards of excellence which are appropriate to, and practically definitive of, the form of activity, with 
the result that human powers to achieve excellence, and human conceptions of the ends and goods 
involved, are extended” (2007: 187). This definition, like Rawls’, emphasizes the cooperative and 
normative elements of practices, but, unlike Rawls’, adds an emphasis on the excellence involved in 
achievement internal to the practice and conceptions of the good external to the practice. Although I agree 
with MacIntyre that self-understanding is one good of practices, I follow Rawls by not making self-
understanding partially definitive of a practice. 
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Millgram puts it, “typically, it is only after one has a great deal of experience with a … practice 
that one is in a position to do a reasonable job of picking out organizing goals for it” (2011: 190 
n. 32). And it bears emphasizing that identifying the organizing goals or values of a practice is a 
matter of interpretation. We do not deduce the goals of a practice, but infer them from observing 
how people act within the practice. What are we aiming at when act partially toward each other 
in various relationships? The key move, as my epigraph from Mill’s Art of Life describes, is to 
assume that whatever our aims turn out to be, those ends are valuable.  This generates a rational 88
explanation of a social practice, in which some of the reasons that agents have to act anyway are 
reasons for them to act in ways that conform to and support the practice. Of course, there is no 
expectation that each agent acting within the practice has formulated such a rational explanation 
in order to act well within the practice. As Lydia Goehr writes, “The way practice works is not 
necessarily identical to how people think it works in their day to day activities. Persons tend to 
think globally only when encouraged or forced to do so” (1992: 104). The interpretation of how 
practice works, at this global level, is a job for theory. 
 It is not the only job for theory, however. Once we have identified the organizing goals of 
a practice, we are in a position to evaluate it (§2.3). In particular, this is where we can apply the 
theoretical criterion of rightness given in Chapter 2: An act is morally right if it is permitted by a 
justified actual practice in one’s society, where a justified practice is one that better promotes the 
happiness of those affected by it than the viable alternatives do. We want to know not only which 
 As a recent trio of commentators puts it, “For such [practices], ascertaining their respective axiological 88
first principles is a fairly straightforward matter of interpretation rather than a matter of affirming a value 
judgment. For each such art, the end at which it aims can be identified by interpreting the actions 
understood to be guided by the art in question, and then its axiological first principle can be formulated as 
the proposition that that end is desirable” (Eggleston, D. Miller, and Weinstein 2011: 5).
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acts are permitted but whether there is feasibly a better distribution of the goods of partiality that 
could increase the happiness of those affected by the practice. If, as I will argue, the organizing 
goal of partiality is to provide certain goods, then we can see how it falls short where those 
goods are poorly distributed. So the theoretical standard can give us a reason to change our 
practices where possible; it is not normatively idle. As with Wolf’s reasons of meaning, the 
widespread distribution of the goods of partiality is already an element within our practices, but 
the force of non-ideal theorizing is to serve as a diagnostic tool to make explicit this previously 
unrecognized commitment and suggest hypothetical solutions for improvement. My hope in 
pursuing the three-step justificatory procedure is not only to show what NPU has to say about 
partiality, but to offer further illustration of how two-level ethical theorizing can be reason-giving 
for us.  
2.1 Valuing and Relationships 
 Begin, then, with the goods that human beings actually value in their partial relationships. 
I understand relationships broadly as relations individuated by the identities of their participants 
and the history of encounter between them.  An exhaustive list of what we seek and benefit 89
from in relationships would perhaps be impossible to provide, but we can make some progress 
by distinguishing two kinds of goods. Special goods can by provided only by a particular person 
with whom we share a functionally irreplaceable relationship, while generic goods could be 
 I take relationships between persons as my paradigm, but the account can in principle extend to cover 89
relationships between human beings and animals, artworks, the natural world, and so on.
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provided by others, in principle if not in practice.  There are difficulties in spelling out the 90
distinction precisely, but we need only the basic idea.  
 Any token relationship may be the site of goods of both kinds. For instance, a (suitably 
reflective) child might value her relationship to her parents for the educational opportunities and 
material comforts they provide her, as well as for their emotional support and approval. The 
former are generic goods: if her parents genuinely could not afford tuition and someone else had 
to pay, the child should not be upset at the need for substitution. But the latter are special goods: 
what the child desires could not be provided by any other adult, and if her parents were cold and 
withholding it would be appropriate for her to feel bereft even if she were smothered with 
affection by other family members and friends. It is a significant fact about human valuing that 
many of the goods we most desire and pursue are special goods: the love of a particular 
individual, the approval of a certain friend, and the way that just one person makes us feel can all 
take on outsize importance in our practical deliberation. And when we are lucky enough to 
receive these special goods, they will often be among the most highly valued elements of a 
relationship. Our relationships to others give our lives meaning: they have the power to make our 
lives go well or poorly, and as a result we very much hope that they go well.     
 Believing that relationships are the source of these goods does not mean that we value 
our relationships only instrumentally. Following Rae Langton (2007), I distinguish two basic 
 I borrow the terms ‘generic’ and ‘special’ from Simon Keller (2013: 106-11), although my usage is 90
different from his. Keller defines a good as special “if a full description of its nature implies that there is 
only one person, or only a few people, by whom it could be provided,” but this account produces false 
positives. I may want a recommendation for membership in a certain club, which has to come from a 
current member. Although there are only a few people who could provide it, the recommendation should 
be classed as a generic good, even though the recommendation could only be provided by my sponsor, 
because the relationship of sponsorship is replaceable. (I might, however, also have an irreplaceable 
friendship, or other relationship, with the person who serves as my sponsor. We can bear multiple 
relationships to the same individuals.)  
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ways in which we value things: intrinsically (for their own sake) and extrinsically (for the sake of 
something else). Valuing something instrumentally (for the sake of its effects) is an instance of 
extrinsic valuing, because one way to value something for the sake of something else is to value 
it for the sake of its effects. It is not obvious how we typically value relationships, in part 
because the psychology of intrinsic valuing is so obscure. But it seems fairly clear that we do not 
value relationships only instrumentally.  We value something only instrumentally, I claim, when 91
we would abandon it without loss of value if we could acquire the good to which it is a means in 
another way. To borrow an example of Samuel Scheffler’s, suppose I value my membership in 
the American Association of Retired People for the sake of the discounts on prescription drugs 
that membership provides (2010b: 50). I would value my membership only instrumentally if, 
could I get the discounts in some other way, I would do so without seeing it as a loss. Yet if I 
experienced loss at the lapse of my membership, that would suggest that I value it in non-
instrumental ways, such as for the sake of the camaraderie it provides me. The breakdown of 
important relationships often produces a sense of loss, even if we believe that they end for good 
reasons (more on this in Chapter 4).  
 Even if we deny that we value our relationships only instrumentally, however, I claim that 
we do value our relationships in part instrumentally, i.e., for the sake of the goods they provide. 
To many, this will sound problematic, especially if it is taken to imply that we value 
relationships, as, in Scheffler’s words, “a means to some independently specified end” (1997: 
196). Two points can be made in response. First, although relationships can be thought of as 
 Railton has a nice discussion of this point: “Friends are not ‘things that make one achieve friendship’—91
they partially constitute friendships, just as particular happy experience[s] partially constitute happiness 
for an individual. Thus taking friendship as an intrinsic value does not entail viewing particular 
friendships instrumentally” (1984: 149-50 fn. 21).
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means to ends, in the case of special goods relationships can only be constitutive, and not merely 
productive, means. That is, because the relationship is irreplaceable, it would be the only way of 
attaining the good in question, and so might well be valued in its own right as a constitutive part 
of the end.  Second, and in any case, reflection on the psychology of valuing suggests that 92
relationships are not typically thought of as ‘independently specified’ goods or ends that we 
pursue. Although people often set out in search of friends or romantic partners, what they are 
usually looking for is someone to play that role generically, not someone who answers to a fully-
specified description. And even if we were to embark on a relationship seeking an independently 
specified end, it is often the case that successfully maintained relationships come to seem 
valuable in themselves.   93
 The picture of valuing given by John Dewey lends further support to the claim that 
insofar as we value relationships at all, we value them in part instrumentally. Dewey holds that 
ends and means lie along a continuum. By this, he means two things. First, we do not evaluate 
‘ends-in-themselves’ independently of means, but (at least in part) in terms of whether or not we 
can—whether in a practical, prudential, moral, or some other sense of ‘can’—take the means to 
attain them.  Second, and more relevantly for present purposes, the ends we seek, the desires we 94
have, and the consequences we aim at are all “valued in turn as means of future 
consequences” (1988 [1939]: 229). For Dewey, the means-ends distinction is only clear-cut at a 
 A more precise definition comes from Setiya: “A productive means is an efficient cause [of an end]; a 92
constitutive means is one that is an instance of, or part of, the relevant end” (2007: 99). 
 Consider the description offered by Proust in his Preface to Ruskin’s Bible d’Amiens: “A man becomes 93
acquainted with a woman because she may help him reach a goal other than herself. Then once he knows 
her, he loves her for herself and sacrifices to her without hesitation that goal which it was merely her 
function to help him attain” (1987: 58). 
 This implies that, for Dewey, there can be deliberation ‘about’ ends. We decide which ends are 94
choiceworthy in part on the basis of whether they are feasibly realized through the means available. 
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single timeslice, which is where most philosophers focus. But over time, what was once valued 
as an end can become valued as a means. I might aim to talk to you at a party in order to invite 
you to collaborate on a business venture, but later come to value the end of collaboration in turn 
as a means to befriend you. My conception of my ends shifts as I respond to new experiences, 
thereby shifting what counts as a means. In sum: there is no reason to think that conceiving of 
our valuing of relationships in terms of the goods they provide implies that we do, or should, 
value relationships only instrumentally, even if there are good reasons to think that we often do 
value our relationships in part instrumentally.  
2.2 The Aim of Partiality 
 Having briefly surveyed which goods are most valued in various partial relationships, the 
second step is to identify what is distinctive about partiality. I argue that relationships facilitate 
distinct special goods, and not only distinct forms of generic goods. If this is so, then facilitating 
special goods is the distinctive aim of partiality as a practice. And then, following Mill, we can 
assume that facilitating such special goods is itself valuable. 
 Thomas Hurka (2013) distinguishes three different kinds of value that close personal 
relationships may have. First, relationships may be a place where generic goods are realized to a 
greater degree than usual. Second, relationships may be the site for distinct forms of generic 
goods, with additional value that flows from their location. Third, relationships may instantiate 
distinctive goods not found in any form elsewhere. Hurka does not make a claim about which, if 
any, of these values are facilitated by relationships, although he notes that the three kinds of 
value are not in conflict; relationships could be the site of all three. I want to argue that 
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relationships can in fact be the site of all three kinds of value, although I will understand these 
values somewhat differently than Hurka does.  
 Return to my (incomplete) list of relationship goods: enjoyment, respect, attachment, 
vulnerability, trust, virtue, being known. It is certainly true that relationships are a place where 
some generic goods are realized to a greater degree than usual. The time I spend with my friends, 
for instance, is often much more enjoyable than time spent alone, or with strangers. Being a good 
parent demands many exercises of virtue, and additionally allows me to pass on virtues to my 
children. Marriage and romantic partnerships require enormous amounts of trust and 
vulnerability. And all of these relationships may involve the distribution of material goods such 
as gifts and money. But because these are generic goods, they could be acquired in other forms. I 
could respect, trust, be emotionally vulnerable, and give money to someone with whom I do not 
share a relationship, just as a stranger could respect, trust, be emotionally vulnerable, or give 
money to me (as in Dickens’ Great Expectations).  
 Relationships can also be the site of distinct forms of generic goods. Hurka thinks that 
these generic goods attain an additional, distinctive value in virtue of the shared history that we 
enjoy with our relatives. Just as my furniture or clothing would have additional value, beyond 
their fine intrinsic qualities, in virtue of being treasured hand-me-downs from beloved ancestors, 
so do our relationships attain a distinctive value, beyond the intrinsic qualities of their 
participants, in virtue of the past experiences that have been shared.  I agree that shared history 95
provides one source of additional value over and above the value of generic goods, but I believe 
 The furniture example is Hurka’s (2013: 206-7). Kolodny (2003) holds, implausibly in my view, that 95
relationships (and not individuals) constitute the sole normative ground of love, while in (2010a) he more 
plausibly claims that histories of shared encounter give us additional reasons for partiality over and above 
the discrete encounters of which they are composed.   
!144
that Hurka overlooks the fact that some goods attain additional value just in virtue of being 
produced by a specific person. To return to an earlier example, even if a child’s relationship to 
her neglectful parents generates no additional value, given the negative quality of their shared 
history, there will still be a distinctive value to the first instances of emotional support and 
affection that the parents do show her. In general, though, we should class many special goods in 
this second category of value, so long as we think of it more capaciously than Hurka does.   
 When it comes to the question of whether relationships might facilitate distinct goods, 
and not merely distinctive forms of other goods, Hurka tentatively suggests that there may be a 
special value of reciprocity. This would arise from thinking of the relationship as a Moorean 
organic unity: “The whole composed of each of your loves for the other is, because those loves 
are returned, a separate intrinsic good” (2013: 213). Like Hurka, I find this possibility difficult to 
assess, because it is difficult to understand how reciprocity or mutuality could make one’s life go 
better without having any further good features beyond those the relationship already has. 
Fortunately, I believe that relationships facilitate a less controversial, and less puzzling, distinct 
good, which I call epistemic intimacy.  
 Epistemic intimacy refers to the condition of being known intimately by another, in a way 
that is manifest to oneself.  There are many phrases to reach for in describing this condition, 96
such as being known as one’s inmost self, understood at the core of one’s being, or seen for who 
one is. I find that last phrase in particular suggestive, with its connotations of recognition, 
 I add the modifier to rule out cases where we might want to say that one party is known intimately by 96
another, perhaps through observation from afar, but does not know this. The definition is also intended to 
rule out illusory cases in which one party merely believes that she is intimately known. See Cocking & 
Kennett (1998) for a view that emphasizes the importance of secrets in friendship. Nehamas rightly points 
out that although I might share the same secrets with others (such as therapists), “when I tell my friends, 
both of us treat them [i.e., the secrets] as material that can help or hinder the formation of our character 
and personality” (2016: 223). 
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although this should not be understood as mere political recognition. Epistemic intimacy, like 
many other rich goods, is often well-described by novelists. Richard Russo, in his novel Straight 
Man, writes: “Which is why we have spouses and children and parents and colleagues and 
friends, because someone has to know us better than we know ourselves. We need them to tell 
us. We need them to say, ‘I know you, Al. You’re not the kind of man who’” (1997: 374).  97
Similarly, Willa Cather, in O Pioneers!, has her protagonist Alexandra say: “It’s by 
understanding me, and the boys, and mother, that you’ve helped me. I expect that is the only way 
one person ever really can help another” (1992 [1913]: 27). Many, probably all, of us desire to be 
able to agree when someone says they know or understand us in this way. But this is the kind of 
good that brooks no substitutions, because the exact way a particular person knows us could not, 
even in principle, be replaced. This is the phenomenon that the sociologist Georg Simmel has in 
mind when he writes that the knowledge some person A has of person M is different from 
anyone else’s knowledge of M, since that knowledge “contains as an integrating, form-giving 
precondition the psychological peculiarity of A and the particular relation into which A and M 
are brought by their specific characters and destinies” (1950: 309). Because epistemic intimacy is 
a distinct good not analyzable as a distinctive form of any generic good, some special goods do 
belong in this third category of value. I suspect that most of the remaining special goods can be 
accounted for in the second category of value, as distinctive forms of generic goods, whether 
their goodness is to be explained in virtue of shared history or not. To summarize:  
 Relationship goods 
 I. Generic goods (e.g., enjoyment, virtue, trust, gratitude, material resources)  
 Philip Kitcher has objected that others don’t necessarily know us better than we know ourselves, just 97
differently. I agree completely, but think this leaves the core of Russo’s observation untouched. 
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 II. Special goods:  
  a. Distinct forms of generic goods (in virtue of shared history or not) 
  b. Distinct special goods (e.g., epistemic intimacy)  98
The procedure I recommend for justifying partiality takes what has been said in this section so 
far to be sufficient for meeting the second step. Having understood more clearly the kinds of 
value that relationship goods can provide, and having interpreted the distinctive aim of the 
practice of partiality to be facilitating these goods, we can assume that the aim is valuable before 
going on to evaluate how well our current practices are fulfilling that aim and where reforms are 
required.  
2.3 Impartiality as a Non-Ideal Ideal 
 The preceding two sections investigated the goods that people pursue in being partial to 
one another. Enjoyment, respect, attachment, vulnerability, intimacy, and so on are the kinds of 
considerations that motivate us at the first level of ethical thinking. Stepping back from our 
everyday immersion in these practices, however, we can ask what makes actions motivated by 
and in pursuit of such goods right. Here we are looking for more fundamental considerations that 
explain why we have reason to participate in these practices. The answer that NPU offers is that 
 Of course, like almost all goods, epistemic intimacy can suffer from oversaturation, as illustrated by 98
this passage from Hipps’ novel The Adventurist: “I would have her remain inscrutable. I would never 
arrive at that moment a month or year hence when, watching her fuss over one of her eccentricities (she 
dislikes the color palette assigned to traffic lights, say), I catch myself thinking, Now that’s Madison for 
you! Thinking this and knowing too she is not truly fussing, that it is a hamming kind of fussing, 
distracted and fluttering—is in fact a code for us to celebrate our odd-couple pairing, the mercantile 
rationalist and artistic neurotic; cue for me to sigh and tell her to let it go. It isn’t much of this before a 
person finds himself fitted to persona, all promise extinguished, all mysteries solved, his ‘style’ set down 
as surely as an epitaph” (2016: 89-90). In short, we can know someone too well. 
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these actions are part of a practice that makes things go better by facilitating such goods. And we 
act rightly when we act in a way permitted by a justified actual practice. 
 In evaluating partiality, then, we would like to know which actions are permitted by our 
current practices. To a large degree, this is not so much a matter for philosophical analysis as 
sociological observation: we have to interpret our practices to determine exactly which norms 
and rules they embody. Moreover, it is an open-ended question, since our practices are constantly 
changing as groups work out and revise the norms that govern their attitudes and conduct, 
sometimes even under the influence of an ethical theory.  Though some actions are 99
uncontroversially permitted—comforting a friend, giving care to an aging parent, providing for a 
child’s education—there are innumerable hard cases as well.  
 We would also like to know whether there are viable alternatives to our current 
practices.  I said above that I do not take extreme impartialism, on which no form of partiality 100
is permissible, to be a viable alternative, let alone a desirable one. That would be to fall into the 
trap, diagnosed in Chapter 2, of wrongly identifying false negatives by peering through the lens 
of ideal theory. NPU takes impartiality to be an ideal in the non-ideal sense: not a final, end-state 
standard that we must comply with on pain of moral wrongdoing, but a hypothesis to guide 
proposed reforms. Impartiality does not have the status of an ideal principle but of a 
generalization about the direction ethical progress has taken in the past. As the quotation from 
Keller at the beginning of this chapter suggests, impartiality can be understood in a variety of 
 One example that springs to mind is the influence, far beyond university campuses, of Peter Singer’s 99
theoretical arguments for animal welfare.
 There are difficult questions, which I hope to address in future work, about what exactly constitutes a 100
viable alternative to a current practice. A full answer would make reference to the expected value of a 
positive change weighed against transition costs, with checks in place to avoid status quo bias.  
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ways; NPU takes impartiality to consist in improvements to overall well-being. Before I discuss 
one proposal for moving our practices in a more impartial direction—one that could increase the 
happiness of those affected by partiality—I first want to compare NPU to the most influential 
ideal utilitarian view in the philosophical literature, the one offered by Peter Railton (1984). 
Though my view has much in common with Railton’s, there will be several crucial differences. 
 Imagine that you are happily married, perhaps even a model spouse. You display love, 
attentiveness, and concern for your partner. The two of you are tolerably well-off, living in an 
affluent Western society, but not lavishly wealthy. You are generous toward friends and family, 
but also mindful of the wider world around you, donating around 15% of your income to the 
charities that you judge most effective. Suppose now that you have a friend named Juan, who has 
a similar profile. You are both out to dinner one evening (nowhere too fancy) with one of Juan’s 
friends, a would-be provocateur whom you’ve just met. This gadfly is wondering about marriage 
as an institution, its goods and especially its evils. He knows that Juan is a principled individual, 
and asks how Juan’s marriage fits into that larger scheme. Marriage is all well and good, he says, 
but what about all those other, needier people whom Juan could help if he broadened his horizon 
still further? Juan thinks for a while, and then says the following:  
      Look, it’s a better world when people can have a relationship like ours—and 
      nobody could if everyone were always asking themselves who’s got the most  
      need. It’s not easy to make things work in this world, and one of the best things 
      that happens to people is to have a close relationship like ours. You’d make  
      things worse in a hurry if you broke up those close relationships for the sake of 
      some higher goal. Anyhow, I know that you can’t always put family first. The  
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      world isn’t such a wonderful place that it’s OK just to retreat into your own  
      little circle. But still, you need that little circle. People get burned out, or lose 
      touch, if they try to save the world by themselves. The ones who can stick with  
      it and do a good job of making things better are usually the ones who can make 
      that fit into a life that does not make them miserable (1984: 150).  
In hearing Juan answer in this way, you might have three thoughts. First, you might appreciate 
that there is more to be said about your moral choices, and in particular more to be said about 
why they are right. When asked to justify your love for your partner, you can go beyond the 
simple response, ‘Of course I take care of my partner—that’s just the right thing to do!’ 
Constructing this kind of explanation is, of course, one of the principal reasons to adopt a two-
level theory as I have characterized it.  
 Second, you might believe that Juan is on to something when he claims that “it’s a better 
world” where there exists a practice of marriage than where there is no such practice. This is 
especially true given the current existence of the practice: the transition costs of ending it (“if 
you broke up those close relationships”) would be far too great to make that a viable option. This 
makes Juan’s a forward-looking justification, since his explanation of why marriage is good 
appeals to its outcomes. Notice also that Juan has (correctly, I believe) left the scope of his 
standard somewhat indeterminate: there is no implication that in order to meet the standard, 
marriage as a practice needs to make things go better for each particular person, although clearly 
marriage needs to make things go better for some number of people (and certainly not worse for 
a larger number of others). 
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 Third, you might nonetheless worry that something is off about Juan’s answer, in that it 
seems to imply, first, that his marriage is good only if it is instrumental to producing better 
consequences for everyone (“you need that little circle”) and, second, that marriage in general is 
good only because it allows people to “do a good job of making things better” for others. It is 
here that NPU differs from Juan’s answer. Adopting its second-level theoretical standard means 
that there is a constraint on our first-level practices: if they fall below some threshold of value, 
then they must be altered. But this does not imply that being instrumental to that other value—
happiness—is the only source of their goodness, because we can preserve, at the first level of 
ethical thinking, all our everyday beliefs about the special goods that marriage and other partial 
relationships facilitate. At the first level, relationships facilitate various goods for us as 
individuals in relationships. At the second, theoretical level, we see these relationships as 
constitutive elements of a larger practice that makes things better overall. 
 NPU therefore dissents from Juan’s answer in at least three respects. First, it does not 
apply the theoretical standard directly to individual relationships, but to a particular practice of 
organizing marital relations. Second, it does not require compliance with impartiality understood 
as an end-state ideal toward which we must progress, but as a way of making piecemeal changes 
toward greater overall well-being, without thinking we have to get to the greatest possible 
aggregate well-being. This is not to say that NPU denies that there are moral requirements—
some practices are not justified, so revising them is required—but rather to shift the threshold at 
which reforms are required. Third, in taking impartiality as a hypothesis to be tested in practice, 
NPU is open to the idea that we might need to revise away from impartiality in the future. 
Moving in the direction of greater impartiality might well bring new problems in its train, 
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problems that we cannot even conceptualize in the present. And if our practices were no longer 
able to facilitate special goods such as epistemic intimacy, that would constitute a grave moral 
loss. All three of these features make NPU less demanding than Railton’s view, both 
psychologically (in the sense in which Reconstructive theories are psychologically demanding) 
and practically (in the familiar sense in which utilitarian views require more of agents than other 
views of morality).  
 To this last point, the gadfly issues a skeptical challenge: what about all those other, 
needier people that Juan could help? After all, NPU endorses the axiological principle that 
everyone’s good, if equal in quantity and quality, is equally valuable. But how could the special 
preference that Juan shows for his wife be justified in light of commitment to that principle? Juan 
and his wife exchange various goods; couldn’t some of those be better distributed elsewhere 
(especially the material goods)? The response is to zoom out from an evaluation of a particular 
action—giving charity on some specific occasion—to an evaluation of the larger practice, 
thereby justifying the action indirectly as falling under a (justified) practice. Furthermore, the 
practice itself prescribes bracketing thoughts of impartial utility, i.e., partiality generates an 
exclusionary reason: we should decide to help those with whom we share partial relationships 
not on the basis of their impartial moral value but on the basis of our practices of partiality. In 
particular, we should choose to help our relatives on the basis of the motivations sanctioned by 
the practice—love, concern, reciprocity, and so forth—and not on the basis of a commitment to 
axiological impartialism.  
 How do we know this is an exclusionary reason and not an overriding reason? In this 
case, NPU grants that the reasons given by the impartial value of all people are indeed weightier. 
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We do not have to deny, and can in fact insist, that on any particular occasion, we have weightier 
reason, from the point of view of impartial utility, to distribute some financial resources to those 
who are in greater need. But that weightier reason is excluded by the practice, just as, with 
Rawlsian punishment, a weightier reason to punish the innocent would be excluded by the 
practice. And since that weightier reason is excluded, it is not the case that, as Hare believes, 
partiality is a regrettable side-effect of our not being able to be impartially benevolent. Rather, 
partiality is a practice that is itself (to some degree) justified. 
 But what justifies the exclusionary reason generated by partiality? This is where the 
special goods of partiality carry a significant justificatory burden. If the organizing aim of 
partiality were simply to provide various generic goods, such as financial benefits and occasions 
for virtue, then we can imagine other practices that could do so more efficiently. But I argued 
that among the goods facilitated by partiality are special goods, including distinct special goods 
such as epistemic intimacy. Such goods could be provided in no other way except through 
something approximating our practice of partiality.  And providing special goods typically 101
requires the provision of some generic goods as well. Part of what enables us to develop 
relationships of epistemic intimacy with others is the trust and vulnerability, and the exchange of 
material resources, that accompany long acquaintance. Most intimate relationships begin as 
relationships with a greater degree of interchangeability, and it is only on the basis of providing 
generic goods that they are in a position to be sites of exchange of special goods.  
 NPU does not have to admit that our practices are completely justified in their current 
form, however. Rather, taking impartiality as a non-ideal ideal yields two broad classes of 
 I argue for this claim in Chapter 4. 101
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reasons for improvement. The first set relates to distribution of goods within the practice. Insofar 
as material resources are components of our practice of partiality, then we can ask how better to 
share them. And here it seems overwhelmingly clear that if the aim of partiality is the beneficial 
distribution of various partial goods, including generic goods, then the practice suffers from 
severe shortcomings. Affluent parents often take themselves to have reason to give their children 
every possible opportunity for advancement, at the expense not only of other children in their 
social milieu but in the world more broadly. Economically well-off people often think nothing of 
spending their discretionary income on expensive and time-consuming hobbies that are 
inaccessible to those in impoverished communities. But the second-level theoretical standard 
recommended by NPU need not approve of such reasons, since it is implausible to insist that a 
practice in which people feel free to spend their resources indiscriminately is better than a 
practice in which people are at least strongly encouraged (if not mandated) to devote at least 
some resources to beneficial causes. I do not have anything like a full-dress proposal here, but I 
believe that the structure I have outlined represents the best way to think about these matters, 
which has been my main goal in this chapter. Rather than deliberating on each particular 
occasion whether or not to donate one’s resources to someone with whom one stands in a partial 
relationship or someone with whom one does not, such deliberation should take place at the level 
of practice-reform. And if we want to move in the direction of improving overall well-being, then 
we might fruitfully consider work in the standard consequentialist tradition in search of 
proposals for reform, where these proposals, again, are understood not as moral requirements but 
as hypotheses to be tested in practice and which we could walk back if necessary. 
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 The second set of reasons relates to expansion of the practice. Unlike those philosophers 
who claim that relationships themselves have moral importance, and that there is nothing more to 
be said by way of normative explanation, NPU can account for those who are not currently in 
relationships, or not part of our practices of partiality. Adopting a more impartial ideal implies 
that we also have moral reasons to form special relationships. These reasons could apply at the 
individual level, the institutional level, or both (cf. Collins 2013). At the individual level, we 
have reasons to increase our chances of forming relationships, and to promote others’ 
relationship-formation. For instance, we have reason to make new friends, to help others become 
friends, to try to set people up as romantic partners, to adopt children, and to promote adoption. 
Officially, these are reasons to increase our chances because most relationships of course require 
the cooperation of the other party. At the institutional level, states should work for beneficial 
redistribution, even across national borders, and to promote policies for adoption and child-
rearing that improve access to resources among all children, regardless of background. But much 
of the work has to be done at the individual level, because better relationships arise when people 
feel free to care deeply about their relatives, a state of affairs that cannot be externally 
prescribed. At a minimum, states should maintain policies of benign non-interference with many 
of our more ‘private’ relationships, especially given that non-interference is among the 
conditions under which epistemic intimacy is more likely to arise. 
 These new reasons may seem controversial, especially at the individual level. But there 
are three things to say in response. First, they are only pro tanto, and thus could be outweighed 
by other reasons, especially if part of what makes our current practices function successfully is 
the sphere of autonomy and privacy that they create. Second, these reasons are not totally 
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disconnected from our current practices. Many people serve as matchmakers, advocate for 
adoption, and try to make more friends. What NPU implies is that people have moral reasons to 
do these things. Third, and finally, if non-ideal theory more generally is to have any practical 
impact, we ought to expect that it gives us novel reasons to improve our practices. These would 
be reasons that we do not ordinarily take ourselves to have but which, as Wolf puts it, we would 
nonetheless be “willing to acknowledge” as reasons upon reflection (2010: 117). Again, although 
it is not my intention to propose a full package of reforms, I believe that the procedure 
recommended here is the best way forward. My aim in this chapter has been to illustrate how 
best to think about partiality on a non-ideal two-level picture, and to outline how a second-level 
standard gives us reason to pursue relationship goods.  
 At this point, I have outlined my three-step procedure for justifying partiality. I 
investigated our practices of partiality to determine which goods are most valued in various 
relationships, I provided an interpretive taxonomy of the kind of value those goods have, and I 
argued that seeing partiality’s organizing aim as facilitating those goods allows us to justify it to 
a certain degree but also to construct a non-ideal standard for improvement. NPU justifies 
particular actions against skeptical challenges by zooming out to see them as falling under our 
admittedly non-ideal practices of partiality. But whether for partiality or for other practices, we 
shouldn’t see ourselves as making progress toward some distant end-state ideal so much as 
progress away from our current non-ideal circumstances. 
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Chapter Four: Objections and Replies 
 In this final chapter, I discuss various objections and replies: seven, to be exact. My goals 
are to tie up loose ends in my treatment of NPU and to relate my discussion of partiality to recent 
work in the philosophical literature. I conclude by considering NPU as a Constructive theory.  
1. Objections and Replies  
Objection 1: The formulation of NPU in Chapter 2 was motivated in part by the idea that 
theoretical criteria of rightness should apply in the first instance to practices, and not to 
individual actions. But surely not all aspects of our ethical lives are regulated by practices. What, 
if anything, does NPU have to say about these aspects?  
Reply:  As formulated, NPU indeed applies only to those aspects of ethical life that are regulated 
by practices. In this it might be regarded as structurally similar to Scanlon’s contractualism, 
which purports to account only for “a narrower domain of morality having to do with our duties 
to other people,” as opposed to the broader domain of morality that includes forms of behavior 
such as idleness or wastefulness, which “are often considered immoral even when they do not 
harm other people or violate any duties to them” (1998: 6). Although NPU does not draw the 
distinction in the same place that Scanlon does, I might well be forced to concede that there is a 
narrower domain to which NPU applies and a broader domain that includes aspects of ethical life 
that are not regulated by practices.  
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 That concession having been made, though, there are two things to be said to mitigate 
concerns that NPU is now insufficiently explanatory in scope. First, it seems to me that almost 
all of ethical life is structured by social practices. Even our ‘private’ lives are, while isolated 
from the gaze of others, often judged with reference to their standards; it is arguably built in to 
the notion of a conscience that we enforce internally what would otherwise be imposed 
externally. And social practices themselves often determine where the line of privacy is to be 
drawn: a certain practice of etiquette might insist that we should not pry into the health or 
income of others, but allow us to judge how well an individual holds their fork; a general 
practice of toleration allows that some matters are left to an individual to decide, while others 
should be publicly regulated. In that sense, therefore, even private actions can fall under 
practices in the sense of being permissible or impermissible by their lights. NPU does not, 
however, claim that we cannot or should not try to step outside of our practices at times; it is at 
such times that we ought to employ a second-level theoretical standard such as impartiality, 
particularly in our capacity as reformers. Practices do not themselves do all the justifying work.  
 Still, someone may continue to maintain that there are hard and fast lines to be drawn 
here between the practice-governed and the purely individual. So, second, a non-ideal individual 
utilitarianism could be formulated to account for any remaining ethical spheres. Such a theory 
would take as its primary target of assessment individual actions, but it would preserve the 
teleological and non-ideal components of NPU, thereby retaining its commitment to a moral 
epistemology on which we do not need knowledge of the ideal or best in order to acquire 
knowledge of the better. This picture, which is inspired by Dewey, maintains that we are mostly 
guided by unreflective habit until jarred into reflection by confronting a problem, whether at the 
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social or the individual level (Sen 2009; Anderson 2010; Appiah 2017). So whether or not all 
aspects of ethical life are ultimately thought to be regulated by practices, a non-ideal utilitarian 
theory will have something to say about how to solve the concrete difficulties we face, as 
opposed to finding a final, finished, complete way of living.  
Objection 2: This moral epistemology surely requires further defense. Why think of ethical 
reflection in terms of problem-solving at all? As Hilary Putnam puts it, “The very words solution 
and problem may be leading us astray—ethical ‘problems’ are not like scientific problems, and 
they do not often have ‘solutions’ in the sense that scientific problems do” (1990: 181).  
Reply:  This objection turns on understanding problems as finally solvable, or as having definite 
resolutions, and my reply turns on denying this understanding. Instead, I take problems as 
requiring continual re-solution in the sense that any implementation of a solution should be 
regarded as local and provisional as we await new problems and new understandings of how to 
resolve them. To return to the health analogy, briefly mentioned in Chapter 2, when I recover 
from an illness, I should have no expectation that the condition will never recur, let alone that I 
am in a state of perfect health. Further, ‘solving’ the problem that a chronic condition poses often 
requires techniques of management and learning how to live with the condition; here the 
resolution does not even consist in the removal of the underlying causes so much as a series of 
strategies for coping with the symptoms.   102
 The analogy comes from Dewey’s “Theory of Valuation” (1988 [1939]: 209-11). I note that for Dewey, 102
the notion of a problem encompasses not only conflict but also unfulfilled needs or lacks. 
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 To take a paradigmatically individual case from ethics, I might discover that I have a 
tendency to become impatient, whether because others point this out to me or because I find 
myself frequently rushing to get through things in my life. However this comes to my attention, 
once I have noticed this habit, it has become a problem to me; rather than unreflectively 
continue, I must decide what to do about it. One resolution might be to decide not to worry about 
it, but that path is likely to lead to further problems down the road, such as overly hasty decisions 
or the irritation of others; a more satisfactory resolution might be to cultivate techniques of 
breathing and mindfulness, though this is not a permanent solution either; if I travel too far along 
this path I might find myself becoming irresolute or complacent, which would in turn require 
further problem-solving.  
 Indeed, Putnam’s own example is well-understood in this sense of problem-resolution as 
provisional. He discusses the Supreme Court’s decision on abortion, which held that “a first-
trimester fetus does not have legal protection; that abortion of a second-trimester fetus is 
something to be regulated, primarily in the interest of the mother’s health, though not forbidden; 
and that a third-trimester fetus must be amply legally protected” (1990: 182). Putnam rightly 
points out that there are many issues here that have not been ‘solved’, such as the question of 
when personhood begins or the extent of women’s right to privacy over their bodies. But a non-
ideal theorist can agree with Putnam that the Supreme Court’s decision embodies a successful 
adjudication of a difficult dispute without claiming either that it is the ‘last word’ or that it is the 
ideal end-state solution.  
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Objection 3: NPU clearly has some affinity with actual rule utilitarianism, the theory on which 
agents have a permission to follow the rules of their current societies, so long as those rules are 
not structurally incompatible with happiness-promotion (Eggleston and D. Miller 2007; R. Miller 
2009). But what if the rules, or practices, are unjust in other ways? 
Reply:  I begin by rehearsing the two main attractions of actual-code theories. The 
positive attraction is that actual codes, or practices, have instrumental advantages over ideal 
codes or action-based codes: they lessen the likelihood of individual rationalization, promote the 
goods of social coordination, facilitate belonging to a moral community, and secure freedom 
from undue blame. The negative attraction is that actual codes are non-ideal: they do not offer 
timeless standards of rightness, but focus ethical evaluation on transitions. Yet the primary 
objection to actual-code theories is that they are too conservative, producing nothing more than a 
fancy defense of the status quo. In fact, this worry is only heightened by the focus on viable 
transitions between practices rather than practices as such, because expected transition costs will 
often be a legitimate reason not to alter our practices too much. For instance, if a proposed 
reform to our practices of partiality—raising children communally, for instance—required 
breaking up many existing parent-child relationships, that would be a strong reason not to adopt 
the proposal.  
 The best response to this objection is to recall that actual-code theories are importantly 
distinct from conventionalism, the view that we have most reason to follow the actual 
conventions of our society, full stop. A theory like NPU places an important moral condition on a 
society’s conventions, namely that they do a better job at promoting happiness than viable 
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alternatives (where the viable alternatives include past versions of the practices, which are 
known to have been actual at some point in time). So the theory need not endorse all our current 
practices, and is thus not identical to conventionalism. In fact, it recognizes two sources of moral 
requirements: (a) those internal to existing practices, such as requirements to care for one’s 
children or not to punish the innocent, and (b) those external to existing practices, such as 
requirements to reform, or act in such a way as to reform, practices that fail to do better than 
viable alternatives.   
 Still, the present objection makes reference to other kinds of injustice. Perhaps certain 
expressive harms do not affect individual happiness, even unknowingly, or perhaps an entire 
society is mired in false consciousness about its habits of economic exchange, though no one 
member can articulate this. The response that NPU offers here leans heavily on its teleological 
component: if some putative injustice does not ultimately make a difference to individual quality 
of life, then there is no reason to strive to change it. But nearly any diagnosable injustice does 
have consequences for individual welfare: race-based housing discrimination, lax workplace 
harassment regulations, and even voter suppression laws arguably cause or constitute welfare 
harms. The onus is on any would-be reformer to show how a proposed remedy answers to what 
William James calls “the cries of the wounded” (1956 [1897]: 210), where people can be 
wounded in a variety of ways.  
 The objection can be answered even more strongly by noting that the capacity to reform 
is built into our practices, since acting as a reformer is permitted by a justified actual practice. 
Animal-rights enthusiasts, LGBTQ+ activists, effective altruists, and other movements for 
ethical change are all, by the lights of NPU, behaving permissibly. Some might find reformers 
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obnoxious, but that does not mean they are morally wrong, so long as the means they employ are 
not forbidden by other justified actual practices. The theory does not tell us precisely which 
movements we should support. But that is one of its strengths, because the question of whether 
these movements are in fact happiness-promoting is one to be settled only by experiment over 
time. 
Objection 4: Your standard of evaluating partiality is goods-based. But aren’t goods-based 
standards susceptible to the ‘trading-up’ objection?  
Reply:  The objection to applying a goods-based standard to some evaluand is that it requires 
trading up when there is even a slight increase in expected value. My account of partiality avoids 
the trading-up objection, however, because it is highly indirect. It does not evaluate actions 
directly in terms of the second-level standard, as act-utilitarianism does.  And it does not assess 103
actions indirectly in terms of the dispositions that govern them, as motive-utilitarianism does.  104
It assesses actions indirectly in terms of the practices that govern them, where those practices 
themselves recommend certain dispositions. This makes the theory even more indirect than most, 
and it thus approves of actions that other standards might not. 
 This is Railton’s view, and it requires him to say that there can be acts of objective wrongdoing that are 103
nonetheless in keeping with the character that it is best to have: “Juan should have (should develop, 
encourage, and so on) a character such that he sometimes knowingly and deliberately acts contrary to his 
objectively consequentialist duty” (1984: 159). NPU can maintain, contra Railton, that many such actions 
are right.
 This view is developed, in somewhat different ways, by Adams (1976) and Mason (1998). 104
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Objection 5: That seems like a dodge! Insofar as agents apply a goods-based standard not just to 
their practices of partiality but to particular relationships, then they would still face the trading-
up objection. So what about particular relationships?  
Reply:  This is a useful place to emphasize an important feature of my theory, namely that 
NPU is officially silent on the reasons internal to our practices themselves. As a highly indirect 
theory, it limits the kinds of questions we can reasonably ask about our practices from the point 
of view of ethical theory, since it holds that the primary locus of theoretical assessment is 
practices, not particular actions.  Yet as Chapter 3, §§2.1-2.2 suggests, there is still work for 105
philosophers to do that is not at the second level of theorizing per se. In particular, there is the 
interpretive work of identifying and then evaluating the goals, aims, and reasons internal to our 
practices, as with, for example, the first two steps of my account of partiality. So my answer to 
this objection will take place at that interpretive level, the first level of ethical thinking.  
 Clearly, many people do not deliberate about whether to opt into a practice of partiality or 
not; rather, we find ourselves already behaving in partial ways. But we do deliberate about 
whether to form or maintain particular friendships, romantic relationships, or family 
relationships. And here, I also hold that what explains our beginning or continuing some 
relationship is whether it is expected to facilitate certain relationship goods. Again, however, this 
does not follow from NPU, which is compatible with some other account of agential deliberation 
 Jordan MacKenzie (2017) emphasizes this point in her recent account of agent-regret as a constitutive 105
element in a social practice of moral luck. For MacKenzie, it is not reasonable to ask whether agent-regret 
is, in and of itself, rationally justified; we can only ask (1) whether a particular instance of agent-regret is 
justified according to the practice and (2) whether our practice of moral luck is, as a whole, rationally 
justified. 
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within a practice of partiality. But since I hold that a goods-based standard of evaluation is doing 
some work even at the first level of ethical thinking, I want to address the trading-up objection at 
that level, too.  
 It is tempting to think that the trading-up objection is especially worrisome if our goods-
based standard is maximizing, aiming for the highest expected value. But even if the standard is 
less demanding, such as a satisficing standard that only requires the relationship to meet some 
suboptimal level of value, the trading-up objection would still apply so long as a given 
relationship fails to meet the standard.  The objection is most fundamentally about thinking in 106
terms of the provision of goods at all, no matter at what threshold a particular relationship is 
assessed as suboptimal. As Joseph Raz puts it, “Being engaged in a pursuit or a relationship 
includes belief that certain options are not comparable in value. Abandoning such beliefs is 
therefore one way of abandoning the pursuit. Regarding a particular relationship as a proper 
subject for an exchange damages or even destroys it” (1986: 356). 
 The first thing to be said in response is that some people simply deny the force of the 
trading-up objection. Emerson believed that we should periodically replace all our friends, a 
policy justified by his views that friendship is ultimately a means to self-cultivation and that self-
cultivation requires regular infusions of new ideas and stimuli. Going further back, Plato’s 
Symposium can be interpreted as an argument in favor of trading-up: as we ascend Diotima’s 
 In any case, I am inclined to think that worries about maximizing are, when applied to deliberation, a 106
side-show: most often we do not know what to maximize (how do I balance short-term hedonic pleasure 
and long-term satisfaction in a romantic relationship?), or how (even if I know that I want to maximize 
my own hedonic pleasure in a romantic relationship, how much do I need to care about my partner’s 
pleasure in order to do so?). This is not to deny that maximization cannot be the basis of a successful 
objection to the criterion of right action offered by a theory; in fact, I think that such objections tell 
against maximizing criteria in general (cf. Norcross 2006). See also my discussion of practice-based 
theory in Chapter 2.
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ladder, we should no longer form relationships based on certain kinds of properties of the 
beloved (e.g., physical beauty), but based on their having different, better properties (e.g., beauty 
of character, beauty of belonging to a city that instills such a character). If that is the case, then 
we would have reason to replace our beloveds if they did not possess the better kinds of 
properties.  
 Since such views may have only niche appeal, let me instead try to understand what 
makes Raz’s objection compelling. First, it could seem compelling if the goods-based standard is 
thought to be egoistic. If I am just out to maximize my own pleasure, then I am indeed likely to 
damage our relationship sooner or later. But I deny that our standard, within partiality, should be 
egoistic. Instead, it should concern the goods produced for both parties to the relationship. 
Perhaps I think that you could find a more suitable partner, and that our incompatibility is 
preventing you from attaining various relationship goods. There need be nothing egoistic about 
ending a relationship so that you can trade up. Second, the objection could seem compelling if a 
loving relationship is supposed to be unconditional. But a loving relationship should not be 
unconditional, because everyone should agree that there are some reasonable grounds for ending 
some relationships (cf. Edyvane 2003). If your partner, or your parent, or you yourself, 
underwent a drastic personality change, such that you became uncontrollably violent, or wildly 
prejudiced, or viciously hateful, then you would no longer have reason to pursue the relationship: 
the expected goods it provides would have dropped below whatever threshold of value is set by 
the standard. Perhaps you might still have all the attitudes and emotions of love toward such a 
person, in virtue of your past history, but an ongoing relationship would no longer be feasible. 
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 Dispelling these two misconceptions allows us to see what is misguided about Raz’s 
objection, and in particular why it rests on a faulty picture of deliberation. The fact is that 
everyone should regard their particular relationships as proper subjects for exchange, at least 
conditionally.  Part of what it means to have a commitment is to have conditions under which 107
one would reasonably revise those commitments. But the mere thought that there are conditions 
under which one would end a relationship certainly does not imply that one intends or plans or 
even considers doing so now. As Raz himself insists in discussing exclusionary reasons, the mere 
thought of acting on a reason need not in itself have negative consequences for action.  108
Certainly it is true that intending, planning, or even seriously considering ending a relationship 
means that the relationship is damaged or destroyed, but this is not because we consider ending 
it. Raz gets things the wrong way around: in cases where considering the end of a relationship is 
a live option, that is because the relationship itself is already damaged.  
 In short, we need to have some sense of when it is reasonable to form or maintain a 
relationship. But again, NPU is officially silent on that topic, leaving that question to our current 
practices to decide. In fact, the theory forbids the scrutiny of particular relationships in terms of 
its more impartial utilitarian standard, since such scrutiny is precisely what gives rise to the 
skeptical challenge to partiality.  So we should not reject or end particular relationships because 109
they fail to meet the utilitarian standard, but because they fail in other ways according to our 
 As I argued in Chapter 1, §2. 107
 As I quoted in Chapter 2, “So long as one knows that one’s reflections will not affect one’s action, the 108
ill effects of such thoughts are avoided” (Raz 1999: 184). 
 This point is well emphasized by Tedesco (2006), who notes that, from the perspective of a 109
consequentialist standard, most particular acts of, say, friendship, and most friendships themselves, will 
be found unjustified because suboptimal. If the standard is applied to the pro-friendship disposition, as 
Mason (1998) urges, or to our practices of friendship, as I urge, then we must not also apply it to 
particular acts or particular friendships. 
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practices. Different practices may have different senses of when it is reasonable to end a 
relationship—compare medieval Christian and contemporary secular views on divorce—and in 
striving to alter our practices, we should deliberate in terms of the utilitarian standard—doesn’t 
the contemporary secular view prevent years of embittered unhappiness, even if it may be 
imperfect in other ways?—but the trading-up objection itself should not be a cause for concern.  
Objection 6: One recent debate about partiality concerns the ground of partial treatment, and 
whether our reasons to behave partially are ultimately grounded in facts about (the value of) our 
own projects, the relationships we stand in, or the individuals with whom we share relationships 
(Keller 2013; Lord 2016). Does your view take a stand here?  
Reply:  Yes! Non-Practice Utilitarianism claims, as a teleological theory, that all of our ethical 
reasons are ultimately justified by considerations of goodness. In particular, its criterion of 
rightness makes reference to whether our practices better promote the happiness of those affected 
by them than the viable alternatives do. This is the happiness of individuals, and thus my theory 
does take a stand on what ultimately grounds partiality. The value of relationships and the value 
of personal projects must be cashed out in terms of how they affect individual quality of life.   
 Yet at the first level of ethical thinking, any of these three kinds of facts might serve as 
motivating reasons. In being motivated to behave partially toward someone, I might permissibly 
concentrate on their effects on me (‘I would hate to be single’) or on the mere fact that she stands 
in a certain relationship to me (‘she’s my mother!’), without focusing on properties of the 
individual him- or herself. Our current practices don’t seem to forbid thinking in these ways, 
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though perhaps on some interpretations it would be problematically selfish to be motivated in 
these ways alone. But most of us, I take it, have had motivating thoughts of each of these three 
kinds.  
 Furthermore, my theory also has the resources to respond to Keller’s objections to what 
he calls ‘a consequentialist version of the individuals view’. Keller’s first objection is that 
consequentialism gets our reasons wrong: though he concedes that the view “has the resources to 
explain the form of reasons of partiality—how we could have (derived) agent-relative reasons 
and how they could be morally significant—it will struggle to explain their content” (2013: 127). 
Because my view is non-ideal and practice-based, however, I am happy to allow that, to borrow 
Keller’s example, a parent has stronger reason to give her children treatment for severe asthma 
than to make a donation that will save multiple children from blindness. Our current practices 
would even forbid acting in such a way as to save other children at the cost of one’s own child’s 
life. The constraint on our first-level reasons from the point of view of theory—the ‘derivation’ 
of our ordinary reasons from a theoretical standard—takes place at the level of practices, not at 
the level of individual actions. Keller’s second objection is that consequentialism is wrongly 
committed to condemning our ordinary reasons to act: “the consequentialist will have to say that 
when we take ourselves to have reasons that are not answerable to assessments from the 
impartial point of view, we make a mistake” (2013: 129). But the Constructive element of my 
theory means that there is no commitment to seeing our second-level reasons as fundamental or 
our first-level reasons as illusory because non-fundamental.  
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Objection 7: Another recent debate in the literature on partiality concerns the value of 
relationships, and whether they have fundamental or only derivative moral value (as briefly 
mentioned in Chapter 3, §1.1). Does your theory take a position here? 
  
Reply:  Yes! I hold the latter, reductionist position, and in the course of showing why 
NPU is committed to reductionism, I hope to offer one final consideration in favor of the 
practice component of the theory. I begin with some terminology. Non-reductionism about 
relationships is the claim that relationships have fundamental moral importance, while 
reductionism is the claim that relationships have at most derivative moral importance.  110
Something that has fundamental moral importance has unconditional reason-giving force, 
meaning that thing itself is a source of reasons independently of its meeting other conditions. For 
classical ideal utilitarians, pleasure (and only pleasure) has fundamental moral importance: the 
fact that something will produce pleasure is itself a source of reasons, even absent any other facts 
about it. Something that has derivative moral importance is a source of reasons only 
conditionally on its also having something of fundamental moral importance. A given practice 
will have derivative moral importance for ideal utilitarians if and only if it is likely to produce 
pleasure. Partial relationships, for instance, would have at most only derivative moral importance 
for such utilitarians.   111
 I adapt this formulation from Wellman, who notes that reductionists and non-reductionists (whom he 110
terms associativists) can “agree about the content and stringency of any given obligation among 
intimates” (2000: 540). Agreement at the first level of ethical thinking does not preclude debate at the 
second level about the ground or normative explanation of these obligations or, more broadly, reasons.
 As a matter of terminology, I understand the claim that relationships have intrinsic value to entail non-111
reductionism, and reductionism to entail the denial of the claim that relationships have intrinsic value. 
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 Inspired by my discussion in Chapter 3, §2.1, we might pursue this latter position and 
observe that if relationships have value only because of the goods they instantiate or facilitate, 
then reductionism about relationships is true. This can be motivated by the thought that many 
relationships are abusive, destructive, or dysfunctional. Some marriages are sites of radical 
inequality at which one spouse benefits greatly to the detriment of the other. Some friendships 
are occasions for vice in which both friends enable each other’s bad habits. And some familial 
relationships produce nothing but anxiety and ill will for all parties involved. We might well 
judge that these relationships are not, on the whole, valuable. This is not to say that they could 
not contain valuable elements: an abusive marriage may result in happy, well-adjusted children; a 
vicious friendship may provide companionship and joy; and a dysfunctional sibling relationship 
may yield opportunities to deploy one’s devastating wit. But on the whole, the burdens of the 
relationship would outweigh the benefits, leading us to render an overall negative value 
judgment.   
 At this point, however, the defender of non-reductionism about relationships could object 
that these examples have no force, because they are not examples of the kind of relationship that 
has fundamental moral importance. Raz, for instance, who holds that relationships have intrinsic 
value, claims that there is a strong normative component to friendship, such that a relationship 
between people who simply enjoy amusing themselves in each other’s company is not actually a 
friendship (1989: 19). Having a friendship, according to Raz, involves seeing yourself as having 
duties to your friend. This just pushes the problem back a step, however, because some such 
duties will not be valuable. There is honor (and duty) even among thieves, and the overly servile 
wife is servile in part just because she sees herself as having extensive duties to her husband. The 
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mere existence of a duty does not establish that the duty is valuable.  So it seems that 112
reductionism is true.  
 Consider, then, an objection to reductionism, intended to show that relationships have 
value over and above the goods they facilitate. Imagine a world in which there are no 
relationships as we understand them. People do not regularly give preference to certain friends 
over others. There are no long-term romantic couples. Children are raised in common and not by 
the same guardians. Nonetheless, all the goods that relationships facilitate in our world are 
enjoyed in this imagined world. It’s just that the goods are dispersed randomly and not in the 
patterns that partially constitute relationships. I help someone who is carrying her groceries, and 
then later a stranger helps me carry my groceries. I give money to a child for her education, and 
then later a different child calls me up to ask about my day. Call this, following Philip Kitcher, 
the “Secret Santa” world, or the “Random World” (2011: 200). It seems that the reductionist is 
committed to denying that there is any loss of value in the Secret Santa world. But, intuitively, 
there is something wrong with such a world.  
 The reductionist, however, need not deny that there is a loss of value in that world, 
because she can deny that the thought experiment is plausible: if goods really were distributed at 
random, then the Secret Santa world would not promote the same goods as our world does, 
because it would exclude special goods. If I am in need of comfort, a stranger may be able to 
listen to my woes, but she will not understand me as well as a friend or family member might. At 
this point, then, the defender of non-reductionism about relationships can try to strengthen the 
 Friedman makes a similar point against the claim that all relationships have intrinsic value, saying that 112
it “fails to take account of the differing moral value of different personal relationships, and it mistakenly 
presumes that whatever sustains any personal relationship is a moral good without qualification” (1993: 
42). 
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objection. Imagine, per impossibile, that all the special goods are facilitated. When you need a 
shoulder to cry on, your friend will (at random) appear. When you want to reminisce about your 
childhood, someone who knew you back then will (at random) be there to talk with you. Exactly 
the right person will be there at exactly the right moment. But then, I claim, the world will begin 
to look a lot more like ours. In order for these special goods to be facilitated, then normative 
expectations will need to develop. If I am to enjoy the good of feeling secure in our relationship, 
you would need to be available to me at times and places we previously agreed upon, such that I 
could reasonably criticize you if you failed to show up. Even if we can imagine, as Kitcher does, 
that the Random World were possible through massive amounts of false belief—“that the guilty 
suffer because of the suffering they inflicted and that the generous rejoice because those they 
help express gratitude” (2011: 200)—we can see that it has no bearing on the actual world, in 
which such a scheme could not be set up. In our actual, non-ideal world, we can safely conclude 
that reductionism is true.  
 This thought experiment illustrates two points. First, it is impossible to evaluate a 
relationship apart from the goods and ills it brings about. We are simply not able to assess 
whether a token relationship has fundamental moral importance independently of knowing which 
features of that relationship make it good or bad. Thus even if we had a good, non-stipulative 
answer to the question of whether the relationship itself is valuable, we would not be able to 
assess how it gives us reasons. The Secret Santa world is therefore additional evidence for 
passing the explanatory buck from relationship types to relationship goods. Second, facilitating 
relationship goods depends on our social practices. As my definition insists, partiality requires a 
system of rules that define roles, expectations, penalties, and so forth. A practice of partiality, as 
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opposed to one-off acts of charity, vulnerability, and suffering, demands stable, repeated patterns 
of action that sufficient others take themselves to have reason to conform to. Reflection on the 
Random World thus provides one final consideration in favor of appealing to practices as the 
primary target of ethical theorizing about partiality. 
2. Conclusion: Non-Ideal Practice Utilitarianism as a Constructive Theory 
 The Reconstructive view of the role of theory in everyday deliberation, as I characterized 
it at the beginning of this project, is committed to three major claims: (1) we should be able to 
use ethical theories to derive what to do in any conceivable situation; (2) we should have an 
overriding commitment to following our favored theory; and (3) because of this commitment, 
our everyday modes of deliberation are justified only to the extent that and because they are 
sanctioned by the theory. Constructive views deny each of these three claims. Here I explain how 
NPU is a Constructive theory by showing, first, how it denies the three Reconstructive claims, 
and, second, how it responds to the instability objections from Chapter 1.  
 As a reminder: NPU is non-ideal, in claiming that in order to be justified, a practice needs 
only to facilitate more good for those affected than the viable alternatives; it is teleological, in 
appealing to the happiness of those affected by a practice to rule out some practices and rule in 
others; and it is practice-based, in evaluating actions not directly in terms of happiness-
promotion but indirectly in terms of compliance with happiness-promoting practices. As with 
other indirectly utilitarian accounts, the criterion of right action that emerges flows from the 
rightness of the broader evaluand, in this case a practice:  
!174
      Criterion of right action: An act is morally right if it is permitted by a justified  
      actual practice in one’s society, where a justified practice is one that better 
      promotes the happiness of those affected by it than the viable alternatives do. 
 (1) It is clear that NPU cannot be used to derive what to do in every conceivable 
situation, because it insists that the ethical status of actions depends in part on practices. All 
ethical theorists agree that some empirical facts are necessary in determining what to do—the 
standard utilitarian who holds that an action is right just when it brings about the best outcome, 
or the virtue ethicist who holds that an action is right just when it would be performed by the 
fully virtuous agent, would both need facts about the outcome space or circumstances in question
—but once these facts are taken as inputs, these Reconstructive theories themselves label which 
actions are, say, supererogatory or obligatory. But on my Constructive view, these other deontic 
categories are not derived from the theory; rather, our practices determine the deontic status of 
most actions, and NPU is used only to check whether a practice is itself justified. Unlike the 
maximizing act-utilitarian theory that would label as wrong giving away, say, only 20% of one’s 
income to effective charities (as opposed to some larger percentage), NPU would, in my current 
social context at least, label that action as supererogatory—though the status of that action might 
well change over time as our practices do. Thus, most of our ethical deliberation takes place 
within and is structured by our practices—the judge who is deciding how to punish, or the 
partisan newspaper editor who is deciding how to respond to an offensive letter—rather than in 
terms of NPU itself.  
 (2) In fact, there would be a further obstacle to using NPU to derive the single right 
action, which is the same reason that an agent’s commitment to NPU is not overriding: there are 
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(at least) two independent ways to comply with it.  Standard act-utilitarians are motivated by an 113
overriding commitment to promote the good, and rule-consequentialism can be motivated by an 
overriding commitment to do what is impartially defensible (Hooker 2000: 101). But on NPU, 
we can either do what is permitted by our practices, or we can seek to reform them. Neither 
commitment is automatically overriding, since on the Constructive view, we are independently 
committed to our practices, and not only on the grounds that they are justified in the light of 
theory. NPU isolates one component of those practices—the fact that they can promote the good
—and uses that as a standard for revision. But, following Mill, the content of morality cannot be 
derived from the good. As John Skorupski puts it, glossing a Millian view,  
      the utilitarian theory of the good is the appropriate ‘controller’, in his word, of all our 
      principles, ideals and ends. It is not their generator. They are not derived from it, or  
      reducible to it, even though they are defeasible by it. They have relative autonomy.  
      According to this utilitarian view, we have many normative principles governing  
      action that are justified in their own terms, without derivation from the final good;  
      but they must give way if they turn out to be systematically [i.e., as a system or  
      practice] incompatible with that final good (2006: 37). 
 (3) It is the fact that the good is the controller of our practices, and not their generator, 
that explains in turn why, finally, NPU denies that everyday deliberation is justified only to the 
extent that and because it is sanctioned by the theory. On Reconstructive two-level views, the 
 There is a question, probably more difficult than I would like to admit here, about what to do when 113
practices conflict. To adapt the simple answer typically given by actual rule-utilitarians, agents are 
obliged to conform to all the rules that flow from the legitimate practices to which they belong, where 
rules are to some degree weighted by the practices themselves (R. Miller 2009: 22-3). Though I think this 
answer will address many conflicts between practices, I doubt it will address all. But perhaps this 
implication is a feature of the account, which stresses the benefits, for deliberation, of not being able to 
derive what to do in any conceivable circumstance.  
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only value of everyday deliberation is instrumental, as an implementation of the ideal criterion of 
rightness, and thus the only value everyday deliberation can have is derived from the theory. But 
on the Constructive view, everyday deliberation, and our practices more generally, have value in 
their own right. Certainly they can have instrumental value, and NPU exploits this fact in 
guiding efforts to reform—how could our practices of blame, for instance, better satisfy our 
general aim of preventing future wrongdoing?—but they do not have only instrumental value. 
 At the end of my lengthy Chapter 1, I only mentioned, with reference to Strawson, why 
the Constructive view of the role of theory is not in general subject to the various instability 
objections lodged against Reconstructive views as a whole and Hare’s two-level utilitarianism in 
particular. Here I spell out why NPU can avoid those objections as well.  
 Clearly bifurcation, in Bernard Williams’ sense, is no concern, because there is no “willed 
forgetting” (1985: 109) in having the two or more commitments that accompany NPU. An agent 
does not understand her dispositions in purely instrumental terms, but “sees the world from the 
point of view of [her] character” (1985: 108), whether she is immersed in the norms of her local 
practices or reflecting on how best to reform them. Although I conceded that even a 
Reconstructive theorist such as Hare can perhaps overcome the bifurcation objection, the other 
two instability charges were more serious.  
 The alienation objection holds that there is normative failure in being made to feel 
alienated from one’s psychological makeup simply on account of coming to adopt an ethical 
theory, as Harean utilitarianism entails. The Constructive theorist, by contrast, is able to insist 
that there is no reason to regret one’s intuitive dispositions as a class. Again, the independent 
commitment to one’s practices that NPU endorses does a lot of work here, since while it is 
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perfectly possible to regret individual instances of one’s dispositions—in considering one’s 
blaming practices, one might strive to become less judgmental, for instance—and while adopting 
a conception of how to reform one’s practices in the light of the second-level utilitarian standard 
might give one reason to regret larger swathes of one’s dispositions, there is arguably no viable 
alternative to our current practices on which regretting one’s intuitive dispositions as a class 
would become appropriate.  
 Neither version of the inconsistency objection can be made to stick, either. First, NPU 
denies that the reasons on which we act when immersed in our practices are illusory, inaccurate, 
or in global error, as has been charged against indirect act-utilitarianism in particular. Second, 
NPU does not claim that we selected our current dispositions or practices, or that these are the 
optimal dispositions or practices to have. That falls directly out of the non-ideal component of 
the theory.  
 I am sure that there are further objections one could raise to NPU in its own right, and in 
future work I hope to draw out its implications in more detail. But the question with which I 
began this project was how a commitment to an ethical theory could guide an agent’s ordinary 
life. Though I said from the outset that I would not have a full answer to that question, it has 
been my contention throughout that we should assess ethical theories not only in terms of their 
epistemic merits, but in terms of the effects that adopting them would have on our deliberative 
lives. Pursuing that line, I therefore argued that not only the role of theory, but its form as well, 
should be constrained by facts about our limited deliberative capacities. Going non-ideal can put 
to rest many of the older objections that critics raised to ethical theorizing.  
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 Though different value-orientations will produce different flavors of non-ideal theories, I 
motivated one such utilitarian-style theory, in the first instance in order to illustrate in more detail 
my primary claim about the relationship of theory to deliberation. But I also showed that NPU 
has substantive and attractive normative implications for our practices of regret, toleration, 
punishment, and, most of all, partiality, which gives us independent reason to consider it further. 
Understanding ethics as a matter of improving our practices in piecemeal fashion, guided not by 
a distant end-state ideal but by our diagnoses of current problems and attendant hypotheses about 
viable solutions, produces not only a healthier picture of ethical theorizing, but hopefully a better 
ethics as well.  
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